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preface v 
I first studied the WarscHv Treaty Organiso.tion in an honours 
option on "International Communism" at Dundee University, as part 
of my degree course in Political Science. Full acknowledgement 
must go to my t-.hen tutor, Alex Reid, for allowing me to pursue 
this topic, and generously aiding and encouraging my interest in 
it. 
In that early reading I was fascinated that open academic 
sources presented such a different view of the WTO from that seen 
in the West's media. In particular they did not adopt the image 
of a 'war-fighting. war-winning' military machine used by the 
West's political leaders. In my resolve to develop my 
unden;t.anding of t.he subj ect beyond the undergraduate level, I 
was happily awarded a Social Science Research Council (nov} 
Economic and Social Research Council), grant to take to the 
Insti tute of Soviet and East European StudiEls (ISEES), Glase;m'l 
Univen:;ity, v1hich had offered me the expertise and resources to 
carry out advanced research into this topic. Under the guidance 
and supervision of Professor William V. Wallace, the Director of 
ISEES, and. Dr Stephen L. White, this thesis has taken shape. 
While my conclusions do not necessarily show the opposite of 
tbe image of the WTO commonly seen in the We!3t, my re~;earches do 
show a poll tical-military all iance that is very different from 
such an image. While I cannot claim to have produced tbe 
ultima.te handbook on the WTO, this thesis does I hope throw light 
preIo.C8 vi 
on many of the things that seemed so puzzling and contradictory 
to me when I first looked at the Organisation, and I trust that 
it offers insight into practical aspects of the body. I would 
like to thinl{ that I have provided at least some of th(:ol 
groundwork for the furt.her st.udy and assessment of the WTO. 
In the course of my st.udies, I was steadily clravm t.o the 
conclusion that the political rather than the military aspects of 
the WTO Vlere the more important, and tho more fruitful for 
research. This is not to deny substance to the military factors. 
Rather I have been forced into dividing between what I havG found 
to take place vIi thin the formal structure of the WTO, and what 
taltes place in the name of the WTO. Of the two, the political 
and the mil i tary, it is my analysis that t.he former takes 
precedence over the latter in t.he formal context of the 
Organisation. Where t.here are formal mil i tary ties, I have 
indicated their scope and significance. My conclusion is that 
the actual mi~tary relationships "lithin the formal alliance an~ 
extremely limited. The content of this thesis reflects such an 
analysis.' 
My policy throughout has been to base my Hlsearch on open 
original sources, not just from the Soviet Union but where 
possi ble from the non-Soviet members of the all iance. '''hile I 
have consul ted Western sources, they have played a peripheral 
part in my analysis. The aim has been to explain the WTO in the 
vmrds of its mm documents; I have generally quot.ed Western 
sources only to add substance to my mm conclusions based on the 
origi nal sources. I have adopted the term "Central Europe" to 
denote the European all ies of the USSR; my contacts in those 
countries confirmed a preference for this description, consider-
preface vii 
ing "East" Europe to refer geographically to the Soviet Union's 
European territories. 
During the period of my research the opportun.i ty arose for 
me to visit the Hungarian. People's Republic, on a British Council 
scholarship. I viaS thus able to consult several published 
sources not available in Britain, but above all had the 
opportuni ty to taB;: at length with a variety of academics from 
several disciplines (and also not just from Hungary). This vlill 
explain why Hungarian sources lllay be seen to figure 
disproportionately in the thesis. I have also greatly benefitted 
from conversations vli th academics frolll JIlany of the 'Ilarsavl Treaty 
states Vlho have visited Glasgov-l during my research. Whi Ie often 
providing me vdth useful unpublished information, these people, 
together vii th research in Hu ngary, served to conf i rm many of the 
conclusions I had reached from my reading of the publiE;hed 
materials. In the thesis text, when I have quoted these sources, 
I have marked them with a superscript N (viz: X"'). I have also 
used this method to !,;how non-attributablE) remarks gained from 
si tuations simi lar to those governed by "Chatham House rules". 
All responsibility for the interpretation I have placed on these 
sources, both published and confidential, remains with me. 
Apart from the continuous help and support I received from 
Profe::;sor Wallace and Dr Whi to as my 
acknowledge the further academic help 
supervisors, I must 
and encouragement I 
recei ved from the rest of the staff at ISEES. The S8cr8taries 
Vlere al~m of immense support. in the supply of sundry assistance 
and humour. External to the Institute, Gerard Holden, Boris 
prefac8 viii 
Neis:c;ner, Do.n Nelson, o.nd Condoleezzo. Rice o.lso helped my 
reseo.rch. 
In persono.l terms, I must not forget the many other student::;; 
at the Institute and beyond. Amongst them, Richard Berry was of 
inestimable support, both in Glasgm,r and Budapest. Peter 
Anghelide:3 also made an appearance in Glasgm,r, only this time he 
did not have to lend me his typewriter. A special mention must 
go to Suso.n Lo.mb, who entered my life early in the proceedings 
and has not yet left it. 
Endnote 
1) For tbose interested, there has been 0. weo.l th of useful 
milito.ry o.no.lysis of the Soviet Union and its o.llies. Recent 
works by Johnson et 0.1, Jones, [Dan] Nelson, and Rakowska-
Harmstone et 0.1, are listed in the Bibliography. 
abstract ix 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes the political-military alliance of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation <VITO) from its origins and founding in 
1955 to its 30th Anniversary in 1985, and after. In showing how 
the WTO has developed and operated, its practical application in 
the fields of joint foreign policy and military affairs are 
described and discussed. In the light of this analysis, the WTO 
is placed in its context within the socialist community. 
The origins of the WTO are shown to be part of a general 
trend towards closer co--operation between the European sociali(3t 
countries. The states were formally brought together as a public 
response to the London and Paris Agreements of 1954, vlhich 
officially rearmed the Federal Republic of Germany and 
incorporated it into the Western mil i tary all iance system and 
NATO. 
The structural development is described and analysed, 
showing the practice of the offica1 structure largely to be a 
response to existing ad hoc arrangements. The limitations placed 
on the Organisation's political and military roles are explained, 
detailing how the WTO is formally restrained from operating as PAn 
efficient or effective multilateral co-ordinating body. Where it 
dmJs operate, the WTO is shmlTl principally to be a pol i tical 
organisation. 
The docum8ntary history of the WTO is analysed, to show how 
the structure works in practice. Particular stress is placed on 
abstract x 
the role of the WTG in carrying out its claimed purpm:;e of co-
ordinating the foreign policies of the members. The conclusion 
is suggested that the WTG at most co-ordinates the 'basic 
principles' rather than the diplomatic practice of its members' 
foreign policies. The participating states are shown not to be 
significantly bound by the WTG in the practice of their national 
foreign policies, though they are bound by bilateral factors 
external to the structure of the Warsaw Treaty. 
The 30 11-, Anni'Jersary of the signing of the WTG, potentially 
a historic landmark, is shown to have passed \,li th very 1 i ttle 
pomp or celebration. The treatment of the Anniversary in the 
Soviet Union and amongst its allies \'laS low-J{8Y. The issues 
covered by the Anniversary speeches and articles are described, 
and are analy!3ed both for Itthat they said about the WTG, its 
origins, practice, and significance, and for what was not said or 
done. 
Changes are analysed that have taken place under the new 
Soviet leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, whose accession occurred 
just before the signing of the Protocol extending the Treaty. The 
30l.·h Anniversary soon followed. Structural changes wen3 hinted 
a.t but never took place, though the documents issued by the 
exi:3ting bodie!3 have become much more open in their description 
of the discussions and disagreements that tODk plac8. These 
events, COinciding with other changes in Soviet internal and 
external policies, were shmm to be part of a.n apparGnt attempt 
by the Soviet authorities to consult and co-ordinate its actions 
with its allies, or at least to appear to be doing so. It is 
also shown where past practices, such as unilateral Soviet moves 
on foreign policy and arms control, have not changed, 
abstract xi 
The conclusion is that the real significance of the IIlTO is 
ideological, serving to give the impression of unity. The vlarsaVl 
Treaty Organisation is just another means in the many forms of 
all iance i ndicati ng, and U~38d to justify, the "socialist 
community". Other forms of all iance, both po1i tical and 
military, take precedence over the WTO in all its functionE .. 
These are principally bilateral, rather than multilateral, forms, 
and in many caS8S they are party, rather than state, forms of 
alliance. 
Research into the WTO has not been fruitless, but has proved 
to be the study of issues other than the foreign or defence 
policies of a multilateral alliance. 
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chapter 1 1 
THE EARLY POSTWAR PERIOD 
Introduction 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to discuss the postwar 
years and the origins of the Cold War. Such aspects of the 
political and military division of Europe are amply covered 
elsewhere in the academic literature of both East and West (see 
the Preface). However, in their discussion of the origins of the 
, 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation 01To) , Soviet historians do briefly 
mention events prior to 1954-1955. As an introduction to the 
analysis of the WTO proper, this chapter will outline how the 
Soviet literature introduces the topic of this thesis. 
By comparison, the Central European literature does not 
rea]y cover this period; the Czechoslovak writer Josef Urban, for 
example, goes straight into discussing the threat of Ger~n 
militarism as the origin of the WTO. The Central European 
analysis of the 30 t .h Anniversary (see Chapter 5), unlike the 
Soviet analysis, again ignores any events prior to the perceived 
growing threat of anti-socialist imperialism and the need for the 
peace-loving states of Europe to defend their revolutionary gains 
with a political-military defensive B.lliance. 
It is probable that the need to justify the roots cf a 
mul tilateral socialist alliance is felt much more keenly by the 
USSR, if only for ideological and propaganda purposes, for the 
self-styled kudos of the first socialist state. Despi tc. the 
original claim that the WTO was to be open for accession by any 
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state, regardless of social or political system (cf the Treaty 
Text, Appendix 1; and Chapter~2), as this chapter shows, the USSR 
/ 
has' since argued that the WTO was, rather, a natural progression 
for its members, and its members alone - in other words an 
example of the scientific materialist conception of historYI The 
assessment ( of historians, both East and West, is thus avoided, 
/ 
in favour of this more.political analysis 
The Roots Prior to 1945 
Grechko argues that "The comradeship-in-arms among [the] 
armies of the fraternal countries dates back to the first years 
of Soviet power.... [when] a quarter of a million fighter-
-internationalists" helped the Red Army against foreign inter-
vention and the Civil War (1977, p.326). In a book marking the 
30 t .h Anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, Viktor Shkarovskii goes 
even further back in time, and beg&~5 by claiming that "The basis IN\<; 
i 
of a military-political defensive co-operation of the fraternal 
countries of socialism was laid down by the Great October 
Socialist Revolution." (p.10a) 
Both these writers include lists of nationalities that 
helped in the battles of the young socialist state, but they are 
not quite the same. They both mention Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, 
Czechs, Slovaks, and Bulgarians (all, bar the Serbs, now active 
in the WTo), but then Grechko adds Finns, Chinese, Koreans, "and 
representati ves of many other peoples" whi Ie Shkarovski i adds 
Croats, Romanians "and representatives of other peoples" (of whom 
only the Romanians are active in the WTO.) (Grechko, 1977, 
p.326j Shkarovskii, p.10a). 
Such libcs of course stress the contribution of the USSR's 
allies, but the inclusion of even other nationalities is pre-
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sumably to show a 'truly' international support for socialism. 
Why, though, should Grechko,/ one-time Commander-in-Chief ,- omi t to 
mention the Romanians? Was ita subtle snub at a time when the 
Romanians were asserting a measure of military independence? But 
in 1976 the Romanians had hosted a session of the VITO's Political 
Consultative Committee (PCC) that had significantly extended the 
formal political mechanisms of the Organisation <cf Chapter 3). 
The reasoning for Grechko's action must remain obscure. 
As the next stage of co-operation, Grechko goes on to 
discuss the aid sent by bath the USSR and the Soviet Party to 
revolutions that occured in the inter-war years, citing Hungary, 
Mongolia, China, and the Spanish Civil War, as examples of inter-
national solidarity. As a much more fundamental example of 
military co-operation, Soviet writers excel in their treatment of 
the years of the Second World War, and the Soviet Union's role in 
this. For example: 
In the fire of battle against fascism took shape and was 
baptised the military-political co-operation of the Soviet 
people with the patriotic forces or a number of European 
countries. Together with the Soviet Army.... . (Shkarovskii, p. lOb) 
Shkarovskii lists "Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, patriots 
of Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Hungary" as reci~nts of Soviet 
equipment and stores, and for whom "The Soviet Union rendered 
great help" in the creation of their armies (p. lOb). Thus 
Shtemenko was able to claim that the WTO was "A brotherhood, born 
I 
in battle" (1976',; (?16g) 
1" i I 
The significance of these earliest years is explained by 
Shkarovskii, when he writes nbput the defence of "the gains of the 
Great October" and its role in the development of the world 
revolutionary processes (p.llb). He also states that 
The traditions of the armed friendship, born in the lears 
of the Second World War, serve today the affairs 0 the 
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training of the soldiers of the states-participants of the 
Warsaw Treaty. (ibid) 
/ 
The End of the Wartime Alliance 
The participation of the Soviet Union as an equal partner ;/D. 
the world arena during what it calls the Great Patriotic War 
seems to have been incredibly important to the Soviet leaders. 
According to one history of the WTO, this great wartime alliance 
could and should ''lave been carried on into the postwar period, in 
order 
to channel the course of historical development towards peace 
and co-operation, and [to ensure] that mankind's centuries-
old dream of eliminating wars and military conflicts from 
inter-state relations and from the life of society would 
finally come true. (The Warsaw .... , 1984, p.7) 
On this basis the Potsdam decisions were to be seen as the 
/ grounds for the continued co-operation of the "states in the 
( 
anti -Hi tIer coalition", in order that Germany would never again 
threaten the peace of Europe (ibid, pp.7-8). 
Such a blissful future did not occur because, as is 
officially argued in Warsaw Treaty historiography, the 
imperialists did not want such a world, and so, led by the- US 
Joint Staff, they created "aggressive military blocs" in Europe 
and around the world (Bakhov, 1971, p.3) and began to work out 
plans "for a preventive war against the USSR" (Zhilin, 1984, 
p. 15). Rather than construct peace, the US military leadership 
sought to use the West's economic and human resources for its own 
aggressive aims (Bakhov, 1971, p.3). This resulted in the 
"objective necessity for the armed defence of the achievements of 
the socialist revol •. ftions" in Europe (Zhilin, 1984, p. 14). 
/ 
The Creation of "armies of a new type" A 
Wi th the establishment of "people's democracies" in much of 
the Soviet zone of liberated Europe came the problem of the 
,,, 
..::> 
\/ 
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defence of those states. As the volume Marxism-Leninism on War 
and Army puts it, the new socialist armies were different from 
"the armies of exploiter stat8s" because of the "class-historical 
laws" of "historical purpose and moral make-up" that were behind 
them. This meant that 
in order to consolidate their power, to uphold their 
revolutionary gains and to defend the socialist country, the 
working class [had] to create powerful armed forces 
([Progress], 1972, p.167) 
In other words, maintaining defences against an "imperialist 
threat"defends "the achievements of building socialism and 
communism, the freedom and independence of the socialist 
countries .... " (ibid, p. 168) . Such developments in the armed 
forces, as with the establishment of a socialist state as such, 
are considered to be an expression of the general lav/s of the 
transition from capitalism to socialism (ibid, p.169). The 
establishment of armed forces as "an instrument of the socialist. 
state of the whole people" thus results in an army of a new type, 
one determined by social and historical laws, guided by a 
Marxist-Leninist ideology (ibid). 
Such "deep social transformations" of the postwar years led, 
according to Grechko, to the 1945-55 period being seen as the 
"first stage" of development 1 where "the countries v/hich embarked 
on the socialist road almost completely solved the problem of 
forming national armies." (1977, p.330) The problem had been 
that of forming "armies of the dictatorship of the proletariat" 
(i bid, p. 331) - in other words, where they supported the ne,w 
socio-political regimes, and guaranteed defence against a hostile 
imperial ism. In practical terms, a multilateral alliance could 
not have been possible in this "first stage" because, presumably, 
the armies did ~ support the new regimes, and the confrontation 
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with hostile imperialism was· being maintained by the Soviet armed 
forces or by the "groups of S5:lViet military advisers" who arrived 
/ 
"On the request of the governments of the fraternal countries and 
their armies" (Yakubovskii, 1975-p, p. 63). 
The main mechanism for securing the support of the armed 
forces for the new regimes seems to have been the development of 
officer corps loyal to the new political leaderships, generally 
by encouraging membership of the ruling parties and the promotion 
of pOiiically-reliable officers; the quotation of figures showing 
I-
the growth of this party membership features prominently in 
several of the writings on the WTO (eg: Yakubovskii, 1975-~ pp.60-
-62; Shtemenko, 1976; Kulikov, 1980~ p.53). Kulikov, citing 
problems in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in the eradication of 
"anti-national elements" from the armed forces, conclud7~ that 
"To the end of the 1940s the communist and workers' parties 
completely secured for [themselves] the leadership of the armed 
I 
forces." (ibid) Yakubovskii explairel/ that a maj or element in 
achieving this, and overcoming the "anti-popular conspiracies", 
was the activity of a party-political apparatus in the new 
armies, using the experience of the political work in the Soviet 
Army <1975-p, p. 60). Thus in his discussion of «the construction 
of the armies of the European countries of the socialist 
communi ty», Zhilin begililS by claiming that 
/ 
The creation and stren1}thening of the armies of a new, 
socialist type is one o~ the important results of the 
activities of the Marxist-Leninist parties, and of the people 
of the socialist countries. (1984, p.3) 
The aim of this party work was, according to Kulikov, to help 
ensure the "democratisation of the army, and the conversion of it 
into the reliable instrument of the defence of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat." where old customs had to be broken, the army 
'~~ 
,,:< 
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and the people 'drawn together', the 'mood' of the officers and 
men brought round to the sOsi-alist revolution, and the communist 
staff [ komsostava] , puriJied' of enemies and fellow-
travellers (Kulikov, 198~hJP.53) 
Grechko explains/ what the new military "type" amounted to: 
the fundamental principles of their construction were the 
same: community of political aims and tasks, Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, and .... tile interests of the people and the army, 
and tlie principles of organising political education and 
training of the armed forces. (1977, p.330) 
The Soviet Union was, of course, credited with giving much 
material and training aid to this process (ibid, p.331). Kulikov 
explains I that it was on "the request of the governments of the 
( 
fraternal countries" that Soviet military advisers "arrived" in 
their armies, giving them weapons experience, helping them to 
master new military techniques, reorganise their military 
structures and institute military and political training (1980-h) 
i 
p. 56). He conclud~ that 
The effectiveness of the Soviet military aid above all 
brought about the firm decisions· of the leaderships of the 
fraternal communist and workers' parties to construct their 
armed forces according to the experience of the Soviet Army. (ibid) 
This would suggest that the postwar Soviet leadership was 
, 
I 
satisfied wi th de~oping a string of national armies in Central 
/'-'''') 
Europe, that it either did not want or could not attain a 
collecti ve socialist army. Were the Soviet advisers sufficient 
to ensure whatever military might would prove necessary? Or did 
the Soviet leadership consider that national armies could better 
rally each nation to its new political leaderships? In the 
event. this process turned out to be the lead-in to the system of 
the WTO's Joint Armed Forces, where national contingents remain 
under national command (see Chapter 3). 
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The Conclusion of the Network of Bilateral Treaties 
This "first stage" of lllili tary construction was Q.lso the 
/' 
period "'/hen the network of bilateral treaties was established, 
the only formal system of military alliance of the Stalin era. 
(For a fuller discussion of the bilateral treaties, see Appendix 
5. ) Bakhov explains that these treaties were signed by the 
-
socialist countries "in the interest of guaranteeing their 
securi ty" (1971, p. 4), though security mainly against "the 
rebirth of German imperialism and the repetition of German .... 
aggression" (pp.4-5). Bakhov compares them to the wartime Anglo-
Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties (p.4) (which were 
ceremoniously revoked by the Soviet Union in 1955, after the 
ratification of the Paris Agreements of 1954 - see Chapter 2 on 
the specific origins of the WTO). 
However, writing only four years later, Yakubovskii, in a 
book originating from the WTO Joint Staff (according to the 
publishing and production notes), argued that the role of the 
bilateral treaties was for security of the socialist community in 
the face of the aggression of international imperialism (197~) 
p. 62). 
In practice, the bilateral treaties became the 
justification, if not the mechanism, for measures of mutual 
military assistance, and consultation and co-ordination of 
defensi ve capacities -- acti vi ties which were later developed and 
co-ordinated in relation to the Warsaw Treaty (cf Marxism-
Leninism .... , 1972, p.171). This seems to confirm a general 
progression, a stage-by-stage development, of the Soviet Union 
binding its allies into a political-military alliance. 
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The Politics of the Postwar Years 
In popular Western political and media presentat~on, the 
postwar years and the establi~hment of "people's democracies" 
resulted in a uniform political, economic, and social system in a 
Central Europe in thrall to the Soviet Union and above all to the 
personality of Stalin. Views expressed by Central European 
academicsN recently, and with hindsight, totally rejected such an 
interpretati';Jn. These views should be treated with circum-
spection, but they seem to confirm that the 1945-55 period was 
one of bilateral links, and not just in military terms, between 
indi vidual states and the Soviet Union. They argue that there 
was in fact a marked differentiation in the Soviet Union's links 
wi th each state. The main factors determining these relations 
were whether or not the Central European state was a 'winner' or 
'loser' in the war, the strengths of the national ruling party 
and of popular feelings or antipathy to the Soviet Union, the 
existing industrial level, and the intensity of Soviet 
occupation. Cultural, political, geographic, and inter~al 
factors all had an influence. 
uniform, 
The Soviet Union itself must not be seen as monolithic or 
since factionalism is to be founJ;!1f1 all aspects of its 
'i 
political system2 • In particular, for the postwar period, the 
death of Stalin can be seen as a major influence on the foreign 
policy of the region. The internal Soviet debates covered not 
just attitudes towards Central Europe, and Germany in particular', 
but also economic factors and their influence on the conventional 
or' . nuclear military balance. It is still being suggested by 
Central EuropeansN that the internal Soviet factionalism after 
Stalin's death even included debate over whether or not to reduce 
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the USSR's hold over Central Europe perhaps even to the extent 
that it \'lOuld be made effe,cti vely neutral in exchang!3 for a 
/ 
reduction of US influence in E~rope and a general rapprochement 
all round. 
The move to a broader and multilateral alliance through the 
Warsaw Treaty is not, however, to be seen as such a marked change 
or innovation, even wi thin the post-Stalin context. There had 
been a move to\,/ards greater military cohesion from 1951N, as a 
response to the superpower confrontation in Korea, with increases 
in military spending and construction intended as part of a 
greater integration in foreign policy. By the early 1950s, the 
Soviet Union had realised that it had t lost t the Cold War; it 
would lose its traditional predominance in the European 
conventional military balance, and there would be an inexorable 
growth of the ~ern part of EuropeN. 3 
According to this analysis, the creation of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation did not in itself change anything in military 
terms, though in East-West political terms it could have be&n a 
symbol of the new policy, an image to raise the conventional 
confrontation, At the moment of founding, the WTO was just "a 
fiction"N, It could have been seen as no more than another 
aspect of the internal Soviet factionalism, dependent more on 
Khrushchev's line of the moment than its inherent political or 
military utility, It was, at this levol, a factor of a super-
t E l 't' B power, no uropean, po 1 lCS, 
In superpower terms, official Soviet writers on the WTO 
generally chart public actions by western leaders, such as 
Winston Churchill's "iron curtain" speech, the Marshall Plan, the 
creation of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the establishment 
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of NATO and the accession to it of Greece and Turkey, and the 
creation of the AUZUS (' Australia, Uew Zealand, US') alliance, 
the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, and the Baghdad Pact. 
(see, eg, Bakhov, 1971, p.3j Grechko, 1977, -p~332i Zhilin, 1984, 
p.15.) Having faced this threat with no more than the bilateral 
treaties and the Stalinist military hegemony over Central Europe, 
it took, in the early post-Stalin period, the single continuing 
issue of the division of Germany and the new moves towards the 
rearmament of West Germany, to produce the formal establishment 
of the Warsaw Treaty. 
Endnotes 
1) The "second stage" beginning with the formation of the WTO. 
2) See, for example, Timothy Dunmore I s The Stalinist Command 
Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy, 1945-
1953 (London: Macmillan, 1980) 
3) Such developments could also, perhaps, be seen in the 
progress of the Council For Mutual Economic Assistance. 
Ii) FO:l- '-f( Tl,-'r 1il:--:~~::t,~'r ).: af-;( ,[Jl\in f. l)(~'C-: Lfl' , 
'\rl, ~i!Ll ,Sry;.Jc:qL P01'/(-:T ncJ t..; 
'1 (';?'O) 
\),) nr mCI-C' t-J Oll tl:~~! ntr-,j "C'P;'::U po'-
r~:.-~lD <1~)?J) ,.L] -- 1 ;; i cl<:·.';oj"\ 
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THE SPECIFIC ORIGINS OF 
THE WARSAW TREATY 
Introduction 
The Warsaw Treaty explicity states that it was formed on 14 
May 1955 as a response to the so-called 'Paris Agreements' of 
nine Western powers <of 23 October 1954) which, among other 
things, remili tarised West Germany and integrated it into NATO, 
through the formation of the Western European Union (WEU - as a 
successor to the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 1948) military 
alliance. 
In the Preamble to the Warsaw Treaty, after stating that 
their ultimate aim is 
to create a system of collective security in Europe based on 
the participation of all European states, irrespective of 
their social and political structure, whereby the said states 
may be enabled to combine their efforts in the interests.of 
ensuring peace in Europe .... (see Appendix 1) 
the seven signatory states claimed that the Paris Agreements had 
created a "new situation". Describing themselves as "the 
peaceable European states", they claimed that such moves in the 
West warranted their taking "the necessary steps to safeguard 
their security and to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe" 
as described in the Treaty. 
Thus, officially, the whole blame for the formation of such 
an. East-bloc multilateral political-military alliance was placed 
wj +;hin the ideological East-West confrontation and what am("1"uts 
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to the Cold War, and C¢ri buted specifically to the issue of {j 
T',j '\, 
Germany, politically still under zonal division. 
/ 
The German Question and European ~ecurity 
In the absence of a postwar treaty, Germany was still 
di vided in accordance with the wartime conferences, with the 
German administrations still not given full autonomy or 
sovereignty. The Four Powers were putatively still attempting to 
agree on a sc.heme that would unite Germany under one independent 
government. The Potsdam Conference of 1945 had agreed an 'Allied 
Attitude to Germany' that had specified that 
the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the 
future, the.... measures necessary to assure that Germany 
will never again threaten her neighours~ or the peace of the 
world. . . . It is their intention that the German people be 
given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual 
reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful 
basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this 
end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their 
place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world. (Keesings 7361A, p.7362) 
Germany was to have been treated as a single economic unit, with 
parallel political development in the four occupation zones 
<Banks et aI, p.180a-b). 
As with the Introduction to Chapter 1, it is not the purpose 
of this thesis to participate in the historiography of the Cold 
War, and argue which events and actions on which side 'led to' 
the failure by the 1950s, of the implementation of the 
unspecific, unfocussed particulars of the Potsdam Accords. Even 
taking into account that the two sides mayor may not have 
usefully been adhering to the formal ties of a united Germany, 
their ultimate purposes may have been different. On the Eastern 
side, a Soviet-style system of administration, including a 
reorganised form of district and local government, with a revised 
judicial system and collectivised agriculture, had been 
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introduced in 1952; the USSR "anounced the attainment of full 
sovereignty by the GDR on March 25, 1954" (ibid, p.181-b). 
/ -
On the other side, the three Western powers had agreed on a 
scheme that would give West Germany limited military forces, 
involved in the proposed European Defence Community (EDC) , in a 
Treaty signed in Paris on 27 May 1952. The EDC included a 
proposal for a 'European Army' in which West German troops "muld 
be involved. There was to be a 'European Defence Minister' as a 
solution to the problem of rearming West Germany, and so it was 
/ 
to be /'a European solution to the question of Germany's 
I 
contribution to the organisation of European defence'.! (Keesings 
11037A) The USSR had from the outset objected to such a Western 
military alliance, and in particular to the West German 
involvement in it. The USSR's prime concern was the 'resurgence 
of German militarism' which, at least from the point of view of 
an armed West Germany, it saw as a major threat to Soviet 
security. 
On 25 January 1954, at the opening of the Berlin Conference 
of Foreign Ministers, convened after a long period of stalemate 
without negotiation between the four pov18rs, Soviet Foreign 
Minister Molotov stated that 
'The reunion of Germany and the creation of an all-German 
Government is indissolubly bound up with the question of 
whether a united Germany is going to be a peaceful democratic 
state or whether it once more becomes a militarised and 
aggressive state' 
CKeesings 13434) 
Molotov went on to object to the EDC as '" a military bloc of 
European countries directed against other European states''', and 
a~gued that such an action would make German reunification 
impossible (ihid). 
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The Soviet Union saw any European military grouping from 
which it was excluded as /anti-Soviet, claiming that divisive 
mili tn.ry blocs were adding to international tensions anc1 
heralding a new European war. It also claimed that observance of 
the Potsdam Accords would be a satisfactory basis for the 
solution of the German q:uestion. During the discussions on 
Germany at the Berlin Conference, Molotov repeated the Soviet 
assertion that NATO was responsible for the division of Europe, 
and rejected Western offers of guarantees to the USSR that German 
militarism would not be revived (ibid, 13437). 
To the USSR, 'German militarism' seemed to mean a West 
German military force (East Germany had a Soviet-controlled para-
military police force), especially if it was included in a mutual 
defence agreement of restricted membership. Molotov put forward 
proposals during the Berlin Conference (10 February 1954) for a 
'Progra1llllle for Germany' and a 'European Security Pact', which 
amounted to a pan-European collective 'Security system that would 
control any German military resurgence, thus paving the way for 
German reunification. In his closing speech (18 February 1954), 
he said that 
'During the discussion of the German problem we all stated 
that tlie settlement of this [German] question was inseparably 
bound up with safeguarding security in Europe.' (SWB SU7495, 22 Feoruary 1954) 
In other words, there could be no postwar settlement, no peace 
treaty, without a solution to the 'German problem', which in 
itself could not be resolved without a long-term rapprochement' 
between East and West, or even an end to the Cold War.' To the 
USSR, security was paramount; 'security' meant a system of 
'collecti ve security', proposed at Berlin as a 'Draft Gener~l 
Treaty on Collective Security in Europe', which would involve 
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limits or controls to the military structure of a unified German 
state which only then would it be 'dilling to countenan<?e. The 
USSR had fought against Nazi Germany \,/i th the Western allies, and 
was therefore seeking a role in a postwar security system 
involving Germany. 
That the German issue was paramount to Soviet foreign policy 
can be seen from the fact that, although the Berlin Conference 
discussed Germany, Austria, and European security, and reached 
agreement to hold talks in Geneva to settle the Korean dispute, 
the BBC's Summary of World Broadcasts noted that "the great bulk" 
of Soviet commentary "dealt with the German question - and, in 
particular, with the proposals put forward by Molotov on lOt.h 
February." (SlrB SU/494, 19 February 1954). 
Soviet Security Concerns in 1954 
The two Soviet concerns that continued throughout the period· 
were thus European security in general, and a guarantee against 
the remilitarisation of Germany in particular. Soviet leaders 
expressed concern at any aspect of international affairs which 
they felt had a bearing on these issues. 
On 31 ¥~rch 1954, the Soviet Government sent a 'note' to the 
Governments of France, Britain, and the United States, which in 
general reiterated Soviet proposals to establish 'a general 
European system of collective security', and reiterated concern 
against the EDC and German militarism. The note concluded: 
The position of the Soviet Government as regards the North 
Atlantic Treaty is well known. The Government of the USSR 
has not shared and cannot share at the present time, the 
point of view that this treaty is of a delensi ve character. 
In this, the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that 
the North Atlantic Treaty creates an exclusive grouping of 
states, ignores the task of preventing new German aggression 
and, since of the great powers which belonged to tlie anti-
Hitler coalition only t~~ Soviet Union is not participating 
in this treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty cannot but be 
resarded as an aggressive treaty, directed against the Soviet 
UnIon. 
It is perfectly obvious that in appropriate circumstances 
the Nortn Atlantic Treaty Organisation could lose its 
aggressive nature, provided that all the great powers which 
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belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition become parties to it. 
In accordance with this.... the Soviet Government expresses 
its readi ness to exami ne, together vii th the governments 
concerned, the question of the Soviet Union's part~cipation 
in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
(Pravda, 1 April 1954, p.2) 
It is of course interesting that the Soviet Union waited for 
five years before applying for membership of NATO, but to do so 
was part of its renewed drive on the issues of European security 
and the question of Germany, precipitated by the proposed EDe. 
The note indicates how the USSR sought to transform the Wes~ern 
concept of security (armed defence of a limited number of states 
united on ideological grounds), into its own version of big power 
alliance and policing. (One wonders, however, if the USSR would 
have encouraged the future members of the Vlarsavi Treaty to apply 
for membership of NATO at a later date.) When, on 7 May 1954, 
NATO rejected the Soviet application, the USSR claimed proof that 
NATO was / 'a closed military group of an aggressive character 
aimed against the Soviet Union'; (SWB SU/508, 9 April 1954). 
/ 
It 
did, however, continue to press for its preferred version of 
security, a collective treaty guaranteeing the non-militarisa~ion 
of Germany. In a further note, dated 24 July 1954, to Britain, 
France, and the Uni ted States, agai n opposi ng 'closed mi 1 i tary 
groupings' (and naming NATO and the EDe) , the Soviet Government 
proposed that a conference be convened for European countries and 
the USA to "exchange views" on "the question of setting up a 
system of collective security in Europe". (Pravda, 25 July 1954, 
p.2) 
The Su:mma.ry of World Broadcasts noted that I European 
security' was the "most extensively treated topic" in Soviet 
foreign policy ot:' put during the summer of 1954, centring on 
German militarism and the EDe (SWB, SU/545, 16 August 1954, p.l). 
J) 
d) 
! 
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On 29 August 1954, though, the French Parliament, for 
internal reasons, rejected ratification of the EDC Treaty, and 
/ 
threw the whole West European defence policy into disarray. Both 
before and after this event, however, the Soviet Union's policy 
was to promote its own concept of European security. Prior to 
the French action the USSR was calling for the EDC to be 
scrapped 1 ; afterwards it vias counselling against any new move to 
replace the EDC, and a statement was released from the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry on 9 September to this effect. Paragraph 14 of 
this noted plans for West Germany to join NATO directly. After 
pointing to Western silence on Soviet proposals to convene a 
Four-Power conference to discuss the German question [cf the 24 
July note discussed above] <para. 18), the statement concluded 
that 
The interests of safeguarding general European security 
demand that a system of collective securlty with the 
participation of all European countries irrespective of their 
social systems should be established instead of building 
closed mi1itary alignments in Europe. (SWB SU/553, 13 September 1954) . 
In other words, the USSR was once again stressing its policy ~f a 
pan-European security system as the basis of international 
relations, going on to call for a general European conference to 
examine 'appropriate proposals'. Within a few days, however, 
after visits by both Sir Anthony Eden of Britain and John Foster 
Dulles of the USA to Bonn, the USSR was objecting not only to a 
proposed integration of West Germany into NATO, but also to the 
proposal to integrate West Germany into the Brussels Treat¥ 
Organisation, an alliance which it saw as overtly against German 
aggression but covertly anti -Soviet (SWB SU/555, 20 September 
1954) . 
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The London 9-Power Conference, 28 September-3 October 1954 
The 'Paris Agreements' .which were cited in the Pr?amble to 
/ 
the Warsaw Treaty were in fact the endorsement of a set of vlide-
ranging documents embodied in a 'Final Act', which were agreed on 
by the foreign ministers of the same states at an earlier London 
Conference.:2 
The scope of the London Conference broadly covered various 
aspects of the Western approach to European security. When the 
signatories spoke of "European unification" they were limiting 
themselves to the area known as ~ Europe. The Conference made 
six recommendations. First of all it proposed ending the 
occupation status of West GermanYi it also proposed that West 
Germany and Italy join the Brussels Treaty Organisation (the 
statement included a West German declaration undertaking not to 
manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons). Thirdly 
Britain, the USA, and Canada declared their support for European 
unity and the maintenance of their military forces in Europe. A 
declaration was included recommending West German accession to 
NATO and also covering the future deployment of NATO forces in 
Europe. Fifthly, West Germany promised to conduct its policies 
in accordance with the UN Charter, renouncing the use of force to 
achieve German reunification or the changing of its frontiers, 
while Britain, France, and the USA attached a declaration 
defining their relationship with the German Federal Republic. 
Finally came a declaration anouncing that the detailed agreements 
to implement the provisions of the London Conference would be 
worked out by the respective Governments and submitted for the 
approval of the North Atlantic Council [ie, NATU] (Keesings 
13809) . 
The London Conference declared that it had 
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dealt with the most important issues facin~ the Western World 
- security and European integration withln the framework of 
a developlng Atlantic community dedicated to peace and 
freedom.... [it had] considered how to assure the full 
association of the German Federal Republic wi thin the West, 
and the German defence contribution .... (i bid) 
Thus the explicit aim of the London Conference vias to cement 
the West European political and military bloc, which had as its 
pretext the common defence through NATO, an organisation that had 
a restrictive membership which, at least by implication, placed 
it in opposition to the Soviet bloc. The conclusion of the 
London Final Act explicitly stated that the agreements and 
arrangements were to "reinforce the Atlantic community" in the 
interests of "world peace" (ibid). 
The USSR continued to object both to the plans to rearm West 
Germany and the effect the London decisions would have on 
European security. Commenting on the conclusion of the 
Conference, the Soviet Union rejected the controls and guarantees 
against West German militarism that the agreements promised, and 
saw the threat of a German "aggressive military grouping" (SWB 
SU/560, 8 October 1954). The USSR continued to lobby for' the 
adoption of the position it expressed at the Berlin Conference, 
its call for a pan-European security system that would neutralise 
the German military structure. In objecting to the divisive 
moves by the West and pref erri ng its own sol ut i on, "Moscow 
continued to devote a very substantial proportion of its output 
to a detailed consideration of the various problems connected 
wi th European security - particularly that of German rearmament'." 
<ibid, SU/562, 15 October 1954). In this way, the I Soviet 
response to the events in the West continued along the same path 
that it had taken for several years without managing to alter the 
West's position. 
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The Paris Conference, 20-23 October 1954 
The Foreign MInisters of the states which had convened in 
/ 
London met again in Paris, and confirmed their previous 
recommendations. They agreed to end the occupation status of 
West Germany, modified the Brussels Treaty Organisation to be a 
general defence forum (rather than being anti-German), to be 
called the Western European Union (WEU) , inviting West Germany 
and Italy to join. In conjunction with the 14 NATO powers they 
invited West Germany to join NATO, and agreed on measures for the 
further strengthening of the NATO structure (Keesings 13850) and 
a month later revealed that they had also agreed on "a convention 
on the presence of foreign forces in the German Federal Republic" 
(i bid, 13869), vlhich converted the postwar occupation forces into 
mutual defence forces. 
Both the termination of the Occupation Regime and the 
establishment of the WEU referred to the EDC proposals as being 
the basis of the agreements, highlighting the fact that the Paris 
Agreements were a continuation of the 1952 policies for Western 
defence, and were in fact a response to the French Parliament's 
rejection of that scheme. Thus despite all the lobbying and 
representations of the USSR, its preferred action of a pan-
European collective security system was once again being ignored 
and rebuffed. The West was not interested even in talking about 
these proposals. It had a concept of security incompatible with 
that of the USSR. The Final Act of the London Conference, 
endorsed and implemented (subj ect to ratification) ! by the Paris 
I 
Conference, was a development of the 1952 proposals envisaging a 
'European Defence Community', but took no consideration of ~oviet 
views of its own postwar defence and security needs. The Soviet 
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view of the Paris Conference was that it was the same as the 1952 
proposals for the "militarisation of Western Germany ~nd the 
permanent occupation of that part of the country" (SWB SU/566, 29 
October 1954). 
On 23 October 1954, the USSR issued another note to Britain, 
France, and the United States, on opposition to the agreements of 
the London and Paris Conferences, but limiting its concern to the 
role of Ger~ny in European defence arrangements, and including a 
call for their attendance at a Conference to be held in Moscow in 
November of that year. (Pravda, 24 October 1954, p. 3. ) Once 
again the USSR was using tried and failed techniques to influence 
the West. It was this limited response that dominated Soviet 
objections to the agreements. While considering that the end to 
the occupation of West Germany was spurious since the agreements 
also permitted troops (of allies) to remain on German soil, the 
USSR did not seem to object to Italian inclusion in the WEU, even 
though Italy had been an ally of Nazi Germany. Though the USSR 
was itself party to the UN Charter, it claimed that it could not 
trust West German adherence to Article 2 (peaceful settlement of 
disputes) (ibid). 
Soviet European Policy, November 1954 
During the celebrations for the October Revolution, Soviet 
Presidium (Politburo) member Maksim Zakharovich Saburov made a 
speech with a section detailing the Soviet foreign policy 
positions on a number of issues. The overall call for peaceful 
coexistence and co-operation between socialists and capitalists 
to· their mutual advantage was repeated. The London and Paris 
Nine-Power Agreements were specifically dealt with, reiterating 
Soviet obj ections to the perceived Western I posi tions of 
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strength' policy, which was seen to be characterised by the 
organisation of aggressive ~iltary blocs directed against the 
/' . 
USSR. In particular, Saburov spoke out against the arming of 
"revenge-seeking forces" in Germany, who would be "resurrecting 
German militarism". This action was seen to be particularly 
objectionable, since the USSR considered that extant agn'ii~ents 
!\-# 
between the Soviet Union and France, Britain, and the United 
States, were supposed to prevent the resurgence of German 
mi 1 i tari sm. 
The London and Paris agreements thus lead to the conversion 
of Western Germany into a militarist state. Nor must sight 
be lost of the fact that the Paris agreements give the West 
German Army the opportunity of having atomic weapons in its 
armaments. (SWB, SU/570, 12 November 1954) 
Saburov concluded that there was a need for a collective security 
system in Europe (ibid). 
The reference to German possession of nuclear weapons is 
interesting, since Annex 1 of the London Final Act, a statement 
covering German and Italian accession to the Brussels Treaty 
Organisation, "included a declaration under which the German 
Federal Republic undertook not to manufacture any atomic, 
biological, or chemical weapons" (Keesings 13809), a commitment 
specifically reaffirmed in Protocol II of the Paris Agreements 
relating to the conversion of the Brussels Treaty Organisation 
into the Western European Union (ibid, 13871). 
However, at a later date, in a note to various European 
governments3 dated 13 January 1955, the USSR argued that 
.... the Paris Agreements provide that the member-countries of 
the Western European mi 11 tary all iance shall conduct 
preparations for chemical ana bacteriological warfare, 
accumulating stocks of chemical, bacteriological, and atomic 
weapons and using them in the armaments of their armies. / 
The Soviet Government considers it its duty to issue (in) 
warning, in particular, that the Paris Agreements give 
chemical ana ~ bacteriological weapons, alongside atomic 
weapons, to the West German Army whose establishment is 
stipulated by these agreements. (Pravda, 14 January 1955, p.2) 
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Although confusing, the wording in this instance could be said to 
argue that the West German army would have access to such weapons 
~association. In other words, the USSR may have been objecting 
to West German involvement in military alliances (the WEU or 
NATO), which included nuclear powers. It could be argued that 
this was just another aspect of Soviet objections to the 
remilitarisation of the western part of Germany, which was 
central to its European security policy. 4 
The Soviet Union was well-informed as to the proceedings and 
decisions of both the London and Paris Conferences, (see, for 
example, SWB SU/565, 25 October 1954), and so must have been 
"'-
well-versed in the wordings of the West German renunciation of 
nuclear and mass destruction weapons. Therefore either the USSR 
did not give due credence to such a declaration, or chose to 
ignore it for propaganda purposes, both internally (as in the 
case of Saburov's speech at the time of the anniversary of the 
Revolution), or externally. 
The Soviet Note and the Xoscow Conference, November 1954 
The Soviet Union dealt with the German Question and European 
security yet again in its note dated 13 November 19545 , which was 
much less compromising in its language concerning the Western 
defence systems. 
Taking as its starting-point the London and Paris 
Agreements, the USSR expanded on its view that West Germany was 
being dangerously militarised within exclusive alliances "of 
certain states pitted against other European states" (Pravda, 14 
November 1954, p.2) 
All this testifies that "l. policy is being pursued towards 
Western Germany which is incompatlble both with the promotion 
of peace in Europe and "lith the national reunification of 
Germany. The carrying out of the London and Paris Agreements 
will mean that the reunification of Germany through free all-
German elections is sacrificed to the present plans of 
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resurrecting German militarism, that mortal enemy of 
nations of Europe, including the German nation itsen. (ibid) . 
25 
the 
Once again the USSR proposed solving the German problem by means 
of a system of collecti veEuropean security. Also contained in 
the note were two threats. 
The first was the claim that the London and Paris Agreements 
were "incompatible" with previous treaty commitments against 
German aggression, as had been suggested during the October 
Revolution celebrations (see above) . The note referred 
specifically to the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Collaboration and 
Mutual Assistance, and the 1944 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance 
and Mutual Assistance, and implied once again that since the USSR 
saw France, Britain, and the USA as having complicity in the 
remili tarisation of Germany, it saw the need for action in line 
with the formal war-time ties against the German military. 
The main threat was towards the end of the note. 
Reiterating that the London and Paris plans "cannot but 
complicate the system in Europe" by leading to an arms race and 
strained international relations, the note declared that "It will 
therefore be quite natural if the peace-loving European nations 
find themselves obliged to adopt new measures for safeguarding 
their security" Ci bid). The term "new measures" for the "peace-
loving European states" would often recur, including in the 
formal declarations surrounding the Warsaw Treaty. 
The obj ect of the note was to anounce that, due to the 
issues the note raised, the Soviet Government was convening a 
conference to be held in Moscow from November 29, "to consider 
the establishment of a Et..opean system of collective securi tyll 
(ibid), 6 
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Such a conference had been referred to in the Soviet note of 
23 October 1954 (see above), to Britain, France, and :the USA, 
which had been the first respo~se to the Paris declaration, but 
the USSR had not pursued the idea immediately. The SU11lJ11ary of 
World Broadcasts noted again that the main preoccupation of the 
USSR's media output was European security after the London and 
Paris Conferences, and "the fallacy of the Western Pov18rs' 
reasoning that East-West negotiations could profitably be held 
after ratification" of those Agreements (SWB SU/572, 19 November 
1954) . 
Did the Soviet Union truly believe that the West would 
attend a conference explicitly geared towards a policy that had 
already been rej ected by the West? In view of the aggressive 
wording in the publicised replies from the future signatories of 
the Warsaw Treaty, it seems that the USSR was, in sending the· 
invi tation to the West, merely keeping up the public fayade of 
its preferred policy of being an innocently maligned participant 
on the European stage. Even taking into account that the West 
handed in their notes of non-attendance on the day the Conference 
opened, the tone of the speeches at the Moscow Conference, and 
the resolutions agreed to there, that must have been written and 
arranged before the event, indicated that the 'Conference of 
European Countries for Safeguarding European Peace and Security' 
was conceived of and carried out as an East-bloc riposte to the 
London and Paris Conferences, and that the USSR did not believe 
that the West would accept the Soviet proposals on Germany and 
European security as proposed by Molotov at the Berlin Conference 
of Foreign Ministers ten months before. However, even after the 
event, Bakhov argued in 1971 that this non-attendance was 
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evidence that "The imperialist states refused to co-operate with 
the socialist countries in ·the cause of the organisation of a 
/ 
system of all-European securi ty." (Bakhov, p. 5) . 
The :Moscow Conference "las attended by the eight Soviet-bloc 
countries which eventually signed the Warsaw Treaty, with an 
observer from the People's Republic of China. The tone and scope 
of the gathering was set by Molotov, as head of the Soviet 
delegation, ,in his introductory speech: 
The fact should not be lost sight of that the aggressive 
elements in certain countries well kno"m to all, are 
resorting to every means of pressure to expedite the 
remili tarisation of Western Germany and its inclusion in 
their imperialist military alignments. This being the case, 
the peace-loving countries cannot c09-'fine themselves to the 
measures hitherto taken by them to Sa 'feguard their peace and 
security. , 
(Pravda, 30 November 1954, p.l) 
The Soviet Union, in objecting to the Paris Agreements, had 
evidently decided that there was no chance of causing the West's 
defence policies to be amended or scrapped. The various states 
present were already linked by the network of bilateral defence 
treaties (see Appendix 5), originating in the early postwar 
years, which Soviet defence policy had until then considered to 
be a sufficient safeguard. The 'new measures' "lere thus to go 
beyond this. 
Molotov outlined the proposed new measures in his 
introductory statement, also given on 29 November. The peaceful 
states would have to "cement their forces and strengthen them 
considerably" if the Paris Agreements were ratified; they would 
take "j oint measures in the sphere of the organisation of their 
armed forces and their command, as well as other measures" in 
order to guarantee their peaceful labour and their frontiers 
against possible aggression (ibid, p.3). 
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This implies that the USSR had already decided on some form 
of multilateral alliance incorporating joint armed forces and a 
j oint command. Molotov had alr~ady stat6d, on 25 January 1954, 
in his opening address to the Berlin Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, that the creation of a European army through the EDC 
"may lead to the creation of a defensive alliance of other 
European countries for the purpose of safeguarding their 
security" (K~esings 13434), but the Moscow Conference, following 
the collapse of the EDC proj ect and the formati on of the Paris 
Agreements, was the first overt move that the USSR had taken to 
implement such a view. The threat at Berlin does not seem to 
have been raised again within the Four-Power talks, and was not 
raised again in all the earlier propaganda and lobbying against 
the London and Paris Agreements. The note of 13 November 1954, 
being sent also to the Western powers, had only mentioned the· 
discussion of a European collective security system. At Berlin, 
Molotov had claimed that only if an Eastern bloc was set up would 
"the countries of Europe be split into two opposing military 
groupings of states .... " (ibid), implying that he did not 
consider the bil teral treaty network as a military bloc; the 
Moscow Conference, in anticipating the conclusion of just such a 
bloc system, could not then in reality have been pursuing the 
Soviet pol icy of a ' collecti ve security system', unless both 
sides were giving limited delineations of 'Europe'. 
The SU1lJ111ary of 'World Broadcasts, in commenting on the non-
Soviet speeches at the Moscow Conference, wrote that they 
followed a set pattern. All stressed their people's 
wi 11 to :eeace, the dangers of German mi 1 i tarism as 
demonstratea by historic precedent, the worthlessness of 
Western 'guarantees', the need for a European Gollective 
security system as :eroposed by the Soviet Union, the 
possibility of general European co-operation only if the West 
abandoned the policy of rearmin~ Germany, and the intention -
embodied in the (final] Declaration - to take joint defensive 
counter-measures in the event of ratification (of the Paris 
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Agreements] . (SWB SU/577, 6 December 1954) 
/ 
The Statement by Hungarianpfemier Andras Hegedus, for example?, 
thanked the Soviet Union for convening the Conference (Hegedus, 
p.15), and endorsed the Soviet Union's draft "European collective 
security pact", which he said would lead to "a peaceful solution 
to the German question" (ibid). The USA and "responsible 
quarters in England [sic] and France" were, through the Paris 
Agreements, acting "to prolong bellicose tension" <ibid, p.16). 
Hegedus effectively endorsed a division of Europe, by 
justifying Hungary's alignment with "the Soviet people and with 
other fraternal peoples who have gi ven th~e Hungarian people a 
helping hand since liberation, assisting them in their progress." 
(ibid, p.19) In several extended passages of diatribe against 
West Germany, he justified this foreign policy, and its 
endorsement of the Soviet proposals, on the grounds of Hungary's 
historic "experience of German militarism" (ibid, pp.16-18, 20-
21). The ultimate aim was to permit peaceful economic 
construction in Europe (ibid, p.22-23). 
Perhaps drawing on Hungary's own historic experience, 
Hegedus mentioned that "A peaceful solution to the Austrian 
question within the system of European collective security is 
another vital point of interest for the Hungarian people." <ibid, 
p.23) Overall, however, "The Hungarian Government delegation 
fully enJorses and accepts Comrade Molotov's analysis of the 
, 
European situation .... " (ibid, p. 24) . This underlines the point 
that, .certainly in the early years of the WTO, the Central 
European countries had no autonomous foreign policy role. 
The concluding Declaration from the Moscow meeting, dated 2 
December 1954, reiterated the call for collective European 
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security, and confirmed the threat, in Molotov's opening 
statement, that the ratific5l-tion of the Paris Agreements would 
lead to East-bloc countermeasures, which were justified as self-
defence under the UN Charter. (Pravda, 3 December 1954, p.1.) 
It could be argued, then, that the Moscow Conference and 
Declaration indicate the first formal, or at least overt, start 
to the process that led to the signing of the Warsaw Treaty five 
and a half mqnths later.8 
On 9 December 1954, the Soviet Government issued a further 
note, addressed to the British, French, and US Governments, 
expressing regret at their non-attendance at the Moscow 
Conference, and reiterating concern over the Paris Agreements 
(Pravda, 10 December 1954, p. 2). No mention, however, was made 
of the other Western states invited to attend; while the French 
note of refusal (which was almost identical to the British and US 
notes), had been reprinted in full in the Soviet press on 2 
December, there was likewise no mention of what responses to the 
invitation and to Soviet concern had been made by the other 
Western states. 
The Wartime Treaties 
A further example of the finality of the Soviet reactions to 
the Paris Agreements can be seen in the treatment given to the 
wartime Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet Treaties. During the 
October Revolution celebrations (see above), it had been stated 
that the USSR saw French, British, and US actions on the rearming 
of West Germany as contrary to their wartime commitments against 
German aggression; the Soviet note of 13 November 1954 (see 
above) had specifically mentioned the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 
and the Franco-Soviet Treaty of 1944. 
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From just after the Moscow Conference through to May 1955, 
the Soviet press gave blow~by-blow details of Soviet Government 
/ 
notes and Western responses on the question of the Paris 
Agreements and the wartime treaties; the Soviet press then gave 
blow-by-blow details of the various state commissions and bodies 
that considered and approved the annulment of the wartime 
treaties, culminating in a Decree from the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of 7 May 1955 (Pravda, 8 May 1955, p. 1). 'fhe 
justification for such a move was argued in a Pravda editorial. 
Discussing the Paris Agreements, it stated that 
One cannot fail to see that the revival of German militarism 
would create a new situation in Europe and change the 
existin~position of Britain and France: lnstead of allies of 
the USSR these powers are becoming' the allies of German 
militarism. (Pravda, 10 April 1955, p.l) 
Once again, the whole basis of Soviet foreign policy was the 
German question. Italy was being invited to join NATO and the 
WEi Hungary and Romania had also been allies of Nazi Germany, 
but the Soviet Union was not obj ecting /these countries being 
involved in military alliances. It would seem to be obvious that 
the chain of events leading up to the formation of the Warsaw 
Treaty was dependent on Soviet policy towards Germany. 
The Warsaw Conference 
that 
The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement 
Consul tations with rej5ard to the conclusion of a treaty of 
friendship, co-operatlon, and mutual assistance between the 
eight countries which participated in the Moscow Conference 
have taken place recently between the governments .... (Pravda, 22 March 1955, p.2) , 
This appears to be the first public intimation that the 'new 
~easures' for 'joint defence' would take the form of a 
mul tilateral treaty. 'the statement did, however, have an opt-
out, in the form of an argument that the proposed treaty would be 
;' 
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formed "in the event of ratification of the Paris Agreements" 
(ibid). In the event, those .Agreements were fully ratif:led early 
in April 1955. 
Follo'Vling further consultations, a communique was issued on 
3 May 1955 anouncing the convocation of a second Conference of 
European Countries for Safeguarding Peace and Security in Europe, 
to be attended by the "State-participants of the Moscow 
Declaration ,of December 2, 1954" (Pravda, 3 May 1955, p.2). The 
limi tation on the countries associated with the further 
conference indicates that no others had seen the light or been 
influenced by the Soviet politicking with its notes, statements, 
and soon, on the questions of European security and the German 
problem. The Cold War division of Europe remained intact. The 
communique also stated that the consultations leading to the 
second conference had concurred the conclusion of a treaty, and 
also the "organisation of a j oint command" for the participants 
in the proposed treaty (ibid). The justification for such a move 
was that the Paris Agreements had been ratified. 
This second conference was to be held in Warsaw, and thus 
the first and only multilateral treaty limited to and binding 
together the Soviet bloc9 was to become the 'Warsaw Treaty'. Why 
Warsaw? After all, the process began 'Vii th a HOSCO\'l conference. 
Why did the USSR wish to associate such an alliance with Poland? 
Certainly Poland has primary geostrategic importance as the main 
historic route for invasions of Russia and the USSR, and in 
modern terms Poland has the largest non-Soviet mi li tary force 
wi thin the WTO; but in terms of 1955 the choice was curious. 
Perhaps the USSR wished to emphasise that the measures were to be 
seen as definitely European, even though it was obvious that the 
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non-Soviet participants were merely agreeing with the Soviet line 
throughout. This is all mere~ speculation. 
/ 
N. A. Bulganin, the new Soviet Prime Minister, headed the 
Soviet delegation rather than Molotov, who had been the chief 
representati ve at the Moscml Conference. While the various notes 
and so on leading up to the Warsaw Conference had been restricted 
in general to European security, Bulganin's opening statement 
placed the proposed founding of a new European military alliance 
in the context of Soviet worldwide policies, citing international 
tensions throughout Europe, the Near and Middle East, the Far 
East, Asia, and Africa; he argued that the aggressive rearming of 
West Germany was just one more example of the US-inspired Western 
'positions of strength' policy that sought to encircle the Soviet 
bloc with military bases and alliances (Pravda, 12 May 1955, 
p.3). The bulk of the speech was, however, still concerned with 
the Paris Agreements, the call for a European collective security 
system, and the fact that the Moscow Conference and its ensuing 
discussions, with the proposed military alliance, were broadening 
the co-operation of the socialist states to/£hE~'\inC1Udesphere of 
joint defence. The general Soviet justification was that the 
climate of international relations, in its broadest senses, 
demanded that a multilateral defence alliance be formed - "The 
treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, for the 
conclusion of which the conference was meeting in Warsaw, was to 
serve the aim of safeguarding security." (ibid) 
The main Soviet objection, however, remained: Bulganin's 
opening speech once again reiterated the Soviet view that a 
remili tarised Germany was a threat to Europe alld the Soviet 
Union, and that "the remilitarisation constituted the chief 
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obstacle to the restoration of Germany's national unity on peace-
loving and democratic principles. II (ibid) The foundins of the 
Warsaw Treaty nonetheless put the seal on the postwar division of 
Germany, giving a Soviet de facto acceptance of the Western move 
to militarise its sector. 
As with the Hoscow Conference, the speeches and proceedings 
were standardised. The communique of the fourth and final session 
of the Warsaw Conference stated that liThe meeting examined, 
paragraph by paragraph, the Treaty .... All the delegations of 
the states represented at the conference declared their agreement 
with the text of this treaty. II (Pravda, 14 Hay 1955) This 
session also II adopted a decision to form a j oint command of the 
armed forces of the states-participants to the treaty. II (ibid) 
Consequently the Treaty was formally signed on Hay 14, along with 
the resolution for the creation of a Joint Command. The states 
ratified the Treaty, and it came into force on 4 June 1955 (see 
Appendix 1 for the full texts). 
Krasnaya Zvezda on 15 Hay 1955 covered the conclusion of.the 
Treaty with the title 'Reliable basis for the guaranteeing of the 
security of the peaceloving states" above the text of the Final 
Communique and a photograph of Bulganin signing the Treaty, all 
on page one. After placing on page two the texts of the Treaty 
and the creation of the Joint Command, plus a report of the 
ceremonial dinner that followed, page three had an article 
(IIKeeting in Warsaw"), which claimed that "200 000 workers of the 
capital's enterprises, representatives of communal organisations, 
activists of science, culture, and the arts" had gathered in 
Felix Dzerzh~nskii Square, and spontaneously applauded the chief 
delegates and leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party 
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involved in the Warsaw Conference, and the flags of the allies 
adorning the rostrum. Such an ecstatic welcome (if it did in 
--/ 
fact take place), seems somewhat out of place, !lot just in view 
of how-little the WTO affected the individual countries for 
several years after its creation (and perhaps even to the present 
day - see Chapters 4 onwards), but also since the documents 
directly emerging from the meeting did not cover party 
participation in the proceedings at all. 
The general justification for having created the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation was that it exemplified 
the unanimity and might of the peace camp, the indivisibility 
of peace and security as illustrated by the [Chinese People's 
Republic's] pledge of support, the f1.11lconformity of the 
Treaty with the UN Charter and the defensive and peaceful 
character of the countermeasures taken as borne out by the 
provisions for accession to the Treaty by other states and 
for tits invalidation in the event of the establishment of an 
all~"European system of co~lecti ve security. These points 
wete' frequently linked wlth references to the support 
expressed at Warsaw and throughout the world for the Soviet 
disarmament proposals. (SWB SU/626, 31 May 1955) 
However, by the 30t.h Anniversary, it was argued that "The signing 
of the Warsaw Treaty was an objective necessity brought about by 
the conditions in which the European socialist countries had to 
live and act .... " (Nezhinsky, p.162) 
An editorial in KOJ1ll1]unist (1955/8) also covered the Warsaw 
Conference. Titled "In the interests of strengthening peace and 
the security of peoples", in three pages out of nine it covered 
only joint defence against a West German and imperialist threat. 
After referring to the Joint Command and Joint Armed Forces, it 
added that "The participants of the Treaty will also take other 
co-ordinated measures for strengthening their defence 
potential .... " (p.13) which implied immediately that the forml 
miL ~ary structure was not going to be the limit of military l...i-
operation. The editorial did not refer at all to the Political 
\/ 
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Consultative Committee, or the political co-operation called for 
in the Treaty. 
Overall, the significance of the Warsaw Treaty was 
minimised, since the editorial went on to discuss, as quite 
separate events, the Austrian State Treaty, Soviet co-operation 
with Yugoslavia, the German question, Taiwan and the People's 
Republic of China, the United Nations, and other world issues. 
Post Hoc Explanations 
Ignoring the press coverage of the main speeches and 
Declarations, the first Soviet apologia (intended for Western 
consumption) I for the creation of the WTO was in International 
/ 
Affairs, in an article my M. Slavyanov, entitled 'Firm Foundation 
of European and International Security (the Warsaw Conference) I 
<1955/6) . The purpose of the article was to set the foundation 
of the WTO, by summarising the Treaty, in the context of the 
Paris Agreements and what amounted to a Cold War ethos, arguing 
that the Paris and Warsaw proceedings "reflect the existence and 
struggle of two opposing policies in world affairs, but largely 
predetermine further developments in the international 
situation." (p.17) While stressing the German question and the 
"new situation" of NATO policy in Europe, Slavyanov also brought 
in the wider international context of the "imperialist camp" I s 
"positions of strength policy", the arms race and the balance of 
power, and the "capitalist encirclement" of the "socialist camp" 
due to which "The Warsaw Treaty lays an even more reliable 
foundation for the policy of co-existence of different social 
systems .... " (p. 25) . In its widest context, Slavyanov claimed 
that "The Warsaw Treaty strengthens the international positions 
of socialism as a dependable and indestructible bulwark of the 
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peoples, who are fighting for peace, freedom, and progress." 
(p.23) However, unlike it~ coverage of the Austrian State 
/ 
Treaty, International Affairs did not publish the text of the 
Warsaw Treaty, which would seem to minimise the importance of the 
new Organisation. 
The October issue of International Affairs also carried an 
article 9'"' the Warsaw Treaty, this time by the Polish expert on 
international law, Professor K. Lachs, who also placed the Treaty 
in the context of the Paris Agreements, but argued that the 
latter were merely an expression of a broader policy of Western 
aggression (ibid, 1955/10, p.55). Thus, to Lachs, the Treaty was 
an extension of socialist bilateral co-operation to a 
multilateral level, creating mutual political obligations made 
necessary by the "conclusions regarding the international 
situation" recognised in the Treaty (ibid). As with the speeches 
and declarations of the Warsaw Conference, he argued that there 
was a need for a collective security system in Europe, but 
claimed that the Warsaw Treaty was a contribution to this policy 
since it was not an "exclusive bloc" along the lines of NATO, the 
WEU, and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation, all of which he 
named. 
His article was the basis for an anti-Soviet article in the 
New York Times <12 December 1955, p.30), by its Koscow 
correspondent, S. L. Sulzberger. In a further article in 
International Affairs, which misini tialed Sulzberger as "C. L." v 
Lachs was given the opportunity to reiterate his basic foreign 
policy points. 
The New York Times correspondent calls :he Warsaw Treaty a 
reply to the North AtlantIc Treaty, in short - 'anti-NATO'. 
We do not deny that. We have always declared that if there 
had been no North Atlantic Treaty and no Western European 
Union, there would have been no need for the Warsaw Treaty. 
The latter took shape under definite international 
circumstances, and was necessitated by the aggressive 
--(')n,/ 
! 
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international policy of the Western Powers, particularly the 
United states. 
(1956/2, p.113) 
and, in the context of the Paris Agreements 
[the Warsaw Treaty] is a de{ensive arrangement open to anyone 
vlho \"lants to co-operate for European peace. The Warsaw 
Treaty organisation [sic lower casel wilI cease to exist the 
moment tliere is a general European collective security 
system. (i bid, p.115) 
This seems to indicate a slight modification of the reasoning for 
the Warsaw Treaty, with the Paris Agreements, and therefore 
German rearmament, being seen not as an issue in themselves, 
which is the way they were presented prior to the Warsaw 
Conference and in the Treaty, but as an important factor wi thin 
the Western defence policy as responded to by the Soviet Union. 
Concurrent International Issues 
The analysis so far has shown that the Warsaw Treaty appears 
to have been created as a direct result of the militarisation of 
West Germany within the context of the London and Paris 
Agreements. This was not the only foreign policy issue that the 
USSR was campaigning about at the time. On 13 May 1955, during 
the Warsaw Conference, the Soviet Union made a major set. of / 
proposals to the UN Disarmament Commission, a move praised after 
the event by the Central European leaders but apparently made 
independently of the multilateral discussions going on within the 
Soviet bloc. This indicates that the MOSCOVI and Warsaw meetings" 
were just one strand of Soviet thinking on its security. 
Western analysts have put forward a variety of 'reasons' for 
the formation of the WTO, in which the Paris Agreements and the 
German accession to NATO (treated as independent actions by those 
cHing them), figure prominently, though not in the context of 
the Soviet concept of a general European security system. 
(' 
chapter 2 39 
Several Western sources cite a Soviet desire for "military ( 
integration" , which was indeed mentioned by the contemporary 
sources, but is placed by Western analysts in the context of a 
consolidation of the East-bloc bilateral mi li tary treaties. In 
Bulganin's opening statement to the Warsaw Conference, however, 
he argued that 
Nearly all our countries are bound with one another by 
bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance, which 
have played iill.d. continue il2 ~ a'l important part in 
safeguarding European peace and security. 
But in'the new situation this is no longer enough. (Pravda, 12 May 1955, p.3 - stress added) 
This seems to indicate that the USSR conceived of the mul ti-
lateral alliance as complementary to the bilateral treaties, 
which still exist and play a part in Soviet defence thinking to 
this day (see Appendix 5). 
Soviet fears of encirclement are cited by few of the Western 
analysts. This reason was explicitly stated by the Soviet Union, 
but was first mentioned only during the Warsaw Conference, rather 
than in the propaganda campaign leading up to the establishment 
of the WTO, though this could indicate that such a fear was 
intended primarily for internal consumption, or that the Soviets 
did not want to admit the point in public. 
Very few Western writers suggest that the WTO was formed as 
a 'bargaining chip' with the West, despite the repeated claims by 
the original sources that the WTO would cease to exist if a 
collective security system acceptable to the Soviet Union was 
created in Europe (1e replacing the WEU and NATO also), and as 
stated in Article 2 of the Treaty. The Soviet Union only seemed 
to use the WTO as such at the Four-Power Geneva Conferences later 
~il. 1955, but the offer of mutual dissolution still contin"")s to 
\\, 
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. appear in official WTO documents (see Chapter 4 and Appendix 4 
below) . 
The main Western reason given for the founding of the WTO 
was that it was a justification for the continued Soviet military 
presence in Central Europe after the successful negotiation of 
the Austrian State Treaty (ending the postwar occupied status of 
Austria), which was signed on 15 May 1955, the day after the 
signing of, the Warsaw Treaty. This reason, however, should 
probably be discounted. 
The Four-Power 'Moscow Declaration' of 1943 had promised an 
Austrian peace treaty, but by as late as November 1954 the three 
Western powers were still accusing the USSR of obfuscation and 
delay, both at the Four-Power and at the UN levels, in refusing 
to negotiate let alone ratify such a treaty. The main Soviet 
excuse was that, without a satisfactory solution to the German 
problem, there would always be the chance of another Anschluss, 
which Soviet security needs could not tolerate. 
The Soviet shift of policy on the Austrian problem seems to 
date from a speech to the Supreme Soviet by Molotov, on 8 
February 1955. This was followed by Soviet-Austrian discussions 
to clarify the Soviet statement, and the resultant Soviet 
declaration that it would no longer insist on retaining 
occupation troops in Austria even though there was still no peace 
treaty with Germany. (Keesings 14059; 14154.) Agreement was 
concluded in April 1955, allowing the Soviet Union to draw up a 
peace treaty with the Western powers (ibid, 14155). The terms of 
the Austrian State Treaty were agreed by a Four Power meeting in 
Vienna between 2 and 11 May 1955, and were given final 
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consideration by the Big Four foreign ministers on May 14, being 
signed the next day (ibid, 14193, 14194). 
Under the +.erms of the Austrian state Treaty, occupation 
forces would have to be removed by 25 October 1955 (Part I I I 
Article 20[ 3] - Keesings 14194). In the event, the Soviet Union 
had removed all its forces by 19 September (ibid, 14561) a fact 
"lhich would not indicate any feeling that it was trying to 
maintain a military position in Central Europe up to the last 
moment. Only British troops remained longer than the Soviet 
ones, being finally removed on 24 October (ibid). In fact, Jain 
(p.17) points out that the Western powers which signed the 
, 
Austrian State Treaty never invited the USSR to withdraw its 
troops from the rest of Europe once its position in Austria no 
longer had to be maintained. 
The USSR could claim that the bilateral treaties, which 
dated from the early postwar years, permitted the stationing of 
its forces in Europe. If there was a problem, the Soviet Union 
did not need a multilateral treaty to solve it. Sovi et troops 
still stationed in Europe are in any case there through 
i ndi vidual bi lateral agreements which do not need the Warsaw 
Treaty as justification, a point acknowledged by Central European 
specialistsN. 
In other words, it seems that since the Moscow Conference 
put in motion the multilateral events that led to the Warsaw 
Treaty, two months before the Soviet Union gave any indication 
that it was prepared to negotiate an Austrian settlement, and 
since it did not need to occupy Austria in order to justify its 
presence on its allies' soi~, the Austrian question had no 
bearing on its policy to develop the WTO. (As pointed out in 
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foot-note 8 of this chapter, the decision to form the WTO was 
taken even before the Moscow Conference - further evidencE that 
it was an independent issue fcr the USSR. ) 
In arguing that the USSR feared encirclement and felt the 
need to bind Albania 'closer' to the rest of the socialist 
community, Szawlowski (p.6) seems to be the first Western writer 
to argue that the Soviet Union specifically feared the 'Balkan 
Pact' . This 'Treaty of Alliance, Political Co-operation and 
Mutual Assistance', a 'collective security' alliance overtly 
aligned with NATO, was signed by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia 
on 9 August 1954, though the preamble describes it as extending 
and strengthening the 1953 'Treaty of Friendship and Co-
operation' of the same three countries, which was not a mutual 
defence treaty (Keesings, 1952-1954 volume). While this treaty 
falls wi thin the lead-in time to the Moscow Conference, it was 
never mentioned by name or even by implication in any of the 
speeches surrounding the WTO, or the diplomatic moves of the 
Soviet Union leading up to the Treaty. The USSR and Yugoslavia 
had in fact undergone a rapprochement from June 1953 (Fejto, 
p.13), and Yugoslavia had signed treaties with Hungary (Hegedus' 
StateJ1lent p. 19). Thus it would seem that Yugoslavia would not 
have been engaging in activities likely to harm that 
rapprochement with the USSR, and the Balkan Pact would not have 
been seen by the USSR as a threat. 
There was another mutual defence pact of this period not 
/ 
by we~rn sources, the Baghdad Treaty, originally mentioned 
signed by Turkey and Iraq on 24 February 1955, but later acceded 
to by Britain, Pakistan, and Persia, wi c;h close military and 
political liaisons on the part of the USA. It was explicitly a 
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mili tary alliance, explicitly an I Arab alliance, and implicitly 
anti -Soviet and anti- Israeli (Keesings, 1955 volume). 
The first suggestion that the Baghdad Treaty was of concern 
to the WTO vias in the declaration issued by the first session of 
the PCC (1956). In expressing concern about the growing US 
influence around the USSR's borders, the declaration mentioned by 
name the "North Atlantic Bloc", the "Baghdad Bloc", and the South 
East Asia Treaty Organisation. Fear of the Baghdad Treaty can 
therefore not be seen as a particular threat to the USSR, but 
just as another aspect of the East-West division of influence. 
This is how the "Baghdad Pact" continues to be referred to, for 
example by Grechko (1977, p.331). 
In expressi ng its / I, feeling/ encircled the Soviet Union 
; ~ - ~ 
observed specific NATO pressures in Europe. For example, part of 
Bulganin's opening remarks to the Warsaw Conference were to do 
wi th a decision by NATO "to prepare for atomic war" (Pravda, 12 
May 1955, p.3). He was apparently referring to a regular meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris on 17-18 December 
1954. Hidden wi thin the various resolutions covering the full 
scope of NATO affairs, it vias decided that SHAPE (NATO's military 
wing), "should be given authority to plan its defensive strategy 
'taking into account modern developments in weapons and 
techniques', but that the decision on the use of these weapons 
should be left in civilian hands" (Keesings 13988). This move 
was understood to be the go-ahead for the development of military 
strategies based on emerging theatre nuclear weapon technologies, 
which is certainly how the USSR interpreted it. However, the 
NA'1\.) policy agreed on at the session of the NATO Council was 
based on the North Atlantic Council directives adopted in 
{l 
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December 1953 (ibid). Once again, though, this issue emerged 
rum:.. the London and Paris Agreements had set in motion the 
events that led to the Moscow Conference and after. 
Conclusions 
The formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation lies 
squarely in the Cold War confrontation of the mid-1950s. It was 
a further aspect of the continuing Cold War division of Germany 
referred to at the start of this chapter. The USSR did, however, 
back do~~ over Austria, and accepted the assurances on Austrian 
neutrality and the limitation of its military policies. But then 
Austria was not so geostrategically important as Germany, was not 
being incorporated into the West's military policies, and above 
all the Soviet Union was fully involved in the discussions on the 
fate of Austria. 
Something that cannot be calculated or even accounted for 
are, of course, the internal Soviet debates and factionalism on 
all areas related directly or indirectly with security and 
defence (see also Chapter 1), and the influence/Khrushchev, . as ,I, 
party leader, had on this and on the policies that actually 
emerged. Soviet reactions to the EDC proposals of 1952 were 
limited by the lack of action on the matter taken when Stalin was 
alive. Even before the EDC proj ect emerged in the West, there 
noted in Chapter 1, b,!,)?,~a greater co-ordination of were moves, 
/,j 
Soviet defence policy with its allies, but this "las contained 
within the existing bilateral relationships. Concern that a 
rearmed West Germany represented a "new situation" for the 
socialist countries could, therefore, only be publicly voiced 
after the collapse of the EDCj the London and Paris Agreements 
gave the new Soviet leadership the excuse they needed to do 
U(,'I~ 
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something publicly with their allies, even somethi ng as 
unsophisticated as the WTO was in its earliest years. 
But the question remains as to why, in its "earliest 
mai.'ifestation, the WTO Vlas so obviously an inter-state b\.ldy. 
Khrushchev did not officially participate in the WTO until the 
PCC sesion of 1960 j the main state representatives, from the 
Moscow Conference of 1954 onwards, were Bu 19ani n and Molotov, 
both allies of Khrushchev in the post-Stalin factionalism in the 
Soviet Union 10 • It has been arguedN that by 1954, Khrushchev and 
the CPSU did control Soviet foreign policy and the relations with 
Central Europe, so Khrushchev's absence from the WTO is not 
necessarily important. What is important ~s that the WTO, having 
been created in the face of a specific 'threat' from the West, 
was virtually moribund .for several years, and was not really used 
in Soviet foreign policy for several years. 11 
In the second half of the 1950s the USSR continued to pursue 
its own disarmament initiatives in the UN, and its own 
negotiations with the West and the USA. The foreign policy 
strand that led to the creation of the WTO was just another 
aspect of this world-wide foreign policy - military, diplomatic, 
and ideological. It was another tool in the Soviets' overall 
system. 
Endnotes 
1) At the Berlin Conference, Molotov had in fact proposed that 
a collective European security treaty replace both the EDC a.rui ",. 
NATO. - 'I, 
2) Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, the United States, and Canada. 
In the commentaries immediately following the Paris Conference, 
the USSR objected to the 'London and Paris' agreements, but, as 
with Western bJurces, later omitted the reference to London. 
3) France, Britain, Holland, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, West 
Germany. 
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4) In 1986, a Central European military expertN vias adamant 
that, owing to the nature of modern war, the speed of events, and 
the problem of communication during war, the non-Soviet armies 
vmuld "of course" have access to and control over theatre nuclear 
warheads. 
5) This note was sent to: France, Great Britain, Austria, 
Al bania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, the Netherlands, 
Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, 
Rumania, Turkey, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Svdtzerland, Sweden, 
Jugoslavia, and the USA. The People's Republic of China was 
offered observer status to the meeting. (Pravda, 14 November 
1954, p.2) The list was explained as being states with 
diplomatic relations with the USSR. 
6) The Soviet News coverage of the note referred, mistakenly, 
to the "West European Alliance". 
7) This was the only such text supplied to the National Library 
of Scotland, and vias in the form of a supplement to New Hungary 
22 (January 1955). 
~ 
8) Unofficially, however, and behind the scenes, on returning 
from his attendance at the Moscow celebrations of the anniversary 
of the October Revolution, Hungarian party leader Rakosi had 
, leaked', that a Warsaw Treaty was gQ..ing. to be signed; he did 
this for his own internal factionalism against Nagy, who did not 
support the idea of the allianceN. The treatment of the foreign 
policy issues behind such a decision were not so forthright at 
the time - see Saburov's speech above. It is also useful to note 
that it was a party figure, Rakosi, who had nothing to do with 
the Moscow Conference, which was an inter-~ meeting, who 
brought such a decision to Hungary. In its early years, the WTO 
tried hard to present itself as an inter-state body with no party ~ 
input. . J 
9) The CMEA Treaty can be discounted since it has a worldwide 
membership, and its activities - trade and economic development -
are also carried out by its members outwith the CMEA. The Warsaw 
Treaty limits the members' foreign policy activities and is the 
only multilateral tie of an ideological nature that formally 
defines a 'Soviet bloc'. 
10) Khrushchev did, however, make an appearance to observe the 
signing of the Moscow Declaration, but he was not accorded 
specific treatment, being placed half-way down the list of 
persons at the ceremony (Pravda, 3 December 1954, p.1). 
11) This was similar to the use made of the CMEA. 
';' 1-: \!,la nUi-C -; 
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THE STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE WID 
Basic History 
Prior to the signing of the Warsaw Treaty as a multilateral 
political-military alliance, the signatory states were linked by 
a series of bilateral 'Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual 
Assistance' treaties, which have been maintained throughout the 
existence of the Warsaw Treaty. The two methods of alliance 
must, however, be seen as fulfilling different functions, and 
therefore have complementary roles. For a full discussion of the 
bilateral treaties, see Appendix 5. (See also Chapter 1.) 
The main direct benefit of the Warsaw Treaty was to link all 
the states of the European socialist community within a 
mul tilateral alliance that had a definite inter-state structure 
with specific roles and activities. Signed by the leaders of the 
governments of the eight member states, this inter-governmental 
alliance seemed to give precedence to military over political co-
operation, in that of the two articles of the Treaty that deal 
with the organisational structure, Article 5 permitted the 
setting up a j oint command of the states' armed forces and 
Article 6 established a political consultative committee (see 
Appendix 1). 
I 
A separate document was issued 'Vii th the Treaty, ar.'lOuncing 
the "Formation of a Joint Command of the Armed Forces of the 
States that are Parties to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation 
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and Mutual Assistance" (Pravda., 15 May 1955). Naming Marshal of 
the Soviet Union I. S. Konev as the first COllL."'llander:-in-Chief 
(C-in-C), it anounced that the "Ministers of Defence and other 
military leaders" of the participating states were to command the 
national armed forces "allotted to the joint armed forces", and 
to act as the C-in-C' s "assistants". The document also anounced 
that a Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, to be based in Moscow and 
including "permanent representatives of the general staffs" of 
the member-states, was being established. 
However, overall control of the Joint Command would lie 
elsewhere: 
This decision envisages that general questions 
the strengthening of the defence capacity 
organisation of the joint armed forces of 
participants of the treaty will be examined by 
Consultative Committee, which will take 
decisions. (ibid) 
pertaining to 
and to the 
the states-
the Poli tical 
appropriate 
This seemed to give the political structure precedence over the 
military, even though the military structure was given precedence 
in the Treaty itself. 
In fact, the formation of the Political Consul ta:ti ve 
," ... ", 
Committee (PCC) was not anounced until 20 January 1956, when a 
communique from Warsaw anounced that the PCC had been created and 
would convene its first session in Prague on 27 January "with a 
view to examining the problems and the measures to be taken in 
common for application of the Warsaw Treaty" (Pravda, 20 January 
1956, p.3). So, even though the Treaty had been in force from 4 
June of the previous year, it did not properly go into operation 
for over six months. 
The Prague PCC meeting "approved" the Statute of the Joint 
Command as proposed by Marshal Konev, "and settled organisational 
matters connected with the activities of the Joint Armed Forces 
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of the states signatories of the Warsaw Treaty" (Pravda, 29 
January 1956). After agreeing that the German Democratic 
Republic's proposed national army, and its Minister of National 
Defence, should be fully and equally integrated into the 
structure of the Warsaw Treaty, two "auxiliary agencies" were 
anounced, which were "to be set up under the Political Consult-
ative Committee" and be based in Moscow. These were described as 
A standing commission charged with the elaboration 
recommepdafions on foreign policy questions; 
A j oint secretariat to De formed of representatives of 
the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty. (ibid) 
of 
all 
Thus, at the start of 1956, the declared structure of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation was as indicated in Figure 1. In formal 
terms, this is how the structure remained until the Budapest 
Reforms of 1969 i in practical terms, however, various changes 
took place over the intervening sixteen years. 
The final paragraph of the document anouncing the formation 
of the Joint Command declared that the "Distribution of the joint 
armed forces on the territories" of the member states "wi 11 be 
carried out in accordance with the requirements of the mutual 
defence in agreement among the states." (Pra.vda, 15 May 1955) In 
effect, the Soviet forces that were already stationed in the GDR, 
Poland, Hungary, and Romania, were given a new ra.ison d'etre in 
relation to the Vlarsavr Treaty. These Soviet troops were to be 
considered as stationed I temporarily' by individual agreements 
between the Soviet forces and the host nation. Accardi ng to 
Tyushkevich, beyond the agreement to station these troops, "there 
was also a formal signing of agreements on the number of Soviet 
soldiers and the conditions of their stay on the territories of 
friendly countries." (pp.410-411) 
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In the midst of the crisis over Hungary in 1956, the Soviet 
Union issued a "Declaration of the Government of the Soviet Union 
on the Principles for Further Developing and Strengthening 
Friendship and Co-operation Beh18en the Soviet Union and_Other 
Socialist Countries" (Pravda, 31 October 1956, p. 1). This 
Declaration, in its analysis of the economic and political 
relationships within the Soviet bloc, offered to re-examine the 
question of Soviet military units on Central European territory 
(i bid) . In the aftermath of the Hungarian crisis, 'status of 
forces' agreements were signed with Poland (17 December 1956), 
the GDR (27 March 1957), Rumania <15 April 1957) 1, and Hungary 
(27 May 1957):2. 
On 27-28 April 1959, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw 
Treaty member states met in Warsaw (a Chinese representative was 
also present). Although this was not officially recognised 
wi thin the formal structure 
commentators argue that this 
of the Warsaw Treaty, some Soviet 
was the beginning of the 'practical 
work' carried out by the foreign ministers who were later 
formally convened in the Committee of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs (see for instance Menzhinskii, p.36). In fact, the 
foreign ministers did not meet again publicly until 1966, and it 
was this meeting that was the first of the regular meetings of 
the foreign ministers (see Appendix 2). From 26-27 February 
1968, the deputy foreign ministers also began to have regular 
consultations (see Appendix 2). 
The Warsaw Treaty defence ministers held the first of what 
became regular meetings on 8-9 September 1961 (see Appendix 2). 
(The national Chiefs of Staff have also attended t1dse meetings.) 
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This first meeting was probably timed to coincide with the first 
multilateral exercises in the ,following month. 
The question of the role of Albania ,(iithin the WTO is not 
officially discussed in any detail. Prior to the Warsaw Treaty, 
Albania had only a bilateral treaty with Bulgaria to tie it in to 
the general Soviet bloc (excluding the wider and '(maker ties of 
the CMEA). The Warsaw Treaty thus was the first real tie Albania 
had poli tica.lly and militarily with the rest of the socialist 
community. However, as part of the machinations of the Sino-
~. 
Soviet schism in which Albania sided with the Chinese, Albania 
was excluded from the PCC meeting held in Moscow on 7 June 1962. 
The Albanians waited until 13 September 1968, and the pretext of 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, to pass a law formally 
wi thdrawing from the WTO. (See AppendiX 6 for a discussion of 
Albania's role in the WTO.) Arguably, though, Albania was only 
an 'active' member during the initial period when the WID was 
generally moribund, and the Organisation could not really be 
considered as an important international body. 
While the series of multilateral exercises (beginning in 
1961), can be seen to mark the beginning of the WTO's rise to 
claim attention as a force to be noted, the structural reforms 
that were agreed on at the PCC meeting in Budapest on 17 March 
1969 (the "Budapest Reforms"), mark the most important departure 
in this process. New Statutes on the Joint Command and the Joint 
Armed Forces were agreed, along with the creation of a Military 
Council and a Technical Committee. 
The Communique of that meeting (Pravda, 18 March 1969) says 
that these changes were based on "a report from the Commander-in-
Chief of the Joint Armed Forces on measures worked out by the 
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Ministers of Defence with the approval of the respective 
governments." Though these changes have been recog~ised by 
successi ve Soviet commentators, the Communique carries on to say 
that 
other documents designed to bring about a further improvement 
in the~~tructure ana bodies of administration of the defence 
organi '\cJ on of the 'Warsaw Treaty, (iDid) V 
"/ere likewise "unanimously endorsed" by the PCC. As with the 
wording of the Statutes revised at this meeting, these 
"documents" have never been revealed, and it is unclear whether 
they refer to the Military Council and Technical Committee, or to 
something covert. 
Thus, after the Budapest Reforms, the known formal structure 
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was as depicted in Figure 2. 
The PCC meeting in 1972 anounced for the first time that its 
activities were aided by a "Secretary-General to the PCC" 
(Communique, Pravda, 27 January 1972), "/hose acti vi ties have 
nonetheless remained obscure. 
The only formal document other than the founding docum~nts 
and the Protocol of extension that has been published is the 
I Convention concerning the legal status, pri vileges, and 
immuni ties of the Staff and other administrative bodies of the 
Joi~t Armed Forces of the state-participants to the 'Warsaw 
Treaty' . This appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda on 27 April 1973, and 
was dated 24 April. Menzhinskii writes that this came into force 
on 21 November of the same year (though the event does not appear 
to have been reported in Krasnaya Zvezda, Pravda, or Izvestiya) , 
when the final state deposited its ratification papers in Moscow 
(Menzhinskii, footnote, p.39). 
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FIGURE 2: WTO formal structure, March 1969 
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(1) the Joint Secretariat and the Permanent Commission had 
carried out no public functions. 
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The second round of structural changes that took place, this 
time to the political side of the Organisation, was adopted by 
the PCC at its meeting in Bucharest, in 1976. These changes were 
that 
In view of the further improvement of the machinery of 
poli tical co-operation wi thin the framework of the Treaty, 
the decision was taken to create a Committee of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and a j oint secretariat as bodies of the 
Politlcal Consultative Committee. (Pravda, 27 November 1976) 
The formal structure of the WTO thus became as is illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
In conjunction with the PCC meeting, a Declaration "For 
fresh advances in international relaxation, the strengthening of 
securi ty and the development of co-operation" was issued by the 
WTO (ibid). It must be seen as more than just the standard 
statement on various issues of the contemporary international 
situation, since section four of the Declaration appears to 
J 
include a post..,lHelsinki Final Act statement on how the Warsaw 
Treaty member-states proposed to broaden their public 
international face, both wi thin the socialist community and ,by 
implication in wider terms. After reiterating their ideological 
t, 
basis as a socialist community, they declare: 
'VI 
To continue to expand effective co-operation in the 
strengthening of peace in Europe and universal peace .... ; 
To aeepen ~he political contacts of the fraternal peoples, 
including the practice of holding consultative meetings of 
Parliamentarians and also representatives of the public for 
the discussion of topical problems of international affairs; 
to expand mutual information and the exchange of experience 
of socialist and communist construction and to promote the 
development of contacts between states and public 
organisations and labour collectives; 
To develop bilateral and multilateral co-operation in all 
spheres of the economy, in the application of the 
achievements of scientific and technolo~ical progress for the 
further rise in the material and splrituaI "lell-being of 
their peoples, to promote together witb other countries wfiich 
are members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 
the ever fuller implementation of .the Comprehensive Pro~ramme 
and the fulfillment of the decisions of the 30t.t-, seSSlon of 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance concerning the j oint working. out and ~.mple"'8nt~tion of long-term s:pecial 
proRraIiIffies, The.1 oint tl1 irhts ot cosmonauts Trom soclal ist 
countries in Soviet spaceshlps and stations planned for 1978-
1983 will be a striking manifestation of tbe high level of 
co-operation in science and technology; 
To cement cultural co-operation, exchan~es of literary and 
artistic values, contacts between professlonal unions, twin 
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regions and cities and to encourage broader tourist contacts 
ana communications between individuals. (ibid) 
The section was concluded with a resolution to strengthen 
friendship and co-operation within the world socialist cO~fiunity. 
This section of the Declaration was singled out for 
particular stress when "the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central 
Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR 
Council of Ministers" issued a j oint statement approvh.g the WTO 
Declaration (Pravda, 4 December 1976, p.l). 
Some time after this Declaration, and presumably in 
conformi ty with its proposals on improved relations wi thin the 
bloc, the first 'consul tati ve' meeting ~ of Chairmen of the 
Parliaments of Warsaw Treaty states was held in Leningrad (5-8 
July 1977), though it limited itself to reinforcing the 
established proposals of the PCC and other common policy lines. 
The original Treaty would formally have expired on 4 June 
1985 (see Appendix 1). However, the BBC Radio 4 news at 08:00 
hours on 7 March 1985 anounced, without naming a source, that 
Hungary had intimated that the Treaty would be extended. The 
Guardian of :March 8, quoting the then Hungarian Foreign :Minister 
Peter Varkonyi, who was visiting London, said that the Treaty 
would be extended "for another 20 years, and without any changes 
to the text". The Times, covering the Hungarian Party Congress, 
reported that Kadar had confirmed this in his speech to the 
Congress on :March 25 (Times, 26 March 1985), adding that Kadar 
had suggested the final decision had been taken in meetings of 
the Soviet bloc leaders attending the Chernenko funeral. The 
text of Kadt 's speech (Pravda, 26 March 1985, p.5), only states 
that there had been "Recently in :Moscow a meeting of the main 
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party-State delegates of the states-participants of the Warsaw 
Treaty .... " which had unanimously endorsed the extension of the 
term of operation of the Treaty. (The only known recent meeting 
had been held at Chernenko's funeral.) 
Only weeks before the Treaty was formally extended, the 
Western press, quoting unpublished sources, reported continued 
resistance to the terms of the extension. It was stated that the 
Soviets were wanting formally to link the anniversary of the 
Treaty with the anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 
Europe (The Observer, 14 April 1985, p.10). While resisting such 
a move Romania also intimated that it wanted the Treaty renewed 
for 1/ only ten or even five years" and had Hungarian and GDR 
support for this line, though it was apparently Romania that had 
been first "to agree in principle to the renewal of the pact" 
(ibid). A 
On 26 April 1985, only 18 days before the 30~h Anniversary 
of the signing of the Treaty, a meeting of 1/ the highest party 
leaders and statesmen of the states-participants of the Warsaw 
Treaty" was held, which signed a Protocol of just two Articles, 
"On prolonging the period of validity of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsaw 
on May 14, 1955." (Pravda, 27 April 1985.) 
also Chapter 5. ) 
(See Appendix 1; see 
Certainly, in view of the state of East-West relations and 
the continUing existence of NATO (which has an indefinite period 
of validity), such a move was to be expected, but it seems 
unusual that the Preamble to the original Treaty, so explicit (.bur 
the fear ~; a remili tarised West Germany being included in the 
new military alliance of the Western European Union and in NATO, 
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was not rewritten, since it is such an Ctf;r(J-~t· anachronism. Of 
most significance, however, ,is that it was not the PCC which 
/ 
signed the Protocol, but an extraordinary meeting of 'Warsaw 
Treaty member states'. The signatories of the Protocol were all 
the party leaders; with the exclusion of Gorbachev for the USSR 
and Kadar for Hungary, the other signatories also signed in their 
concurrent State capacities. The original inter-state Treaty was 
being treat~d as an inter-party agreement vii th state aspects, 
which is a very unusual scheme of things, particularly when the 
formal structure of the Organisation is taken into account. 
In his keynote address on the 30~h Anniversary, Rusakov (see 
Appendix 7), said of the "Warsaw meeting" (ie, the meeting that 
signed the Protocol), that 
It demonstrated with renewed strength the determination of 
the allied socialist countries' parties and peoples to 
continue to strengthen their unity and cohesion, jointly 
defend socialism's pOSitions, act in a co-ordinated manner in 
international affairs, and strive for lasting peace on Earth. (Izvestiya, 15 May 1985) 
In such an analysis the allied governments really had no part at 
all in the scheme of things, and if they had any role at all in 
an inter-state treaty it must have been as a front for the 
parties. However, Rusakov later stated that the use of the 
Protocol as the form of extension was 
an expression of the continuity 
policy and the immutability of the 
they considered it necessary to 
alllance 30 years ago. (ibid) 
of the socialist states' 
objectives for whose sake 
form a relationship of 
This suggests that it is the 'states' who decide WTO policy. 
(But as this and following chapters discuss, there is no clear 
indication from the original sources as to where policy is 
decided, or whether the parties or the governments are officially 
in control.) 
chapter 3 60 
Introduction 
An international organisation was formed on the basis of 
the Warsaw Treaty. .The organisation is equipped with 
suitable organs operating on tliepasis of the Treavy itself 
and their own statutes.... [J/1ff is a regional allied 
Ortanisation Q.f.. collecti ves.ali /QJiillQa. It has come to be 
ca led the Warsaw Treaty OrganisatiJn. 
The importance of the Varsaw Treaty Organisation goes, 
hov18ver, far beyond the framework of preparation for a Joint 
defence in case of an armed attack. The organisation 
consti tutes a forum for adopting a common poli hcal line, 
common attitude of its member states towards the most 
important problems of international politics. It is one of 
the organlsational forms of the community of socialist 
states. 
CTyranowski, p.118. Original stress.) 
The structure of the WTO, and perhaps even more importantly 
the structural development of the Organisation, illustrates the 
paradoxical nature of the alliance. Under the overall general 
policy-making control of the Political Consultative Committee, 
two quite separate formal structures have developed, the military 
and the political, each with its own goals and perspectives and 
with virtually no interaction between the two. CThe informal 
structure is discussed separately, at the end of the chapter.) 
While arguing since its formation that the Organisation was 
a response to the aggressive militarism of the United States and 
its NATO allies (for example in the first PCC Declaration,- 28 
January 1956), that in fact this military confrontation has 
continued (see, for example, Alexandrov, p.23j Kozlov, p.212j 
Stepaniuk), even to the present day (as claimed in the Protocol 
of extension), the Signatory states continue to have military 
links outwith the WTO, in the form of the bilateral treaties, 
which are specific to military co-operation (see Appendix 5), and 
other military and political relations on bilateral terms. 
Indeed in defence terms, the structures of the WTO could be 
disbanded with little or no disruption to the states' defence co-
operation and capabilities. So what function is the WTO intended 
to have? 
/(j 
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A catch-phrase from statements about the WTO is that the 
"unity and cohesion" of the members is being cemented and 
developed through their participation in the multilateral 
alliance. This is in fact mainly in political relations. 
Despite the early stress on military activities, from the 
creation of the Joint Command in 1955 to the inauguration of 
regular multinational military exercises in 1961, an equal if not 
predominant role of the Organisation has been to indicate a co-
ordination of the foreign-policy activities of the members (see, 
for example, Stepaniuk). The PCC is the only formal institution 
which regularly gathers the leading representatives from both 
party and state machineries from all the active members of the 
European socialist communi ty, 
/ 
i1}c.~6ding Romania, in the same 
place and at the same time, and gets them to agree on a formal 
document. :3 These people can be called together on an ad hoc 
basis, for example at the Chernenko funeral or in the Crimea (see 
Appendix 2), but if only to give the impression of equal 
sovereignty and voice, a formal political body, such as the FCC, 
is necessary to show a co-ordinated international position for 
the socialist community. 
With due regard to the claim that the PCC merely co-
ordinates East-bloc support for an independently-generated Soviet 
foreign policy (eg Kobal, p.191), and the writers who decry any 
mul tilateral non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty role in any prospective 
European conflicts4, it would seem that the prime function of the 
WTO is political, in both intra-bloc and external terms. It 
presents an image of being a 'war-fighting, war-winning' military 
alliance (at least to NATO, the US Department of Defense, and the 
majority of the West's politicians and opinion-leaders), while 
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internally it is the political functions which have become 
dominant. 
Arguably, the WTO has almost from the beginning had a 
function as a force for bloc integration. Meissner argues that 
the original bilateral treaties were part of Stalin's scheme for 
Soviet dominance of post-war Central Europe <1966, p.238), with 
the twin aims of bloc security and also a means to effecting the 
political loyalty of the new 'socialist commonwealth' to a 
hegemonic USSR (ibid, p. 240). Officially, the establishment of 
the WTO was the 'second stage' in the development of the 
socialist 'combat community', the 'internationalist solidarity' 
that was "characterised by a more active participation of each 
socialist state in the strengthening the common defensive might 
of the fraternal alliance." (Grechko, p.332 - see also Chapter 1) 
In broader terms, though, the vlTO as a whole was generally 
moribund until the 1960s. Khrushchev, who had overseen the 
founding of the WTO, used it to argue the scope for a general 
reduction in Soviet ground forces (as part of his internal Sov~et 
political debate)~ but relied more on the CMEA as a multilateral 
means to encourage integration~ Although the first PCC session 
was attended solely by governmental representatives, all the 
subsequent ones have included at least Party First Secretaries 
(from the third PCC session in 1960 the party leaders have also 
been the "heads of delegation" to the PCC), indicating the shift 
in emphasis of the WTO to have a distinct party role. 3-5 August 
1961 saw in Moscow the first meeting solely of party 
representatives as opposed to a formal PCC meeting, and a 
foreign-policy Communique was issued (see Appendices 2 dnd 3). 
!p < 
I,'· :;. 
Al though this meeting is mentioned by E. S. Shevchenko to the 
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exclusion of the August 13 Berlin Declaration that led to the 
building of the Berlin Wall, it is only the latter document that 
is included in the official volumes of documents and materials 
(see Appendix 3). However, Kobal sees the Moscow meeting as 
being the beginning of a more overtly political role for the 
Organisation (p.249). Both -these meetings were, it must be 
remembered, ouhli th the formal structure. 
The COIIlJ!lunique covering the Budapest Reforms (Pravda, 18 
March 1969), specified that the changes were designed to improve 
the structure and administration of the defence aspects of the 
WTO. It was not until the Bucharest Reforms of 1976 that an 
officially-consti tuted (as opposed to a limited ad hoc) , 
political structure took shape. This indicates a specific (if 
delayed) response to the changing status of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation in bloc politics. Over the same period the 
corresponding public statements surrounding the WTO also changed 
from those bringing the military mechanisms and activities to the 
I 
fore (eg Stepaniuk, in a 17~h anniversary articlo/), to those t~at 
f 
F"--
gi ve precedence to the political mechanisms and acti vi ties (eg 
Menzhinskii, and Savinov [1980] - see also Chapter 4). Over its 
first thirty years, the WTO has in general shifted from being an 
overt defence pact issuing statements on foreign policy to being 
the main centre for the co-ordination of the fraternal countries' 
foreign policy activities. Military policy is of course an 
aspect of foreign policy. (This is not to ignore any role that' 
individual countries or politicians may have at various times 
used the WTO to play in their internal or intra-bloc politics, or 
any role ascribed to the WTO or its members in broader 
t 
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international relations, for example with the Third World, which 
are not directly covered by the WTO's European focus.) 
Thus although the bulk of the official bodies wi thin the 
structure of the WTO are military, the activities of the 
Organisation seem to bel ie this. The WTO must be seen in the 
context of being an aspect of bloc, and in particular Soviet, 
poli tics, wi thin the "structure of world socialism" (Alexandrov, 
p.25), in ~hich the direct European confrontation plays its 
part. s (See in particular Chapter 7.) 
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The Bodies of the WID 
The Political Consultative Committee 
The PCC is repeatedly described as "the highest body of the 
WTD" (eg Menzhinskii, p.34; see also Savinov, 1980, p.15, and 
Alexandrov, p. 21) . Article 6 of the Treaty states that "each 
state-participant of the Treaty will be represented [in the PCC] 
by a member of the government or another specially appointed 
representative". The first session of this body was attended by 
Chairmen or First Vice-Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers, and 
the IUnisters of Defence. (The USSR and Czechoslovakia also sent 
their Ministers of Foreign Affairs - Pravda, Communique, 29 
January 1956.) Delegations of later meetings soon became swelled 
by the First or General Secretaries of the national parties, and 
the Foreign Ministers. (See also Savinov, 1980, p. 16. ) Since 
the March 1961 session the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed 
Forces has generally been reported as having attended the PCC 
sessions. Later still the Chief of Staff of the WTD was known to 
attend, and from 1972 to 1980 inclusive, meetings of the PCC were 
attended by a "General Secretary" (see separate entry below). 
Shtemenko states that "other party and state leaders" are 
"invited" to the PCC (p.168a-b), vfhile Menzhinskii states that 
the size of delegations is not limited, and that "other leaders 
of high rank" can attend (p. 34). After the formation of the 
Committee of Ministers of Defence in 1969, the Defence Ministers 
did not attend sessions of the PCC until the sessions from 1983, 
onwards (though at the session in 1980 all the states except 
Bulgaria sent their Defence Ministers). However, photographs of 
sessions of the PCC in, for example, Kulikov (1980) and 
Shkarovskii show that behind the formal delegations there are 
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'.>lhat must be advisers to each delegation, who have never been 
listed in the communiques or ,otherwise referred to as attending. 
The Treaty is very vague in its reference to the PCC. 
Article 6 explains that it is being formed to facilitate "the 
consul tations provided for" by the Treaty, but that it will also 
be "considering problems arising in connexion with the 
implementation" of the Treaty; "consul tations" are by 
implication ~o be for the securing of arms control (Article 2), 
and on "important" international issues (Article 3)6, (see 
Appendix 1). In broad terms the Treaty was signed to ensure 
peace and stability in Europe and around the world, so in theory 
issues covered by the PCC should have this in mind. 
In practice, the PCC 'discusses', or carries out an 
'exchange of views' on, a broad range of the international 
problems of the day (as it is described in the eommuniques), 
about which it issues a range of documents from brief communiques 
to draft international treaties, to show the common position of 
its members? (Menzhinskii, p.35), and also discusses reports from 
the C-in-C on matters covering the activities of the Joint Armed 
Forces (ibid), and thus the common defence. However, in an 
article covering the 30~h Anniversary, it was stated that the PCC 
was "set up for consultations and for reviewing the Warsaw Treaty 
activity" (Nezhinsky, p.63 - added stress), which seems to be 
vaguer than the wording in the Treaty. 
Article 6 of the Treaty also states that the PCC can "form 
auxiliary bodies for which the need may arise". The first two of 
these were the Permanent Commission on foreign policy and a Joint 
Secretariat, established by the PCC in 1956. (But see the 
specific discussion of these two bodies below.) The Spravochnik 
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Politrabotnika, in describing the WTG's structure, said that the 
Commi ttee of Hinisters of Foreign Affairs, and the Joint 
Secretariat, were bodies of the PCC (p.214). The Eol' sbaya 
Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya's Ezbegodniks for 1983, 1984, and 1985 
state that the PCC's bodies were the Committee of Hinisters of 
Foreign Affairs, the Co~~ittee of Ministers of Defence, and the 
Joint Secretariat; they then go on to discuss the Joint Armed 
Forces and its structure. Further confusion about what the PCC 
actually controls is added by Kulikov, vlho claimed in an article 
from the 30t..t-. Anniversary that the PCC vlaS 'fundamental' to the 
mili tary development plans (1985 p. 75); this is despite the 
fact that there is virtually no direct reference to 'military 
plans' in the PCC'S documents (see Chapter 4). Even if the 
Ezhegodniks are correct, there is no obvious means by which the 
PCC can organise the military structure of the WTG; all that can 
be seen publicly is that the PCC's Communiques occasionally refer 
to a report having been delivered at the session by the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces. 
According to Zamyatin, the PCC is a co-ordinating body to 
ensure the 'fraternal co-operation' of its members. The question 
arises of just how much control the PCC does exert. If it is 
accepted that the body "examines general political problems [and] 
international issues.... including defence" (Grechko, p.325), 
then it could in practice be considered as just a rubber-stamping 
authority. The Communique covering the Budapest Reforms stated 
that 
The Political Consultative Committee heard a report from the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces on measures 
worked out by the Ministers of DefeD 0 e with the approval of 
the respective governments. (Pravda, 18 March 1969) 
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This amounts to saying that an ad hoc meeting of the defence 
ministers :!&ld. the PCC to convene the defence ministers as an 
official c01lliIli ttee of the WTO. Meissner takes this further and 
claims that the PCC proposals for the strengthening of the WTO's 
defence capabilities are actually drafted by the C01lliIlittee of 
Ministers of Defence (1983, p.361b)G. Tyranowski states that the 
PCC examines problems concerning the Joint Command "on the motion 
of the Commander-in-Chief" (p. 109). Other vrriters have claimed 
that the C-in-C only "takes part" CMenzhinskii, p.35) in the 
proceedings, and the C-in-C has not been listed as an official 
member of the PCCj in fact a study of the attendees9 reveals that 
, 
the C-in-C has not attended every session of the PCC. 
If the PCC can be seen as issuing general policy (see 
Chapter 4) , vlhether or not it is independently generated, 
Alexandrov explains that these ideas and proposals "are further 
defined and developed in other Warsaw Treaty Organisation bodies, 
especially those at ministerial level." (p. 22) For example, the 
PCC C01lliIlunique of 1983 states that "It was agreed that at its 
next meeting the C01lliIlittee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty is to study the question 
of further steps directed at the implementation of this 
initiative." (Pravda, 6 January 1983) The C01lliIlunique of 1986 
also stated that the PCC "positively evaluated the work of the 
C01lliIli ttee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the C01lliIli ttee of 
Ministers of Defence over the period that has passed since the 
previous meeting of the Political Consultative C01lliIlittee, and 
determined their further tasks." (Pravda, 12 June 1986) In 1969, 
hovf8ver, the PCC instructed the v-in-C to 'ensure the practical 
implementation' of the military policy, though this may have just 
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referred to the formation of the Committee of Ministers of 
Defence (Pravda, 18 March 1969). 
The Communique of the fir~t session of the PCC stated that 
it had been decided to meet "as necessity arises, but not less 
than twice a year" (Pravda, 29 January 1956). Tyranowski repeats 
this, but argues that "The Committee meets in principle once a 
year .... " (p. 106). Even this is an overstatement, since the PCC 
had not met at all in 1957, 1959, 1964, 1967, and 1971 (the year 
Tyranowski was writing). From 1970 to 1983 inclusive, the PCC in 
fact met biennially, mainly issuing declarations on wider 
foreign-policy themes. Such activity of the PCC underlines that 
its control of the activites of the WTO can only be of a general 
nature (which is confirmed by the scope of its published 
documents see Chapter 4), and emphasises its role as a 
political body, one that issues statements on political rather 
than practical military matters. 
Since each document from the PCC is intended to bear the 
signature of each state's chief delegate it can be assumed that 
the PCC, like the OrnA, operates on the principle of unanimity, 
implying that PCC documents are evidence of at least a 'minimum 
consensus'. Despite M:enzhinskii writing (p.34 - also VCilkerrecht 
p.87a), that each delegation had only one vote, a leading Central 
European specialistN stated that, in his "understanding", there 
Nas seldom any formal voting in the PCC. Therefore the non-
Soviet states cannot really be said to have a 'veto' of any sort, 
but can carry out "obstruction" to the attainment of consensus. 
Several Central EuropeansN also spoke of a semi-formalised 
expression of "non-participation" by the Central Europeans, again 
affecting the ultimate decisions 10 , What are describedN as 
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"informal talks" also take place in meetings outwi th the PCC 
where, for example, the Soviets are asked what they \:!ill give 
through, say, CMEA aid, to compensate for, say, the non-Soviets' 
having to accept WTD agreements in foreign policy that could 
damage national trading patterns, or if the WTD is asked to agree 
on increased military spending during times of national economic 
stringency. 
This explains why PCC documents are almost invariably of a 
, 
more' conciliatory tone than the independent statements from the 
Soviet Union. It also indicates that the WTD, the only formal 
multinational political body of the Soviet bloc, is not of 
paramount importance or significance. The most striking example 
of both these points is that there was no PCC meeting between 
January 1983 and well after the 30t.t-· Anniversary (S.CL Appendix 2). 
A regular meeting of the PCC was scheduled for January 19&;, but 
was postponed, presumably due to Chernenko's ill-health; during 
this period the decision was taken to extend the WTD's period of 
operation, so the negotiations for such an important action must 
have been taken outwi th the PCC, and so ouhli th the formal 
structure of the WTD. 
Despi te such obvious limits to the WTD'S main body, the 
official propaganda still describes the PCC as "one of the most 
important forms of co-operation between the leaders of the 
fraternal parties and countries." CSWB SU/5375/A2/1, 27 November 
1976) 
Dfficial writers on the WTD repeatedly describe it as an 
organisation of sovereign nations. Grechko, for example, 
explains that 
The principle of the sovereignty of states.... is clearly 
expressed in the composition, powers and procedures of the 
Poli tical Consul tati ve Committee of the Warsaw Treaty 
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Organisation and the organisational structure of the Command 
of the Joint Armed Forces. (1977, p.321) 
As has been shovm in this discussion, such an assessment would be 
hard to justify from other official descriptions of the PCC. 
Research=' shovfs that the "composition" of the delegations of the 
PCC is not uniform, either between the nations participating or 
in a national delegation at different meetings; the "povl8rs" of 
the PCC are obscure; and the "procedures" have not been 
officially described. Unofficially, of course, it has been 
explained in this thesis that the Central Europeans states can 
influence the proceedings of the PCC, but only through extra-
procedural means, though this cannot have been the national 
"sovereignty" Grechko meant. Chapter 4 concludes that the 
influence of the WTO on national and internal policies is 
limited, but again this cannot have been what Grechko meant; his 
claim seems to be one of intent, or propaganda, rather than 
official practice. 
The Permanent Commission and the Joint Secretariat 
The Political Consultative Committee concluded its first 
Communique (in 1956) by stating that it was setting up a foreign 
policy commission and a joint secretariat. These were presumably 
to be seen as the political counterparts of the military 
structure set up with the Treaty. Nothing has ever been heard of 
these bodies, in that they have never issued any public 
communiques or other documents, and no meetings have ever been 
recorded as having been held. The 1957 Ezhegodnik of the 
Bpl'shaya Sovetskaya En tsiklopediya, in its analysis of the 1956 
session -: the PCC, did not refer to these two bodies having been 
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set up, whi le later issues also did not refer to them when 
discussing the WTG's structure. 
Tyranowski did refer to their being formed by the PCC 
(p. 110), but said no more about them; Menzhinskii referred to 
them, in a single sentence, adding that they II work on a continual 
basis" (p.37) but did not explain what this work was. Kobal, as 
a Western source writing in 1974, said that "the Secretariat .... 
has been re~ponsible for administering the internal goals of the 
WTG, specifically in the co-ordination of the armed forces 
supplied to WTG by member states. "(p. 230), but he does not cite 
any original source for this. 
In a footnote to page 16, Savinov (1980) contradicts all 
this, by ~Titing: 
.... to all intents and purposes 
operative. Questions whicli had to 
in the meetings of the ministers of 
deputies. 
these bodies were not 
be studied were examined 
foreign affairs and their 
Even this does not quite resolve the problem. Menzhinskii 
says that the foreign ministers had met from 1959 and their 
deputies from 1968 (p.26), though as Appendix 2 shows there ~ere 
no meetings of the foreign min;~ ters attributed to WTG business 
,I ./ 
betv:een 1960 and 1965 inclusive. However, in political terms, 
the WTG was doing very little in these early years, so even if 
Savinov is giving the correct account of the structure, the 
foreign ministers either had very little to do or were not 
meeti ng at an over~ mu 1 ti la teral ] eve 1. 
Perhaps the most telling point is that at the Bucharest PCC 
session in 1976, vlhen the political structure was reorganised, 
the Communique explicitly stated that "the decision vias taken to 
create .... a joint secretariat" (Pravda, 27 November 1976 - added 
stress), indicating that this was a completely new part of the 
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structure, and not just a tinkering with an existing body. (See 
also the specific discussion below on the Joint Secretariat of 
1976. ) 
The Joint COmmand of the Joint Armed Forces 
The Warsaw Treaty created the socialist community's first 
permanent and multilateral military institution. While the 
bilateral treaties linked the states with the obligation of a 
common defence, the Warsavl Treaty promised "concerted measures 
necessary for the strengthening of their defensive capacity" 
(Arti~ 5), the focus of which vlOuld be / 
~he establishment of a joint command for their armed forces, 
"lhich shall be placed, by agreement among these parties, 
under this command, which shall funG..tion on the basis of 
j~i~tlY defined principles t-
(u,~ ) 
A separate document anouncing the establishment of this Joint 
Command was signed and issued at the same time as the Treaty (see 
Appendix 1). Menzhinski i described the Joint Command as "working 
on a permanent basis" (p. 38). 
The document forming the Joint Command explained that it 
would be headed by a Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Joint 
Armed Forces OAFs), with "assistants" who would be "the 
Ministers of Defence and other military leaders of the state-
partici pants to the treaty" 1 1 • In his 30th Anniversary article, 
Smorigo described the Joint Command as comprising the Commander-
in-Chief and his deputies (p. 31). The Legal Convention (see 
Appendix 1, and the specific discussion below), states that the 
Joint Command has its own Statutes (which / have never been 
published) . 
Nei ther the Treaty nor the resolution creating the Joint 
Command 12 state how the Commander-in-Chief is to be appointed. 
The resolution on the Joint Command merely records the 
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appointment of Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev (a member 
of the Soviet delegation to the Warsaw Conference), as the first 
C~in-C, but the Treaty ~'laS the result of a second extraordinary 
"Conference of European States for Safeguarding Peace and 
Securi ty in Europe". Menzhinskii states that the Commander-in-
Chief is "appointed by the PCC" Cp. 38), though in this initial 
case the PCC was not formed until the following January. Savinov 
is more explicit, saying that "The Commander-in-Chief of the 
[JAFs] is appointed .... by the joint decision of the governments 
of all the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation." (1980, 
p.17)13 Since the PCC includes both state ~ party leaders, it 
might be assumed that the PCC must ratify a decision taken 
elsewhere. In fact, there have been no PCC sessions remotely 
corresponding to the dates of the appointments of the various 
Commanders-in-Chief, with the exception of the 1976 PCC (which 
was more concerned -vd th pol i tical matters), which occurred four 
days prior to the death of Marshal Yakubovskii, and more than a 
month before the press notification of the appointment of Marshal 
Kulikov as his successor. (See also Appendix 7.) 
However, the post of the WTO's Commander-in-Chief does not 
seem to be a full-time one. Krasnaya Zvezda for 1 June 1966 
carried an article on its front page, reporting a "Meeting of 
voters -vd th A. A. Grechko", explaining that Grechko and other 
"deputy Ministers of Defence .... of the Soviet Union" had been in 
attendance. Despi te Grechko's having been the WTO's C-in-C for 
six years, this post was not referred to in the article. 
Similarly, Pravda for 9 April 1977 carried a page two article 
describing a meeting held on Air Defence Forces Day; Kulikov was 
listed as an attendee, but he was designated "deputy Minister of 
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Defence of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union" - he was n..o..t.. 
referred to as Commander-in-Chief of the WTG, a post he had been 
given in January of that year. The most glaring example of such 
an oIDIDission was during the 30 t .h Anniversary celebrations, where 
Kulikov was at one point described as a "Marshal of the Soviet 
Union", and not even as a deputy defence minister, let alone the 
WTG Commander-in-Chief (see also Chapter 5). 6lve5f-;~ , IS N1~~ /qgt; .• J 
Accordil!g . to Shtemenko, the Joint C01mnand has "definite 
powers to carry out [its] functions", which are the co-ordination 
and direction of the Joint Armed Forces, from their headquarters 
in Moscow (p. 189a) . E. S. Shevchenko puts it more broadly when 
he says that the Joint Command aims to "secure the co-operation 
of the military forces and the strengthening of the defence 
potential of the country-participants of the Warsaw Treaty." 
:Meissner explains that the PCC's resolutions "in the 
mili tary sphere" are turned by the COIDIDi ttee of Ministers of 
Defence into recoIDIDendations for implementation by the Joint 
Command <1983, p. 361b). <This is consistent with Alexandrov's 
description of 'ministerial elaboration' - see above under the 
PCC. ) PCC COIDIDuniques usually contain a paragraph explaining 
that a report on the "practical work" of the Joint Command has 
been "heard". These presumably include the co-ordinated training 
prograIDIDes, and the regular joint military or staff exercises, 
though these are more the purview of the Joint Staff, which 
Meissner describes as the C-in-C's "executive organ" (ibid·, 
p. 362a). 14 Writing on the WTG in 1980, Kulikov stated that the 
C-·in-C actually reports on the acti vi ties of the Joint Command 
both to the Political Consultative COIDIDittee ~ to the COIDIDittee 
of Ministers of Defence <1980-b, p. 166). Elsewhere, he also 
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descri bed the Staff as the C-in-C's "body of administration" and 
the "working body" of the ,Committee of Ministers of. Defence 
C1980-a, p. 26) . 
This raises the question of just what role the Joint Armed 
Forces, under the WTG Joint Command, can ever play. Since the 
PCC was never convened to discuss the threat posed to the 
alliance by Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, or even 
Poland in 1980-81; and since the military intervention Hungary 
was carried out by the USSR alone while the Czechoslovak 
intervention was not the work of all the members of the WTGl ,5, we 
can discount these sole examples of the member armies in action 
in Europe 1 €-. 
There is speculation in the West about the peacetime nature 
of the Joint Command. Condoleezza Rice quotes one Vaclav 
Prchlik, "the highest member of Czechoslovakia's pOlitical-
military elite" (1984-b, p.140) as having said in 1968 at "a 
nationwide press conference": 
Relations within this coalition [the WTG) .... should be 
improved .... in such a way as to emphasise the real equality 
of individual members of the coalition .... 
The problem is that the 'joint command' is a command formed 
by marshals, generals, and officers of the Soviet army, and 
other member armies have only a few representatives who have 
so far held no responsibilities, nor had any hand in making 
decisions. They play, rather, a role of liaisons. (ibid, p.141) 
Certainly, despite claims that the posts of Commander-in-Chief 
and Chief of Staff could be filled by any of the WTG 
nationalities (eg Savinov, 1980, p.17) these posts, plus the 
senior deputy command and staff officers, have all continued to 
be filled by Soviets; it can therefore be argued that the non-
Soviet Deputy Commanders-in-Chief and Deputy Chiefs of Staff are 
just token appointments. There may not ha, ~ been any significant 
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changes for the Central Europeans since Prchlik was speaking in 
1968. 
Quite apart from this, the C-in-C has 'representatives' 
posted throughout the allied armed forces (though presumably only 
the non-Soviet allies), and the allied military establishments, 
ostensibly to liaise between the Joint Command and the national 
militaries on issues such as "the training of the troops 
appointed to the structure of the j oint armed forces" (Savinov, 
1980, p. 18). (Shtemenko is more general and speaks of the 
national forces' "preparation" - p.189a.) A further function of 
these representatives is to II ensure constant contact between the 
national command and the Commander-in-Chief of the [JAFsJ." 
(ibid), though Savinov is more particular and refers to liaison 
between "the Deputy commanders of the [J AFsJ and the commanders 
of the national military forces" (p.18), which amounts to helping 
liaison within the national ministries of defence, since even 
wi thin the Joint Armed Forces the national commanders retain 
control of their own forces. (See below, under the Joint Armed 
Forces. ) According to Mackintosh, "Each mission is headed by a 
two- or three-star General with a considerable staff, on which 
the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air Force are normally represented." 
(1974, p.124a) though he does not give a source for this 
information. 
A Central European expertN specified that the WTO 
representation in the national military structures is quite 
independent of other, Soviet, Qilateral representatives; the two 
are separate, covering different subjects and remits of concern. 
This again shows that the Soviets seem to have a military 
relationship with their allies quite distinct from the putative 
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role of the WTO to this end. The Central Europeans themselves 
have representatives in each others' military structures, on 
behalf of the Joint Armed Force~ (SWB, EE/7952/C/18-19) , but the 
role of these is unclear. 
In purely military terms, the role of the multinational 
Joint Command seems to be minimised. This would be consistent 
wi th the conclusions of footnote 4 in this chapter, as regards 
the military. activities of the Joint Armed Forces under that 
Joint Command. 
The Joint Armed Forces 
According to Article 5 of the Treaty, the Joint Command was 
created by the signatories "for their armed forces, which shall 
be placed.... under this command", which would imply that the 
J AFs cover all the mi li tary forces of each member state. The 
resolution forming the Joint Command said that it would cover 
"The armed forces.... allotted to the j oint armed forces", v/hich 
suggests that the J AFs are more limited in scope. Menzhinskii 
talks of troops that are "apportioned in the composition of the 
Joint Armed Forces" (p.38) v[hile Alexandrov is even more limited 
when he writes that" the J oi nt Armed·· Forces consist of 
contingents of troops" (p.24). Shtemenko makes this "a definite 
contingent" <p. 168b), but adds that "their composition, 
organisation, and equipment are determined by the governments of 
each country, noting the recommendations of the PCC and the 
Commander-in-Chief" (pp.168-9)17. 
The national contingents are not led by the C-in-C directly, 
since each is commanded by its own deputy defence minister, 
acting as a deputy ~-in-~ of the Joint Armed Forces (Alexandrov, 
p. 24). <Prior to the Budapest Reforms and the creation of the 
('~ 
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Commi ttee of Ministers of Defence, the deputy (5' s-in-c were the 
./ 
Defence Ministers.) The document forming the Joint Command (see 
Appendix 1) in fact states that the Com,'nander-in-Chief's 
assistants include "other military leaders of the states .... \"lho 
are vested \"lith the command of the armed forces of each state .... 
allotted to the j oint armed forces." While this seems to 
emphasise the lack of multinational direction of the forces, such 
a broad desc\iption does not seem to have been repeated in later 
official discussions of the WTO. 
Shtemenko adds that the J AF contingents "are regulated by 
the laws, statutes, and military regulations of their countries" 
(p.169a). This was repeated by Gribkov in his 30~h Anniversary 
article in Izvestiya (14 May 1985, p. 3), and he concluded that 
this ensured that national equality was 'guaranteed'. Unlike 
earlier writers, he specified that within the national 
contingents, "The Joint Armed Forces include formations and units 
of the land forces, forces of the Anti -Aircraft Defences, Air 
Forces, and Navy." (ibid) This is obviously not an efficient 
state of affairs for the running of a multinational army, and 
raises the question of how the JAFs would be co-ordinated in 
wartime (if they would be used at all), again calling into 
question the role of the WTO as a military rather than political 
body. 
Even during the 30 u -, Anniversary the disparate nature of the 
JAFs was being emphasised. In an address to a meeting, 
Commander-in-Chief Kulikov spoke of the JAFs in terms of national 
armies (Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 May 1985, pp.1-2). In an Anniversary 
article he explained that the JAFs consisted of the "best-trained 
contingents" who had the best equipment (Kulikov, 1985 p. 75). 
\':!C 
I 
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Katrich specified that the national armies v18re "predominant" 
within the JAFs (1985. . p. 56). To Lt.-Gen. Morocz Lajos, 
Hungarian State Secretary of Defence, in an Anniversary article 
in the Hungarian party daily Nepszabadsag: 
The Vlarsaw Treatl is not a transnational organisation, the 
basis of the al iance is the unity of interests of equal 
states. The units of the [Joint] Armed Forces are under 
national authorities and they are developed and trained under 
mutually co-ordinated plans. (MTI Daily Bulletin, vol.20/135, 15 May 1985) 
As these descriptions show, even dfter 30 years the VITO's 
military functions were not being organised under a single 
leadership. This does not mean that they would not function 
together, just that in war, as described in footnote 4 of this 
chapter, the VITO would not be operati ve, ~and any military co-
ordination and action would take place outwith the WTO structure. 
The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces 
The Joint Staff operates under the Commander-in-Chief, co-
ordinating all the bodies that make up the Joint Command, which 
Menzhinskii explains leads to the Staff being "made up of 
corresponding departments and administrations" (p.38). The Le~al 
Convention (see Appendix 1) states that the Staff is covered by 
"documents accepted" by the member states. In practice, 
according to Menzhinskii, the Staff 'solves' the 'problems' 
encountered in running the Joint Armed Forces, their improvement 
and development, and carries out the tasks that will strengthen 
"all-round co-operation and ties between the fraternal armies" 
(p. 39). Savinov puts this in more detail when he says that the 
Staff "plans combined measures, manoeuvres, exercises, and 
generalises experience of the training of the armies and navies 
and works out recommendations from its utilisation." C1Qro~, p.18) 
E. S. Shevchenko merely states that the Staff, with the Joint 
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Co:m:mand, is to "secure the co-operation of the military forces ... 
of the country-participants of the Warsaw Treaty." This is 
explained by Stepaniuk as being "In everyday work and training 
[it] develops and strengthens the business-like international 
friendship elaborated in the staff [for] the service of the 
generals, admirals, and officers of the allied armies." In other 
words, the Staff, being a permanent body, ensures the day-to-day 
functions and general planning of the military alliance. 
The Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar' (1983), in its entry 
for the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, goes into much greater 
detail: 
[ It] keeps an eye on the mili tary-psli tical condit;iQns, 
military preparations, and other measures [pertaining] (inJthe 
system of tlie aggressive bloc NATO, works out correspbnding 
proposals and inlorms the general (main) staffs of the armies 
of the countries of the [VTOJ. [It) provides preparations, 
the carrying out of the meetings of the [CDM) , the Military 
Council of the [JAFs) and realises their decisions and 
recommendations. [ It) works out proposals for the 
development of troops (forces), ap~ortioned to the structure 
of the [JAFsJ, raises their mllitary and mobilisation 
readiness, the convergence of the organisational structure, 
equipment [of the Theatres of Military Operations] and the 
accumulation of reserves of material means. It plans 
annually and in the perspective of combined measures for the 
operational, military readiness of the [JAFs], other 
questions of their activities (training, military games, 
conferences, meetings, courses of instruction), rea~ises 
their preparation, carrying out, generalisation of experien~e 
and takes it to the [JAFs]. It works in close mutual 
activity with the corresponding general (main) staffs. 
But even this modern analysis presents some problems. After 
saying at the beginning and end that it" informs" and 'works 
closely' vii th the national military structures, it speaks in the 
middle as if it is only responsible for the apportioned units of 
the JAFs, and still talks as if the national military structures 
are not fully 'converged' for joint activities. The reference to 
the theatres of military operations ("TVD") is highly irregular 
and. perhaps quite spurious. It could be explained by the fact 
that the D~ :tionary was produced by a main editorial committee 
under N. V. Ogarkov, vlhose view of the military role and 
" 
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structure of Central Europe is very individual. (See, for 
example, Erickson, 1985, and Radio Free Europe RL 325/85, 27 
September 1985.) However, even this descri piion of the Staff 
seems mainly administrative, so the references to an operational 
role need not supersede the analysis of a limited military role 
for the JAFs discussed above. 
The Staff is headed by a Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed 
Forces who, according to Savinov, is simultaneously "the first 
deputy of the Commander-in-Chief and a member of the Committee of 
Ministers of Defence", who is "appointed by the governments of 
the members of the Warsaw Treaty, by mutual agreement, from the 
staff of the mi li tary forces of any member of the WTO." (1980, 
p.18)lE' Under the Chief of Staff are deputies from the other 
member-states (ibid), though Yakubovskii (197~) p.145), said that 
there were deputies 'including' from each of the allied armies. 
(Mackintosh describes them as being "of Maj or-General or Rear-
Admiral rank" - 1974, p.123b - but again without quoting any 
source. ) The Staff in general comprises representatives of "all 
the General Staffs of the members (Menzhinskii, p.38), Whom 
Savinov describes as "generals and officials from all seven 
allied armies" (1980, p.19). 
In analysing the Joint Staff, Mackintosh points out that the 
functions of the Staff are really quite limited, since it does 
not appear to have any "operations, signals, transportation or 
supply services", nor does it seem to be responsi ble for air 
defence (1974, p.123a)19. Mackintosh explains that all these 
areas would be needed for the WTO to have an independent wartime 
function (ibid). Writing in an anniversary article in 1975, WTO 
C-in-C Yakubovskii refe~ to the plan of the Joint Co~~nd being 
( 
chapter 3 83 
carried out through "training and other joint measures" in the 
preparation of the WTG's air defences, ground forces,. allied 
naval fleets, "forces of cOJllJllunication, bodies of the rear, etc." 
(1975-a, p.23) Apart from this being one of the few such 
references to the "rear services" in the official literature, it 
places them along with troops who are specifically under national 
cOJllJlland, and in fact only talks of "joint measures" rather than a 
specific WTG body or function. Rather than dispro~~ Mackintosh's 
/ 
analysis, this further underlines the limited military role of 
the WTG. 
In discussing the Soviet General Staff, Rice explains that 
it has a 'Foreign Military Directorate' "which co-ordinates the 
General Staffs of the Warsaw Pact nations.... [T) he boundaries 
between the Warsaw Pact staff and the General Staff are unclear." 
(1985, p.18) The Soviet General Staff also has a Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff for WTG affairs (ibid). This would imply that 
the WTG Joint Staff must have severely restricted duties, or even 
no independence at all, throwing even more doubt on the WTD's 
military activities and roles; the USSR has once again duplicated 
through bilateral relations what is supposed to be co-ordinated 
on a multilateral basis through the WTG. Rice concludes that 
Since there is no apparent conflict between coalition 
doctrine and Soviet theatre doctrine, one might surmise that 
the Warsaw Pact's staff ..,muld be called on primarily to 
report on the state of affairs in Eastern Europe. (ibid) 
- which would amount to the WTG's Joint COJllJlland in its entirety 
being a glorified watchdog, implying that its direct military 
activities, such as joint exercises, are for public relations or 
propaganda purposes only:2C>, "'hich is ho...I Mackintosh describes 
them <1974, p.122b). Nonetheless, at the end of the first 
exercises in 1961, it was claimed that the direct co-operation of 
/ 
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the armed forces would be intensified under the Joint Command, 
and that the "socialist military coalition" would be raised to "a 
higher level" (ADN in German, SWB EE/787, 6 November 1961). 
Further evidence of the lack of any real military purpose 
for the Joint Staff is that, despite its having 'permanent 
representatives' from the national military structures, the first 
meeting of the defence ministers (September 1961) issued 
instructions to the "Chiefs of the General Staffs", in other 
words directly to the national military structures, circumventing 
the putative multilateral relations in which the defence 
ministers were participating. (Such wording has continued 
intermi ttently throughout the documents.) This might have been 
because there was in 1961 no illll-time Joint Staff. However, the 
"Chiefs of the General Staffs" also met after the Budapest 
Reforms (12-16 May 1969 - see Appendix 2), and again in 1971, 
implying that the reforms had not gone far enough tm/ards total 
multilateral co-ordination. 
There is some confusion over the location of the Jo·int 
Staff . The document forming the Joint Command (see Appendix 1), 
states that the Staff will be based in Moscow, I'lhich is where it 
was placed in the discussion of the WTO in the Bo1'shaya 
Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya's 1957 Ezhegodni k. The Legal 
Convention (see Appendix 1), of 1973 also specifies that the 
Staff is in Moscow. However, writing in 1974, Mackintosh stated 
that 
There were also Western reports in 1973 that a forward 
administrative HQ of the Pact had been set up at Lvov in the 
Western Ukraine - this would be a logical development for an 
organisation responsible for improving the co-oraination and 
control of the East European forces. (p. 125a) 
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And a year later, this had become the probable reference source 
for the claim that there was a "Permanent WTO headquarters in 
Lvov, USSR" (Caldwell, 1975, p. 8). Even in 1981, Wiener was 
insisting that the Joint Command 'VlaS "relocated" in Lvov in 1972. ( 
Yakubovskii <1975-b), did not seem to give a location for 
the Joint Staff, though the 1975 Bol'shaya Sovetskaya 
Entsiklopediya Ezhegodnik did again specify Moscow. (From the 
1976 Ezhegodnik the format of the articles changed, and the 
location of the WTO's Staff was no longer mentioned.) Kulikov 
did not state where the Staff was located, but a photograph 
(1980-b, facing p.161) pictured Staff workers at the Lenin 
Mausoleum in Moscow. For the 30 t .h Anni versary, Shkarovski i 
printed a photograph of the Staff Building, and placed it in 
Moscow (p.37). A GDR source (Volkerrecht, p.88a) also places the 
Staff in Moscow. 
The only public use of Lvov in the structure of the WTO has 
been for the holding of a meeting of the Military Council (26-29 
October 1983). While unusual, this is not unique, since :the 
Military Council has also met in Varna, Bulgaria (27-30 October 
1970), Minsk (17-20 October 1972), and Kiev (25-27 May 1976). 
Thus the possibility of an alternative location for the Joint 
Staff must remain unresolved. 
The Committee of Ministers of Defence 
The CDM is described by Menzhinskii as "the highest military 
body of the WTO" (p. 37), a sentiment also expressed by, for 
example, Katrich, in the course of the 30t.h Anniversary (1985 
p.55). It was officially created as part of the Budapest 
Reforms, on the direct recommendal,lon of the defence ministers 
themselves, who had been meeting on an ad hoc basis and issuing 
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reports from 1961 (see Appendix 3), The second time they met, 
they resolved to get the next session of the PCC to "!3ndorse" 
their decisions (Pravda, 2 February 1(62), vihich took place four 
months later, indicating the slow progress for such decisions, 
l{eissner describes the CDM as being "the link between the 
political and military organs of the Warsaw Pact and the national 
forces, , , ," ( 1 983, p, 361 b) , 
The Committee comprises all the national ministers of 
defence, plus the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of 
the Joint Armed Forces, who "also enter in its affairs" 
(Menzhinskii, p,37), Tyranowski explains that the debates of the 
CDM are "presided over as a rule by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces" (p, 111) , Sa vi nov adds that the CDM meet i ngs are 
prepared and also 'supervised' by the Joint Staff (1980, p,18), 
This shows that the C-in-C and the Chief of Staff have a much 
higher profile in the CDM than in the PCC, 
Shtemenko writes that the CDM discusses "All the most 
important questions on the strengthening of the defensive 
capacity of the allied states" and the Joint Armed Forces 
(p,189a), Savinov, stating that the CDM was created specifically 
"For the implementation of the directions of the Joint Armed 
Forces" , says that it also 'resolves' the issues of defence 
potential and the development and improvement of the Joint Armed 
Forces (1980, p,17), (This would seem to reduce the role of the 
PCC on these matters,) The practical effect of the CDM is that 
"the j oint recommendations and proposals concerning the defence 
of the members of the Warsaw Treaty, and a bout other mil i tary 
questions requiring mutual agreement, enter into force," (ibid) 
(Rice, hovmver, says that the CDM's decisions "had to be approved 
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by the national governments before they could be adopted." (1984-
b, p.194) As noted above concerning the PCC, this is because the 
CDM, as a ministerial committee, 'elaborates' PCC recommendations 
(Alexandrov, p.24). In fact, Meissner goes so far as to state 
that the CDM prepares the PCC's military proposals (1983, p.361b) 
arguing that the CDM's "main task" is to co-ordinate the allies' 
defence policies (ibid). 
The Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces 
After the Staff and the Committee of Ministers of Defence, 
the third institutional arm of the Joint Command is the Military 
Counci I (MO. Like the CDX, it was created in 1969 under the 
Budapest Reforms. 
The Military Council is more broadly based than the CDM, in 
that it includes the COJllInander-in-Chief, his deputies (ie the 
national deputy defence ministers and the C-in-C's deputies for 
specific military functions) , the Chief of Staff, and 
representatives of the allied high commands (Menzhinskii, p.38). 
Savinov refers only to the deputy ~'s-in-6 as sitting on the MC 
/ 
(1980, p. 18)21 . The MC meeting of October 1972 anounced that 
"military leaders" also took part (Pravda, 21 October 1972). 
Virtually every session since then has been attended by the 
official members of the MC "and their delegations", the latter 
being otherwise unspecified, though the report of the May 1975 
session referred to "representatives of the separate national 
armies" (Pravda, 22 May 1975). 
Again like the CDM, the MC is concerned with the practice 
and· development of the Joint Armed Forces' administration and 
troops (Menzhinskii, p.38; Savinov, 1980, p.18; Shtemenko, 
p. 189a), though this is often restricted to "current questions" 
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of these subjects (Savinov, 1980, p.18) or "Questions on the 
current acti vi ty" (Shtemenko)" which implies that it does not 
concern itself with more long-te~m issues. The reports issued by 
the autumn meetings of the MC (see Appendix 3), generally refer 
to an assessment of the concluding year's activities of the JAFs 
and the setting of tasks for the next year. Another function of 
the Military Council is apparently to render "effective aid to 
the command" CYakubovskii, 1971, p.30). 
While Menzhinskii says that the MC meets annually (p. 38), 
Savinov says it meets "as a rule, twice a year" (1980, p.18) 
which is how it is reported in the Soviet press (see Appendices 2 
and 3). According to Savinov, the Staff of the Joint Armed 
Forces prepares and supervises MC meetings, and also ensures its 
resolutions and recommendations are carried out (ibid, pp.18-19), 
though this would question the supervisory role of both the CDM 
and the PCC over the Military Council's affairs. 
Even taking into account the confusion surrounding the 
relationship between the PCC and the CDM on matters of who -is 
ultimately behind policy recommendations, the role of the MC must 
add further confusion. Meissner describes it as "an advisory 
organ to the Joint Command" (1983, p.362a) on what amount to day-
to-day operational matters, but given the broader remit quoted by 
Soviet sources it could be seen as the originator of some of the 
CDM's policies. Mackintosh goes so far as to say that the MC 
decisions are 'reviewed and approved' by the CDM (1974, p.123af 
which would not give the CDM much part in what it passes on to 
the PCC, while Rice argues that "It is apparently a consultative 
organ for the very senior officers of the Warsaw Pact" (1984-b, 
p. 194), though nc.;;2, of these Western writers offers a source 
I 
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for such information. In fact Mackintosh concludes that the MC 
is at the root of the Budapest Reforms as a concession to the 
non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty states'. having a greater access to WTO 
policy" <if not decision-making)" (1974, p. 123b). This, however, 
would mean that what amounts to poli tical-mili tary policy would 
lie in the hands of a majority decision by professional soldiers 
rather than politicians or party leaders, which is surely an 
overstatement. Even allowing for the politicians of the CDM to 
add breadth and a political dimension to the policy aspects of 
the MC's deliberations, this analysis adds more doubt to the full 
role of the alliance. 
The Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces 
One other "further improvement in the structure and bodies 
of administration of the defence organisations of the Warsaw 
Treaty" (Communique, Pravda, 18 March 1969) but not mentioned 
then by name was the formation of a "Technical Committee for 
IHli tary-Scientific Technical Advice" (Menzhinskii, p. 39), vlhich 
"mainly" oversees and co-ordinates military-related research and 
development in the member-states (Savinov, 1980, p.19). According 
to Savinov, this covers weapons, "techniques", and "the design-
experience of works of a defensive character" (ibid). Rice 
attri butes this Committee to a Czech proposal for greater non-
Soviet input to weapons research &c (1984-a, p.68). No meetings 
of this body are reported in the Soviet press, and some Soviet 
wri ters do not even refer to it (eg Zhilin, pp.22-3, discussing' 
details of technical co-operation). 
'* * * 
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The Budapest Reforms 
That completes the known structure of the 'WTO up to and 
including 1969 (as in Figure 2 above). However, Vladimir and 
Teplov list these structural additions and then specify "and 
other bodies of the 'Warsaw Treaty Organisation" (1980, p.31). 
'Writing in 1971, and discussing the Budapest Reforms, 
Yakubovskii stated that there had been agreement on nevi Statutes 
for the Joint Armed Forces and Joint COI~nd, on Statutes for the 
COIlL"'lli ttee of Ministers of Defence, "and other documents, having 
the aim of the improvement of the structure and bodies of 
administration of this organisation." (1971 p.26) Later on, 
he refers to the Military Council in this-context (ibid, p.30). 
Considering that such oblique references occur again and again in 
official writings, v/hi le mention of the Permanent Commission and 
Joint Secretariat of 1956 does not recur, it seems likely that a 
further, obscure but official, structure does exist. However, 
since even on the 30 t .h Anniversary it was explained that 
The practical co-ordination of the military measures are 
realised by the .... military bodies: the Committee. of 
Ministers of Defence, the Joint Command, the Military 
Council, Staff, and Technical Committee of the Joint Armea 
Forces .... (Gribkov, Izvestiya., 14 May 1985, p.3) 
all of which were under the guidance of the PCC (ibid), it is 
hard to imagine what additional bodies might be needed for 
"administration", even wi thin the very limited amount of 
multilateral co-ordination that goes on. <But see below, in the 
section on Extra-structural Factors, under "Other bodies .... ") 
The Budapest Reforms must not be seen as a spontaneous 
reaction to the events in Czechoslovakia of 1968, or as a Soviet 
rearguard reaction to the obvious shortcomings of its policies in 
Central Europe22 • Johnson claims that changes in the 'WTO's 
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military structure "had been broached as early as 1966", and that 
"detailed planning was evidently carried out in the fall of 1968" 
(1978, p.254) (ie, in the immediate aftermath of the Prague 
Spring) . 
But this does not go back far enough. In a speech to the 
plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee (29 September 1965) 
Brezhnev reported on the foreign relations of the USSR, and 
stated that "In short, the substance of our foreign policy is to 
strengthen the international socialist community in every way ... " 
(Pravda, 30 September 1965) Only after expressing satisfaction 
wi th the series of Qilateral talks between the USSR and the 
Central European states (plus other members of the CMEA) , did he 
go on to say that 
Great attention has been paid to co-ordinating the foreign 
policy of the socialist countries, in particular to co-ord-
lnating our actions in the United Nations and its specialised 
bodies. 
We have discussed the question of improving the work of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the need to set up a permanent 
and prompt machinery for considering pressing problems within 
the framework of the Treaty. (ibid) 
In other words, notwithstanding claims that the WTO playe~ a 
central role in co-ordinating the allies' foreign policies, he 
seems to have been saying that in its first ten years there was 
no adequate insti tutional multilateral co-ordination of foreign 
policy or even, presumably, milftlary policy" within the frame\tlOrk 
I " 
of the Treaty". The PCC was, according to Brezhnev's analysis, 
ineffective in its declared role of "considering problems arising 
in connexion with the implementation of this treaty" (Article 6 
of the Treaty). (It also reinforces the analysis that the 
Permanent Commission and Joint Secretariat mentioned in 1956 were 
not in operation. ) 
iV 
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What Brezhnev wanted was presumably some form of 
II supranational permanent political committee to provide overall 
guidance" and linking the member-states together much more 
closely than before, which Kobal claims was discussed at the PCC 
meeting in Sofia in 1968 (p.203)23. By that time the proposals 
for a broad restructuring must have been rej ected, indicating 
some ability of the Central European members to influence the 
USSR at that time. The defence ministers met in Moscow on 29-30 
October 1968 and "discussed the strengthening of the WTO" 
(Pravda, 31 October 1968). The PCC the following March endorsed 
the defence ministers' reco~~endations, but there was no meeting 
of the foreign ministers and no recommendations for political 
reforms24 • 
The overt reason for the PCC session in 1969 was not for 
carrying out institutional reform. Radio Moscow broadcasting in 
Al banianzs claimed that it was due to II the complicated 
international situation caused by the dangerous and frequent 
provocations of the forces of imperialism in the centre .of 
Europe, in the Near East, and in Asia .... " (SWB SU/30281 A2/2, 19 
March 1969), which was presumably referring to the Budapest 
Declaration's call for an all-European conference. 
The documents that the PCC agreed to in Budapest, both the 
poli tical Declaration and the institutional reforms, must have 
been drawn up at least in draft form prior to the session. The 
meeting, which officially lasted one day, in fact began at 14:00, 
hours on March 17 (SWB, EE/3028/C1/1, 19 March 1969). A report 
by -Tanjug, the Yugoslav Press Agency, dated March 17 (the day of 
tHe session), claimed that 
The delegations were waiting- for their Assistant Foreig-n 
and Defence Ministers to add finishing touches to draft 
documents so that the summit meeting itself could start from 
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posi tions "/hich had been made as uniform as possible. (ibid, EE/3027/i, 18 March 1968) 
The full accuracy of the 'Yugoslav report is perhaps open to 
question, since an 'abstract of-reports' claimed that the meeting 
had been "postponed by five hours because preliminary 
consul tations were still in progn:iss between some delegations 
according to unofficial reports." (ibid) (Moreover, not every 
delegation included deputy foreign and defence ministers - see 
footnote 9 df this chapter.) The report later added that 
According to a telephone dispatch from Budapest, the short 
duration of the meeting can be explained by the fact that one 
delegation preferred bilateral talks during "/hich various 
topics were discussed, and the communique and the appeal to 
all European countries were jointly formulated and 
approved.:2B 
(lbid, C1/2) 
It is perhaps significant that, vlhatever their effect and however 
they were formulated, the 1969 reorganis:,tion of the WTD's 
military structure has not since been publicly amended (though 
there have been some extra-structural military meetings - see 
Appendix 2). Furthermore, no political reforms took place for 
another seven and a half years, and these were not of the scope 
that Brezhnev had apparently originally wanted . 
.. .. .. 
After the Budapest Reforms, h-m other organisational 
developments took place before the Bucharest Reforms of 1976. 
The General Secretary of the Political Consultative 
Committee 
The post of the General Secretary is obscur8, and may 
perhaps be no more than a name attending the PCC. Menzhi nski i , 
for example, 1 ists the post with the Commander-in-Chief, who 
"take part in the sessions of the PCC" (p.35), which is also how 
Savinov describes him <1980, p.16). It is reportedN that the 
post of 'Deputy Secretary' vlaS mentioned by the Albanian party 
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daily newspaper in ¥~y 1965 as being held by Nikolai P. Firyubin, 
who on 5 May 1968 VlaS described as I Secretary-General'. by the 
Bulgarian News Agencyibid (this was the day before a PCC session 
in Sofia). The Communique from the first day of the 1956 PCC 
session specifically reports that "General A. I. Antonov, 
secretary-general of the Political Consultative Committee" gave a 
report on "organisational questions" (PrcHTda, 28 January 1956, 
p. 1) . Antonov, however, has without exception been described 
elsev,rhere as the Chief of Staff of the WTO (see Appendix 7). The 
next time that Pravda mentioned the post v,as in the Communique of 
the 1972 PCC session, and Firyubin was for the first time 
acknowledged by the Soviets in that capacity. 
Tyranov,ski, writing in 1971, did not mention the post. The 
last time that Firyubin was mentioned as attending a PCC session 
was in 1980, in Warsaw, at the 25t.t-· anniversary of the WTO 
(Communique, Pravda, 16 May 1980). At the PCC session in Prague 
in 1983, in the absence of Firyubin, "Dusan Spacil, Deputy 
Foreign Affairs Minister of Czechoslovakia, acted at the meeting 
as general secretary of the Political Consultative Committee." 
(Communique, Pravda, 6 January 1983) Firyubin, in fact, died the 
following month (see Appendix 7). 
The post does not seem to be prestigious, nor do the WTO 
members seem to want to replace Firyubin with a full-time post, 
since the Communique of the 1986 PCC concluded by noting that 
"Herbert Krolikowski, representative of the GDR, State Secretary 
and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was appointed the 
PCC General Secretary for the subsequent term." (Pravda, 12 June 
1986). It seems that v,hatever the functiuns of the post, they 
can be carried out between sessio~'-JOf the PCC by the deputy 
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foreign minister of the state hosting the next session. 
(Krolikowski was not listed as an attendee - see footnote 9 of 
this chapter. ) 
A GDR text from 1981 (VO"lkerrecht) did not refer to the 
post. Meissner, vd thout quoting a source, claims that the 
General Secretary heads the Joint Secretariat (1983, p.361a). 
The Legal Convention 
On 27 April 1973, Krasnaya Zvezda published the text of a 
"Convention on the legal status, privileges and immunities of the 
staff and other bodies of administration of the Joint Armed 
Forces of the states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty", which 
had been signed in Moscow on 24 April. The signatories were 
named, but no designation given to them (see Appendix 1). <By 
comparison, Pravda had briefly noted the signing of the 
Convention, but did not supply the text - 25 April 1973, p.4.) It 
was not until Yakubovskii I s book in 1975 that it was stated 
(p.292) that "The deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the 
country-participants of the Warsaw Treaty signed in Moscow a 
Convention .... " in April 1973, a wording repeated verbatim by 
Kulikov (1980). 
This is a very strange state of affairs, since it gives 
minor state representatives authority over senior military 
representatives. Since the Committee of Ministers of Defence is 
a "body of administration" of the WTO, the precedence in theory 
(but not in intent, judging by the wording), is given for the 
----. 
deputy foreign ministers to predominate over the Ministers of 
Defence. All this happened prior to the extension of the formal 
political structure of the WTO (which still does not include a 
committee of deputy foreign ministers). 
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The Legal Convention is the only additional document that 
appears to have been published, even though all the bodie9 within 
the structure of the WTO are sai d to be governed by i ndi vi dual 
, statutes' (see, for example, the preamble of the Legal 
Convention in Appendix 1; Kozlov, writing in 1971, said that the 
Soviet forces in Central Europe were governed by "Legal statutes 
between the Soviet forces and the state bodies in the allied 
countries" - .p.213). 
The Legal Convention in general gives the administrative 
staff of the Joint Armed Forces, of whatever nationality and 
wherever situated, what amounts to diplomatic status. 27 
.. 
'* "* 
Further structural changes were agreed on at the Bucharest 
session of the PCC, 25-26 November 1976, when a Committee of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CFM), and a Joint Secretariat I were 
set up as "bodies of the Political Consul tati ve Committee" for 
"the further improvement of the machinery of political co-
operation within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty. " 
(Communique, Pravda, 27 November 197~) 
The Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
'Practical work' had been carried out by meetings of foreign 
ministers, beginning in 1959 (though no such meetings were 
anounced as taking place betvleen 1960-15 
I 
inclusive) , and the 
deputy foreign ministers (from 1968) (see Menzhinskii, p.36 - see 
also Appendix 2). According to Tyranowski, these pre-1976 
meetings should not be seen as "organs of the Warsaw Treaty" but 
their decisions "may be treated as directives of a political 
nature by which the governments of the Treaty member states and 
their organs should be guided" (p. 111). Addressing the attendees 
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of the first session of the CFM, Brezhnev declared that the 
Commi ttee would improve co-operation "in international .affairs, 
to the successful fulfilment of. the foreign policy tasks of the 
fraternal parties." (Pravda, 27 May 1977, p.1) 
The CFM works "by taking into account" PCC foreign policy 
resolutions and recommendations, which are seen as the "common 
positions" of the member-states, and then the Committee "bring[s] 
about in actual forms the co-ordination of their foreign policy 
activities" (Menzhinskii, p.37). Menzhinskii adds that CFM 
Communiques should be seen as having a role analogous to PCC 
Declarations (ibid). He explains that CFM communiques are thus 
also to be seen as a co-ordinated evaluation of the international 
situation, and therefore a policy statement of the members on 
these issues but which, more than a PCC Declaration, offer 
"concrete suggestions" for peace and security which leads 
Menzhinskii to argue that "A communique of the Committee is a 
document of great political significance." (ibid) (For a 
discussion of the content of CFM documents, see Chapter 4.) 
For practical purposes, the CFM is intended to improve the 
co-ordination of foreign-policy activities (Savinov, 1980, p.17), 
which would mean that it does not just endorse and apply PCC 
positions but is actually the place where debate takes place as 
to what that position should be. Alexandrov, in fact, cites the 
CFM and the meetings of its deputies as being "the most important 
part" of the mechanism for foreign policy co-operation (p. 22); 
which would seem to place it above the PCC on these matters in 
all but general terms. By comparison, Gri bkov, on the 30 t .h 
Anniversary, described the CFM only as "An important link in the 
mechanism of the co-operation and co-ordination of the activities 
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in international affairs .... " <Izvestiya, 14 May 1985, p. 3). 
(For an analysis of WTO foreign policy, see Chapter 4. ) 
A further role for the CFM, according to Alexandrov, is for 
it to propose the full agendas, schedules, and working document?/ 
for the international meetings proposed in outline by the PCC, 
and then carry out the work to implement the decisions of that 
meeting (p.22). However, the example given by Alexandrov was the 
process surrounding the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe ",hich, being concluded in 1975, took place 
before there was an official WTO body wi thin which the foreign 
ministers could operate. 
The deputy foreign ministers 
The role of the meetings of the deputy foreign ministers is 
obscure. Bloed gives them the status of a full 'Conference' 
(p. 36), but gives no source for this description. Zamyatin, 
however, links "periodic meetings" of the deputy foreign 
ministers with the co-operation of socialist delegates at the UN 
and other international fora, in helping to work out "joint 
positions on actual problems". 
Various Central European sourcesN have given the activities 
of the deputy foreign ministers much greater status than official 
Soviet or Central European published sources. One expertN stated 
that the deputy foreign ministers were the consulting body for 
WTO-CMEA ties, anotherN that they set the agendas for the bigger 
meetings. 
What 'setting the agenda' might mean in practice is the 
carrying-out of the active inter-bloc diplomacy that the formal 
structure is too institutionalised to cope with. (See the 
further discussion of this in Chapter 6.) A further expertN 
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furthermore equated meetings of the deputy foreign ministers 
under WTO auspices with the OffiA' s Executive Committee. 
/ 
The Joint Secretariat 
Despi te their both writing four years ai ter the Bucharest 
Reforms, neither Menzhinskii nor Savinov (1980) referred to the 
, j oint secretariat' as mentioned in the 1976 Communique. 
Meissner, referring to ,,{hat he calls "the reorganised Joint 
Secretariat" (pers. comm., 17 March 1985), '~laims that it is of 
"particular importance", since it prepares PCC meetings, conducts 
the PCC's day-to-day business, and constantly liaises with the 
CMEA (1983, p. 361a), and that it also carries out "technical 
preparations" for CFM meetings (ibid). One 6f Meissner's sources 
turns out to be a legal handbook (Volkerrech~ from the GDR, ,,{hich 
states that the Joint Secretariat is a full-time body that 
"prepares the sittings of the Political Consultative Committee, 
attends to its current business and maintains a constant link to 
CMEA" (p. 87b), but does not seem to mention its work with the 
foreign ministers or the post of the General Secretary, whom 
Meissner says heads the Joint Secretariat (1983, p.381a). 
Meissner's insistence that he is referring to the post-1976 
affairs is confusing, since in the same article he writes that 
"at the beginning of the 1970s" the General Secretary took over 
from the Chief of Staff as heading the "Joint Secretariat" 
(ibid). This pre-1976 Secretariat, as discussed above (under the 
Permanent Commission and Joint Secretariat of 1956), was referred 
to as "not operative" by Savinov (1980, footnote, p.16). That 
the 1976 Joint Secretariat was 'nevr' rather than 'reorganised' 
wr"ld seem to be borne out by the Bucharest Communique's UE'- of 
the term "to create" in reference to it (Pravda, 27 November 
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1976), and by, for example, the reference to the Committee of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and "a Joint Secretariat" being "set 
up" by a decision adopted at Bucharest (SWB SU/5377 / A2/ 1) . 
(A Central European specialistN VIas insistent that the WTO's 
Joint Secretariat is not on a par VIi th the CMEA Secretariat. 
This was because the Central Europeans had consistently rejected 
Soviet proposals to make the WTO's structure similar to that of 
b 
the CMEA. ) 
"* "* "* 
Judging by the BBC Monitoring Service, in the month 
preceding the Bucharest session of the PCC in 1976 there were 
several radio commentaries, often linked to nevlspaper articles, 
stressing the improving unity, cohesion, and joint foreign policy 
positions of the WTO member states, saying that this unity would 
be used by the PCC meeting to Vlork for detente and arms control. 
As in the post-session commentaries, it was mainly the Bucharest 
Declaration which was stressed as significant. Despi te the new 
political mechanisms set up, one of the commentaries stated tbat 
both multilateral §.llii bilateral co-operQ'-:ion in all spheres were 
to be developed (SWB, SU/5377/A2/1). Further, the Soviet 'Party-
Government Statement on the Warsaw Treaty Meeting in Bucharest', 
issued by TASS in both Russian and English on December 
4, referred to both the institutional changes anounced in the 
Communique and the various ad hoc proposals contained in the 
Declaration, as being important "for broadening effective 
interaction in international affairs" (SWB, SU/5383/ A2/1-2, 7 
December 1976) - thus limiting the intended role of the official 
structure of the WTO in intra-bloc affai.cs and its place in the 
international relations of the bloc. 
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Extra-structural Factors in the WID 
Other bodies of the WID 
Some actual or potential extra-structural bodies of the WTO 
have been referred to in Western sources. For example, during 
the 30 t .r, Anniversary, the BBC's SUIl1II13.ry of World Broadcasts 
reported that the Warsaw Home Service referred to "the annual 
meeting of the member states' institutes of military history" 
(EE/7952/C/19, 16 11ay 1985). Such a regular gathering has not 
been mentioned in any of the other Soviet or Central European 
materials consulted. 
Jones discusses a variety of extra-structural bodies (1986, 
pp.137-8, p.143, p.161), which he takes from "available evidence" 
or "clear evidence", but for which he cites no published sources, 
either Soviet or Central European. The one exception is where he 
points out (ibid, p.143) that Kulikov referred both to a 
"Technical Committee" and to a "11ili tary-Scientific Technical 
Council" in discussion of 'other bodies' of the Joint Armed 
Forces (Kulikov, 1980, p.168). From this Jones argues, again 
wi thout quoting a source, that "Romania probably refused to 
participate in the work of the Technical Committee" (1986, 
p. 143) . The latter of Jones's two titles is, however, virtually 
the same as that used by Menzhinskii in 1980 (p.39) when 
apparently otherwise discussing the Technical Committee (see 
above under Technical Committee). 
The bodies that Jones describes as operating under the aegis 
of the WTO would co-ordinate "national agencies for military 
doctrine, officer education, political administration, para-
military youth training, bordel troops, and perhaps other 
internal security forces as well" (1986, p.138) and for co-
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ordinating "the corresponding bureaucracies of the paramilitary 
youth training and sports organisations" (ibid, p. 161). Jones 
argues that these agencies "lack participation by the Romanians" 
which "probably accounts for the Warsaw pact policy of not 
publicly acknowledging their existence." (ibid, p.138) 
Economic co-operation and the CMEA 
Notv/i thstanding Article 9 of the Treaty, claiming that other 
states can accede to it (see Appendix 1), it is also claimed that 
one of the WTD's strengths is that its members have a "similarity 
of social and state system, common political goals, and the 
identical Marxist-Leninist ideology of their peoples" (Lototski i, 
p. 347). Within this 'similarity', it is claimed that the 
members' "powerful economic base" is effected by conforming to 
"the single-type planned national economy" (Alexandrov, p. 24) . 
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is said to hold "great 
importance" in creating economic unity (Shtemenko, p. 189a) . 
Tyushkevich singled out as especially significant the adoption by 
the CMEA in 1971 of the Comprehensive Programme for Economic'Co-
operation (p.446), vlhich was reaffirmed in the Bucharest 
Declaration of 1976 (Pravda, 27 November 1976) and again in 1980 
(Savinov, 1980, p. 23). Claiming that the CMEA's trade policies, 
including with the West, were a "guarantor of peace", one Yurii 
Popov commented that " integration of the CMEA member 
countries effectively helps the dynamic economic development of 
every single member country" (Moscow in Slovak, 14 November 1976 
- SWB SU/5367/Al/4, 18 November 1976).28 The same analysis was 
presented during the 30 t .h Anniversary (Skorodenko, 1985, p. 62), 
when it was also claimed that extending economic co-operation "in 
the framework of the Counci 1 for Mutual Economic Assistance" was 
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part of the j oint measures for maintaining the defence potential 
of the WTO (Shkarovskii, p.158a). 
Zhilin, however, in discussing hOVI the extension of the 
states' 'material base' through economic co-operation aided 
defence, considered that the CMEA played "a great role" rather 
than an overwhelming or paramount role. The CMEA Secretariat's 
division on arms industries has a sub-division on WTO co-
ordinationN • 
Outwith the immediate purview of the CMEA, Yakubovskii 
(1976) lists "the mutual supplies of all the more basic parts and 
weapons", the co-ordination of research and development, and the 
moving tovlards the unification of weapons, all being included in 
the states' military and technical co-operation. All these come 
into the remit of the Technical Committee, which Yakubovskii does 
not refer to in this context. Kozlov gives the Soviet Union pre-
eminence with its "continuous and unselfish assistance" towards 
the improvement of all the states' "mapons and equipment (p. 214). 
Such a posi ti ve view of both the weapons and the intra-bJ.oc 
defence trade might not stand up to a rigorous analysis (see, for 
example, Rice, 1985, and other contributors to that volume; see 
also the section on Military Co-operation below). 
Military co-operation 
Mili tary co-operation 'in the framevlOrk of the Warsaw 
Treaty' is not restricted to the formal institutional processes 
of the Joint Command. M:enzhinskii lists "consultative meetings" 
of "the top generals of the (main) staffs" as having taken place 
si"nce Kay 1969 (ie since after the Budapest military Reforms), 
and regular planned meetings since 1967 (before the Reforms), of 
"generals and officers of the Kain Political Administrations" 
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plus "gatherings of cadres of the armies of the allied states" 
(p. 38). (See Appendix 2 for a list of the known meetings.) 
Meanwhile, Shtemenko refers to co-operation of all the allied 
armies in a broad range of military training, military-theory and 
political education studies, plus top-level conferences on a 
variety of topics, and "j oint instruction in military schools" 
(p. 169b) . 
Vlri ting on the 17 t . h anniversary, Yakubovskii described 
exchanges and gatherings of military personnel, covering issues 
such as new weapons and training, "and of information concerning 
the ideological and political education of military personnel" 
(Pravda, 14 May 1969). Strangely, though, despite his article 
being published just two months after the Budapest Reforms, he 
made no mention of them, and his discussion of such military co-
operk(hon seemed to lie outwi th the formal WTO structure. He 
\j \ 
also gave as the only example of this co-operation the meeting of 
"military leaders" that took place on 26-29 November 1968. 
The object of such concerted moves is, according. to 
Yakubovskii, "assisting the attainment of unified opinions in the 
basic problems of training the army and navy", building 
patriotism, and unifying opinions on "the character and methods 
of the conduct of wars on the basis of Marxist-Leninist 
methodology", the latter aim being "one of the most important 
sectors of socialist military co-operation" (1976). The broad 
designation of military and political co-operation at all levels 
and in all frameworks is the building of the "comradeship-in-
arms" of the armies of the fraternal states <Lototskii, p. 349). 
Within uhe formal military exchanges and training, the role of 
the Soviet "higher military establishments" in training Central 
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European officers is seen as preponderant <ibid, pp.349-50), 
while the Soviet Union also sends specialists in ,military 
training to the military education establishments of its allies 
(Grechko, 1977, p.335). The reason for this leading role is seen 
to be because the USSR is "the most powerful country in the 
socialist vlOrld" <Tyushkevich, p.446; see also p. 411). Even 
prior to the first multilateral eXercises, it was claimed that 
"The exchanse of experience in the training and education of 
troops, training commands, and literature, is widely practised 
between the fraternal armies.... An important part is played by 
the exchange visits between vessels and the exchange of 
delegations." (SWB, SU/764/A2/1, 10 October 1961) 
Tyushkevich also sees as important the co-operation in "the 
co-ordination of military technical policy" in the supplies of 
the allies' weapons <p.446). Here again, apart from joint 
consultations and research, the Soviet Union has a dominant role 
in supplying weapons, military hardware, and licences or 
documentation for Central European production of Soviet desi.gns 
(Grechko, 1977, p.335). 
It seems debatable whether or not to include the joint 
exercises carried out in the name of the WTO in a discussion of 
extra-structural military co-operation. Yakubovskii described 
them as II an important aspect of military co-operation" CPravda, 
14 May 1969), and this is typical of such descriptions throughout 
the history of the WTO. However, in the context of the 30 t .r ·, 
Anniversary, Rusakov's address did not specifically refer to 
j oint exercises when explaining how military co-operation vias 
developing and improving CJzvestiya, 15 May 1985). Also trom the 
30 t .h Anniversary, it was stated that 
The highest forms of collective preparation of the armies 
of the states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty for the 
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repulse of imperialist aggression are the holding of periodic jOlnt exerClses, unila~eral and bilateral, with the 
involvement of the staff and troops of the Joint Armed 
Forces. (Shkarovskii, p.158a) 
Since, as explained above, the Joint Armed Forces officially 
comprise only selected units from the national armies, 
Shkarovskii seems to be arguing that these selected troops then 
exercise with the national armies (which are not part of the 
WTG) . (But see also 'Political Co-operation' below.) Since he 
did not specifically mention nrul:tilateral exercises, Shkarovskii 
implies that they have nothing to do with the WTD. A further 
question arises when the vlay in v/hich the j oint exercises are 
officially described is taken into account. In his chronology, 
Kulikov (l980-b) uses the term 'Joint Armed Forces' only eight 
times when listing exercises, and most of these references are to 
do with the Joint Staff. The rest of the time the exercises are 
described as involving the forces of the national armies. This 
once again emphasises the problems involved in establishing the 
formal military co-operation, either bilaterally or vii thin the 
WTD, that actually takes place. 
Since it is not the purpose of this thesis to argue the 
meri ts or demerits of the WTD, or whatever military structure 
actually exists, as a fighting force, or indeed to engage in an 
analysiS of the minutiae of the j oint exercises and the vl8apons 
or doctrines involved, this is not the place to go into such an 
S 
argument. 
As with the discussion above on economic co-operation, it is 
possible to question the rosy platitudes about the military co-
operation of the allied states. It would lead to an analysis of 
the political and economic relationships within the Soviet bloc, 
and the indigenous political, social, economic, military, etc, 
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needs of the non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty member states. Such an 
analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
One factor of military co-operation that is not discussed by 
the original sources is that of the KGB or national military 
intelligence bodies. Any role that they play in maintaining the 
uni ty of the Joint Armed Forces, or in reporting back to the 
Soviet leadership on military cohesion, would obviously occur 
outwith the formal structure of the WTO. 
Political co-operation 
The political education of the troops referred to above as 
part of the military co-operation is given very prominant 
, 
attention within the overall relationships of the allied armies, 
since correct political understanding is considered to be 
essential for "instilling in servicemen devotion to their 
country, faithfulness to their international duty, and constant 
combat readiness" CKozlov, p. 215), which is intricately bound up 
in socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism 
CLototskii, p.349j Tyushkevich, p.433j and eg SWB SU/746/A2/1~ 10 
October 1961). 
The paramount importance given to political training is 
explained by Shtemenko when he says that "The brotherly communist 
parties realise that the main force in war has always been man." 
Cp. 189b) , and \'Jhere he goes on to say that military specialists 
trained in and devoted to socialism must be 
capable of leading troops ably, of seeing that battle 
machinery is constantly ready for action, of carrying out, on 
a scientific basis, the ideolop;ical and political education 
of personnel and creating in them high moral and military 
quaIi ties. (i bid) 
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The Soviet military experience would seem to underline that 
properly-motivated troops can prevail against an otherwise 
militarily-superior enemy. 
As with direct military matters, there is a constant 
exchange and gathering of political representatives in 
conferences, meetings, and 'direct training' (ibid; Yakubovskii, 
1976) . (See Appendix 2.) One Central European sourceN did, 
however, state that WTO co-operation behi8en "political 
representati ves" was at a bilateral level, the WTO negotiating 
individually with each state. Also included in the overall 
process are "direct contacts" of military journalists and 
sporting events of allied troops, and "youth-army camps" 
(Yakubovski i, 1976). These activities are not just for raising 
the political awareness of the allies, but also to increase the 
unity and cohesion of the combat community (ibid). 
In discussing the political aspects of the joint exercises, 
Shkarovskii explained that 
Commanders, poU tical ymrkers, party and youth bodies, in 
the period of preparation and in the course of trainin&'are 
in cnarge of purposeful ideological and political-educatlonal 
work with indlvidual staff of the particlpating forces. 
(p.158b) 
There were also joint seminars and exchanges of experience. 
During the exercises, the j oint production of a multinational 
nevlspaper was prominent wi thin the political co-operation: "This 
newspaper is one of the important means of up-to-date 
informational and propaganda YlOrk." above all creating joint 
editorial processes in the field (ibid). Shkarovskii also 
stressed the role of press-centres during the joint exercises for 
all the allied armies (ibid). It might seem that fostering 
poli tical unity took precedence over combat efficiency during 
practical military training. 
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Like the stress placed 
economic and social systems, 
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on the allies' having similar 
Shtemenko refers to the. allied 
military structure having theor-etical military views based on 
"the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.... on 
Leninist principles of party leadership of the armed forces." 
(p.189b) This has obviously led to the co-ordination of party-
political work within the military structures (Tyushkevich, 
p.433). Such co-ordination is carried out by the Main Political 
Administrations referred to by Menzhinskii (p. 38), which Jones 
describes as "the agencies officially designated by the WTO 
states to secure the political reliability.... of the allied 
armies, and thereby to promote reliable performance in hostile 
circumstances." (1984, p.67) According to Jones, all the non-
Soviet Warsa .... ~ Treaty military structures, with the exception of 
Roruania:2'''', have MFA structures that are "virtually identical" to 
the Soviet MFAs (ibid, p. 68) . He describes the two primary 
objectives of such .... lOrk to be to minimise the spread of anti-
Russian sentiments from the Central European militaries to the 
non-Russian soldiers of the Soviet army, and to "acculturize" all 
non-Russian and European soldiers to the Soviet military ethos 
(ibid) . 
While Jones describes the :mu.l:ti.lateral MFA acti vi ties of 
joint meetings, exchanges, co-ordination of publications, 
touring political lecturers, and so on (ibid, pp.69, 70), he also 
states that the bilateral ties between the Soviet MFA and thE! 
individual Central European militaries are more extensive and of 
greater importance (i bi d, p. 72 I p. 67) . Once again, as wi th the 
formal political and direct military ties, the USSR seems to be 
trying to circumvent the multilateral structures associated with 
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the WTO, and to minimise their significance in intra-bloc 
relations. This again raises doubts as to the active role of the 
WTO in Soviet and Central European affairs. 
The Parliamentarians 
Individual ad hoc conferences of 'representatives' of the 
Parliaments of the Warsaw Treaty states began in 1975, with a 
meeting to mark the 20 t .,-, anniversary of the WTO (see Appendix 2). 
The Declaration issued by the PCC in 1976 (Pravda, 27 
November 1976) singled out meetings of the Parliamentarians as 
one of the means by which there was to be greater political co-
operation of the allies. Explaining this, Savinov quoted that 
the PCC had decided 
to extend the political connexions of the fraternal people, 
including to practice and further the carrying-out- of 
consultative meetings of parliamentarians, and also 
representatives of the communal organisations for the 
discussion of current problems of international life .... (1980, p.22) 
Later, Tolkunov (1986) highly appraised the work of the 
Parliamentarians to this end. 
In discussing such work, but without mentioning the WTO 
meetings of Parliamentarians, Savinov also wrote that "the 
Parliaments and Governments" of the states were working to reduce 
the threat of nuclear war, end the arms race (especially nuclear 
arms), on Earth and in the cosmos, and were working for 
disarmament, detente, and co-operation in international relations 
(1986, p. 249). Such a list of activities, or perhaps of 
intentions, is nothing new, since it is virtually the same 'peace 
policy' contained in WTO documents and in descriptions of 
national foreign policies <cf Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 
pp. 883ff) . 
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The documents issued by Parliamentarians, including that of 
their 30 t .h Anniversary meeting, are nonetheless quite la,?klustre, 
geherally reiterating and supporting issues and policies raised 
in the most recent PCC documents. In this manner, these meetings 
seem to follO\'/, rather than lead, "the discussion of current 
problems of international life". 
The Party and State Leaders 
Appendix 2 shO\'/s that there have also been meetings of party 
chiefs, or the party First Secretaries and the heads of the 
governments, at various intervals throughout the history of the 
WTO. With one maj or exception, these meetings were careful not 
to usurp the official status of the PCC. The meeting in 1983 of 
"leading party and state leaders" in Moscow, for example, issued 
a Joint Statement which "confirmed the evaluations and 
conclusions of the Prague Political Declaration [of the PCC in 
January 1983]" (Pravda, 29 June 1983). The next session of the 
CFM, however, reaffirmed both the PCC Political Declaration and 
the Joint Declaration of June (i bid, 15 October 1983). 
Tyranowski is adamant that these ad hoc m~ings are not part of 
the WTO structure, but only have a capacity to 'advise' the WTO 
members (pp.l10, 111). 
The one major exception to this attempt not to over-ride the 
formal WTO processes was the "meeting of the highest Party 
leaders and statesmen of the states-participants of the Warsaw 
Treaty" which signed the Protocol extending the WTO. The PCC, 
the WTO's 'highest body', was not considered sui table for this 
purpose. 
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The Communist Parties ~ 
A number of Soviet vrriters have given individual attention 
to the role of the communist and vmrkers' parties in the work of 
the WTO and the national armies. All their comments /underlined 
I, 
the understandable concern that the parties should have a leading 
role in the defence affairs of their states and of the socialist 
community as a whole. For example, Stepaniuk, writing as a 
"General-lieutenant-engineer" in an article commemorating the 
17th anniversary of the Treaty, stated unequivocally that the 
leading Marxist-Leninist parties "determined first and foremost" 
the joint foreign policies and military co-operation (including 
economic, ideological, and doctrinal affairs) , of the 
"indestructable fraternity of arms". Kozlov gave a leading 
posi tion to the CPSU in the move to strengthen the WTO against 
imperialist mi li tary aggression (p. 212), as did Grechko (1977, 
p. 318), even giving to the parties the role of determining "the 
forms of [mili taryJ alliance of the fraternal armies" and the 
WTO, as just one part of their "decisive role" in maintaining the 
"socialist social system" (ibid, p.324). Tyushkevich stated that 
the whole structure of the Joint Command (mentioning every body 
from the Committee of Ministers of Defence down to the Technical 
Commi ttee), was under the constant attention of the "fraternal 
communist and workers' parties" (p. 446), which he put behind 
every proposal and recommendation of a milt tary nature Cpp.446-
7) . 
The stress on the role of the parties was explained by 
Tyushkevich in that 
The ultimate basis on which the armies of the Warsaw Dact 
were built is Lenin's principle on the direction of the Army 
by the communist and workers' parties. Creatin~ and 
indoctrinating the armed forces of the socialist coun~ries, 
,i' 
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the parties depend on Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and 
the army. (p.411) 
Such outspokenness on the role of the parties t the vlOrk of 
the WTO presents us with a problem (or pe.-haps a solution to the 
ul timate workings of the Organisation). As it was originally 
formulated and signed, the Warsaw Treaty was an alliance of 
states, and was signed by members of governments without 
mentioning any positions they may have held in their respective 
national parties. As described in this chapter, the whole 
structure of the WTO is geared towards inter-state relations, 
with only the PCC allowing a significant formal input from 
specifically ~ representatives. In any case each delegation 
has only one vote (Menzhinskii, p.34), so party and state members 
of delegations would have to confer and agree. (Even so, the 
above analysis of the PCC shows that it cannot be seen as a very 
active and significant body; see also Chapter 4.) 
In fact, hidden within the WTO's documents, there are 
several references to the parties, which could be interpreted to 
signify that, as Rice expressed in a slightly different context, 
the party ties "transcend national boundaries and are links of a 
socialist world order" (1984, p.132), thus superseding any inter-
I 
~ relations. 
Within the text of the Treaty, Article 6 stated that the PCC 
would be formed "in which each state that is a party to this 
treaty shall be represented by a member of the government, or any 
other specially appointed representative" (see Appendix 1). This 
did not specify that that there should be party delegates. In 
practice, the 1956 PCC listed the attendees only by their state 
designations, the 1958 PCC had attendees with party designations 
but not as the chief delegates, and from the 1960 PCC onwards the 
'IV\) / 
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chief delegate from each state was the First or General Secretary 
of the party (see footnote 9,of this chapter). 
The role the parties were playing in the WTO was specified 
by the then Commander-in-Chief Yakubovskii: 
For the development and strengthening of the military 
alliance of the countries of socialism it has paramount 
imlfortance that the leadership of all the affairs of the 
de~ence of the countries of socialism are accomplished by the 
communist and workers' parties . 
. . .. Of extraordinary importance in the activities of the 
Organisation of the Warsaw lreaty is this, that the communist 
ana vlOrkers' parties and the governments of the country-
partici p,?-nts go forv . .:l.rd in a united front on the 
lnternatlonal arena .... (1971, pp.24-25) 
Only then did Yakubovskii discuss the role of the PCC (ibid, 
p. 25). Also vrriting in 1971, Bakhov spelt out the importance of 
the parties as an extra-structural factor"when he explained that 
The leading role of the communist and workers' parties in 
the country-participants of the Treaty guarantees for the 
unity and cohesion of these countries, and the strict 
[implementation] of the basic peace policies. (1971, p.6) -
In other words, even though the WTO worked as an inter-state 
body, it was taken as read that the parties had a leading, albeit 
extra-structural, role. 
In 1977, Brezhnev, addressing a reception follovdng the 
first session of the CFM, argued that this new (inter-state) body 
would help fulfill "the foreign-policy tasks of the fraternal 
parties" (Pravda, 27 May 1977, p. 1) . Again in 1977, a regular 
meeting of the WTO's Military Council sent a message to Brezhnev, 
as Chairman of the Presidium of the CPSU, and the Soviet 
Government (but principally to the CPSU) , on the 601;.1-, anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution 
in which vias conveyed profound acknowledRement for the 
tireless ..,lark concerning the increasing or the defensive 
miRht of the states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty 
(Pravda, 21 October 1977, p.4) 
Not only were the parties to have a leading role but, as noted in 
the section above on military co-operation, the role of the 
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Soviet Union (or CPSU) was to be seen to be fundamental. In 
other words, it was being stated that the main bodies _ putting 
into practice the foreign and military policies of the PCC were 
in fact carrying out the tasks of a higher, but generally 
unacknowledged, authority. 
Even the PCC acknowledges this higher authority. In the 
Communique of the 1978 session, it is stated that the 
participants! the leaders of both the parties and the states, 
were in the accompanying joint documents being true to the 
foreign policy course worked out by the congresses of the 
members' leading parties (Pravda, 24 November 1978). This role 
for the party congresses was repeated in the 1986 PCC Communique 
(Pravda, 12 June 1986). Thus, taking into account that the PCC 
was the leading body of the joint action of the WTO members, 
Savinov was still able to explain that the foreign-policy co-
operation of the WTO, "as in all other spheres of joint action, 
has at its heart the inter-party ties at the highest level." 
(1980, p.24) 
In the same vein, the 30t.h Anniversary analysis of the WTO 
repeated the paramount role of the parties. Katrich, for 
example, stated that "The first principle for the successful 
activity of the Organisation of the Warsaw Treaty as a reliable 
shield of the socialist community" vlaS the leadership of the 
parties within the member countries (p. 55). On purely military 
grounds, Chief of Staff Gribkov stated that 
The greater place in the life and activities of the allied 
armies is occupied by the co-operation of the political 
bodies, which are accomElished on the basis of the aecisions 
of the communist and vmrkers' parties. 
(1985 , p.96) 
This latter statement "muld imply either that the WTO military 
structure detailed above is irrelevant to "the activities of the 
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allied armies", or that these bodies are in fact a front for the 
"decisions of the parties", Or, as Gorbachev said at a plenary 
meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, since the 1986 PCC 
occurred so soon after a number of party congresses, "the 
foreign-policy guidelines of the supreme party fora became, 
naturally, the focus of collective discussion, II <Pravda, 17 June 
1986, pp,1-4) 
As this chapter has shown, the formal structure of the WTO 
does not include any formal mechanism for 'inter-party ties'; in 
fact, since the basis of inter-party relations is bilateral, 
there could be no formal mechanism for bringing the role of the 
parties into the WTO other than through participation in the PCC, 
which is no more than a forum for irregular guidance of general 
policy (see above, and also Chapter 4), 
Central European sources'" informed me that, bearing in mind 
that the party foreign-policy structures are 'superior' to the 
state foreign ministries, the role of state mechanisms is to 
transfer to the WTO's PCC and Joint Secretariat, polic~ or 
information worked out by the parties, Thus the real originator 
1 WTO policy is the Poli tbureau, vlhere the highest decisions are 
made, , " except that their decisions are taken on the basis of 
information worked out by their International sections, through 
meetings (or even 'phone-callsN ), generally on a bilateral level, 
developing policy compromises, 
But even this is not quite the case, The WTO Joint 
Secretariat has no more than a consultative role as a group of 
"tlxperts and co-ordinators" with a special understanding of how 
the parties and states inver-relate, and how best to co-ordinate 
the national policiesN , The WIO Secretariat does not have a 
(1 
chapter 3 117 
cOI!llll8.ndi ng role. The CPSU controls both the Joint Secretariat 
and military matters, so it is in fact the CPSU International 
Department v,hich effectively writes WTO documents, 'taking into 
account' the 'advice' of both the Joint Secretariat and the non-
Soviet bilateral representatives to the CPSUN~ The level of this 
Central European input can, at times, be no more than to point 
out that~f the CPSU commits the WTO to a certain policy, it will 
affect the Central Europeans economically in such a way that the 
USSR will have to support its allies economically to ameliorate 
the consequences of the foreign or military policy ibid 
The statements on the role of the parties seem to indicate 
that the whole structure of the WTO, as an inter-state body, is 
ei ther irrelevant or just a front. Given the prominent role of 
the national parties in all other aspects of their countries' 
lives, it would be improbable to discount their equal role in the 
multilateral defence of their community, far beyond their 
admitted role of whipping up proletarian enthusiasm in the 
military conscripts and officers. So just what is the status-of 
the WTO in the international affairs of the socialist community? 
Conclusions on the WTO Structure 
At the end of the day, both the official statements and the 
unofficial analysis of the role of the parties shows that the WTO 
as an inter-state body has little independence either in 
. determining the national foreign and defence policies of its 
members, or in multilateral policy. Chapter 4 assesses just what-
the WTO says in its documents, and makes conclusions as to the 
role of the WTO in the joint foreign policy that is expressed by 
those documents. 
} 
') , 
y~ .~:i...f~c. 
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Taking into account all the extra-structural factors to the 
WTO, figure 4 shows a truer picture of the WTO, as it existed in 
1985 at the time of the Treaty's prolongation. It shows both the 
formal and informal mechanisms, and suggests how they might 
inter-relate. <The national armed forces do not appear, since 
they are not part of the formal or informal structures.) Chapter 
4 goes on to discuss the formal documents issued by this 
structure, and discusses what further conclusions can be drawn on 
the place of the WTO in the multilateral relations of its 
members. 
c_h~~ 
FIGURE 4: ~ WTO formal and informal structure, 1985 ! 
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Endnotes 
1) Tismaneanu reports that "in 1958, Khrushchev made 
unexpected decision to Vii thdraVi the Soviet troops that 
stationed in Romania" (p. 59a-b) . 
120 
the 
Vlere 
2) A similar treaty V/aS signed Y/i th Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
For an analysis of its provisions and hoVi they compare vii th the 
earlier treaties, see R. Waring Herrick, 'The Soviet Military 
Intervention: terms of the Soviet troop-stationing treaty imposed 
on Prague' in Radio Liberty Research Bulletin (CRD 379/68) 23 
October 1968, no.24 (2469). 
3) Fr~m the original Moscow Conference of 1954 and the WarsaVi 
Conference of 1955, through all the PCC meetings until 1961 
inclusive, there Vias an official observer from the People's 
Republic of China; North Korea and Mongolia also sent observers 
to the PCC meetings of 1960 and 1961. (See footnote 9 beloVl.) 
Since 1962 there have been no observers at PCC meetings, 
"although Mongolian, North Korean, and Cuban ,observers attend the 
joint manoeuvres" (Walker, p. 563). 
4) John Erickson writes that "the whole apparatus of the pact, 
ponderous as it is, is largely irrelevant to Soviet operational 
purposes; it appears to be a high price to pay for a few hand-
picked non-Soviet formations to fight in the first attack 
echelon." <1982-c, pp.165/8 - added stress) Rakowska-Harmstone 
et 0.1 argue that "The Soviet Union has attempted to solve the 
problem of East European reliability by fragmenting national 
military forces along service lines, detaching elite and 
specialised units from nation~l control and incorporating these 
uni ts into a 'Greater Soci'1't\fst Army' built around the [Soviet 
Armed Forces] and under the operational control of the Soviet 
General Staff." (1981, pp.v-vi) 
5) In mil i tary terms, Article 4 of the Treaty limits mutual 
assistance to being "in case of an attack in Europe. This means 
that it does not cover armed attacks launched outside Europe." 
(Tyranowski, p.112) Strategic Survey 1970 states (p.28) that 
this Vias only made explicit in May 1970, by an official Polish 
handbook on the WTO. Tyranowski argues that documents from the 
PCC, or other WTO bodies, that express views on what amount to 
out-of-area issues "express their interest taken in problems of 
vlOrld importance, according to the principle that peace is 
indivisible." (p.116) 
6) TyranoVlski, writing in 1971, explains that consultations due 
to mi li tary threat or attack have not arisen (p. 107). This 
indicates that the military interventions in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia were not carried out under the auspices of the 
WTD, but at most in its name. 
7) . For an in-depth discussion of PCC documents, see Menzhinskii 
(pp. 35-36) viho divides them, in ascending order, into 
'communique', 'declarati~il', 'appeal', 'resolution', 'statement', 
and 'draft international treaty'. 
8) Malcolm Mackintosh says that the Defence Ministers 
themselves merely rubber-stamp decisions taken by the Military 
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Council (1974, p.123a). But see the specific discussion on the 
Committee of Ministers of Defence. 
9) Unpublished resrarch. by myself on the complete lists of 
an,lounced attendees ,;,\; all WTD meetings. 
10) The question of consensus is also affected by bilateral 
bargaining (both during PCC meetings and during exchange 
bilateral visits of the leaders)N. Romania, for example, is 
saidi.i::oi,::J of late to have increased the frequency of offering 
sU(i'ort (or non-objection), in the WTD, in exchange for Soviet 
ec'onomic aid under non-WTD auspices. ,~1::"" fn.11 ,) 
11> Under the Budapest Reforms, -'-he ministers of defence were 
formed into a separate Committee, and their deputies became the 
Deputy Commanders of the Joint Armed Forces. 
12) The original document is just headed "Formation of Joint 
Command .. .. ", but in Mal'tsev (1980) it is described as 
"Resolution for the creation of a Joint COTIL.'1land .... " 
13) This is also how Shtemenko describes it- (p. 189a) . 
14) Alexandrov describes the Joint Cornumand as being "the 
Committee of Defence Ministers, the Military Council, and the 
Staff of the Joint Armed Forces" (p.24) though this seems too 
broad. The Commander-i n-Chief with his Soviet and non-Soviet 
deputies comprise the military leadership of the Joint Armed 
Forces, though they obviously need the administrative services of 
the Staff and the Military Council. The defence ministers need 
not be military men, so theirs must be more of a policy-advice, 
or political, function. Meissner states that the active military 
leadership rests with the Joint Command and not the Committee of 
Ministers of Defence (1983, p.361b). 
15) Romania was excluded from the planning and execution of the 
intervention. See also footnote 6 above. in 
16) Shtemenko does, however, say that "collective measures are 
taken for the suppression of counter-revolutionary and aggressive 
acts against socialist countries." (p.168a), but this seems to be 
the only time such a function has been described. But see also 
footnote 6 above. 
17) The forces of the GDR were only incorporated into the Joint 
Command after the PCC resolution of 28 January 1956. The 
Communique states that "its armed contingents be incorporated 
into the Joint Armed Forces" (Pravda 29 January 1956). Meissner 
confirms that it is the whole of the GDR's National People's Army 
that is allotted to the JAFs (1983, p. 361b). See also Erickson, 
in Dawisha and Hanson (1981), p.152. 
18) In practice, however, as with the COTIL.'TIander-in-Chief, the 
Chief of Staff has always been 'chosen' as a Russian - see 
Appendix 7. 
19) Mackintosh was 'flTiting in 1974. In July 1978, a WTD Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief, Marshal of Aviation A. T. Koldunov, 
designated as "Commander of the Air Defence Forces" , was 
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identifiedN • Erickson, in Dawisha and Hanson, reports (p. 157), 
that an "Assistant to the C-in-C for Rear Services/Logistics" had 
been identified in May 1980, but he had earlier remark~d (ibid, 
p.154-5) that the \1110 lacked" any specific mobilisation mechanism 
arid logistical support". 
I would argue that until ~ny of these function can be seen 
in practice, their Staff designations must be regarded as merely 
putative posts. 
20) In discussing 'Political acti vi ties in WTO military 
exercises', Jones details that during pauses in the action, 
political discussions, speeches, and film and stage performances, 
take place <1984, p. 71). This seems to me to be a strange vmy to 
simulate offensive, or evep. defensive, operations. 
21) l1ackintosh suggests that the J.filitary Council "probably 
includes the 'Inspector General' II, [a post he does not identify], 
and states that it does include a senior Soviet political officer 
and "a mi 1 i tary representative of Lieutenant-General or Vice-
Admiral rank from each of the East European armed forces" (1974, 
p.123b), but he does not give a source for this. 
22) Mackintosh, for example, argues that the "Soviet leaders got 
dmm to the task of reorganising the Pact" rl:l&L the Czechoslovak 
crisis, though he does acknowledge that pre-crisis there had been 
some criticism of the WTO in Central European journals. 
23) Kobal does not quote a source for this information, which 
was not covered by the session's communique. 
24) Further evidence of the scope of what would be in the 
reforms, and suggesting that Johnson's claims of "detailed 
planning" for them <1978, p.254) might be a bit exaggerated is 
that, behmen 19-28 September 1968, the Commander-in-Chief 
visited all the members' countries to discuss reorganisation .. 
25) But note that Albania had formally withdrawn from the Treaty 
the previous September - see Appendix 6. 
26) Kobal Cp.207) claims that the session vIas preceded by three 
days of bilateral negotiations. 
In view of the Soviet penchant for bilateral relations 
evidenced both in the retention of the bilateral treaties and in, 
for example, Brezhnev's speech (Pravda, 30 September 1965) it was 
presumably the Soviet delegation that held up the session. 
27) For an extensive analysis of the Legal Convention, see Jones 
(1986). 
28) It must be remembered that the OlEA comprises the Warsaw 
Treaty member states, plus Mongolia, Vietnam, and also Cuba which 
is a member of the non-aligned movement. 
29) "Romania, which refuses to participate in the joint 
political acti vi ties of the WTO political administrations, has a 
system of party committees in the military very similar to the 
system of party conuni ttees in the Yugoslav armed forces. The 
Romanians established this system in 1964." (Jones, 1984, p.68) 
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A) For a summary of the intra-bloc issues and problems with the 
extension of the Treaty, see Kusin (1985). See also Socor <pp.1-5) 
and Reissmi.iller. 
B) This is one of the conclusions in Tiedke <pp.146-7). It is 
also discussed by Volfe (1966, pp.210-l>, but he later was querying 
the importance of an internal Soviet economic consideration for 
burden-sharing with Central Europe (1973, pp.7-8). See also 
Erickson (1985) p.149 . 
C) This is argued by Remington (1967) pp.131-2. See also 
Reissmi.iller 
D) The annual volumes of the Europa Yearboolr and YelJrboolr on 
International Communist Affairs succinctly explain the structure of 
OlEA and its activities. For more detail, see, for example, Guiseppe 
Schiavone The Institutions of Comecon (London: Xacmillan, 1981) 
E) The joint exercises are discussed at length by Jones (1981) 
and by Jeffrey Simon in Simon and Gilberg (eds, 1986). Erickson 
also notes that "It seems clear .... that the Warsaw pact does IlQt. 
plan these operationally-oriented exercises .... " (1982-c, p.l00, 
original stress) 
For an exhaustive analysis of all the national armies, see the 
4-volume Canadian study under Rakowska-Harmstone (1981ff). For a 
broader analysis see the Clawson and Kaplan volume. 
F) For a short general account of 'socialist internationalislll' in 
Soviet usage, see for example Kratlrii slovar~spravocbnilr agitatora i 
politinformatora (1(oskva: Izdatel'stvo poli ticheskoi li teratury, 
1977), pp.190-1. 
G) On the role of the CPSU CC International Department, Robert W. 
Kitrinos 'International Department of the CPSU' (Problems of 
Communism XXXIII September-October 1984) provides a major analysis 
while acknowledging the existing deficiencies in the research. He 
also notes that "The ID is concerned only with political 
considerations, however; it does not decide military policy or other 
issues affecting the security of the USSR, as these are the preserve 
of the Kinistry of Defence and the Defence Council." <p.50) This 
would again illustrate the irrelevance of the WTO to military 
matters. 
H) On the question of bargaining, see, eg, Jiri Valenta and 
Shannon Butler in M:. Radu (ed) Eastern Europe and the Third lIorld 
(NY: Praeger, 1981) p.151. For a mainly statistical analysis, see 
William M. Reissinger 'East European military expenditures in the 
1970s: collective goad or bargaining offer?' International 
Organization 37/1, Winter 1983 
D For a discussion of the Soviet- Central European acti vi ties 
prior to the intervention, see, for example, Condoleeza Rice Tbe 
Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army, 1948-1983: uncertain 
allegiance <Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Karen 
Dawisha The Kremlin and tbe Prague Spring (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984) 
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Appendix 3 is a list of the \HO's documentary history, which 
illustrates the extent, as well as the continuity, of the 
documents issued through the WTO's formal and informal structure. 
The documents can be divided broadly into two categories: those 
which give a brief notification that a meeting took place, with a 
very general explanation of the subj ects discussed; and those 
which give a fuller account of the issues and proposals raised in 
the meeting. The former documents cover the meetings of the 
mili tary structure of the WTO, from the Defence MInisters down, 
plus the meetings of the deputy foreign ministers; the latter, 
with one or two exceptions, cover the meetings of the political 
structure. CMenzhinskii [pp. 35-6] discusses the variety of PCC 
documents - see footnote 7 Chapter 3.) 
Documents of Notification 
The meetings of the military bodies of the WTO have been 
almost exclusively concerned with such issues as "the enhancement 
of the preparedness of the Warsaw Treaty" . (defence ministers, 
Pravda, 10 September 1961) and examining "current questions 
concerning the strengthening of tt _ Joint Armed Forces" (defence 
ministers, Pravda, 2 February 1962). Very little explanation of 
Gh~.pt8r 4- '1 ') ,1 ~::.....-r 
how these improvements are to be effected, or indeed vrhat 
concrete decisions have been taken, is evident from the documents 
issued by tbe meetings. The report of a meeting of the defence 
ministers and military leaders (Pravda, 19 May 1965) explained 
that "Tactical exercises demonstrating nevr specimens of arms and 
mi li tary equipment were carried out .... " j many of the earlier 
reports of meetings of the defence ministers mention that the 
Ministers observed exercises of the national army of the country 
in ,,:hich the meeting took place. By the third meeting of the 
defence ministers (Krasnaya Zvezda, 1 Ytarch 1963) , it is 
explained that questions of the co-ordination of the training of 
the states' armies were being discussed. 
These are the issues referred to throughout the 30 years and 
more of the WTO, ~ all levels of the military structure. The 
meeting of "leaders of army cadres" (Pravda, 19 November 1967) 
also stated that "tasks for the next year" "rere set, and functionS 
.. ~ 
taken over by the Military Council in its autumn meetings, after 
that body's formation in 1969 (see, eg, Pravda, 31 October 1970). 
In fact, prior to the Budapest Reforms, meetings of the (then 
inforI"ual) military structure were somewhat ad hoc. This was 
exemplified in the second meeting of the defence ministers 2 
February 1962) vlho reported that "It was decided to ask the 
governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries to endorse the 
decisions (of the defence ministers] at the next meeting of the 
Poli tical Consultative Committee." (Pravda, t~febrtJtAf~ 1%2.) 
The one maj or exception to the documents of the military 
structure prior to the 30\:.·1-, Anniversary is that of the only 
"extraordinary" meeting G ... the Committee of Ministers of Defence. 
This meeting discussed "the development of the military-political 
\ A 
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si tuation in Europe" (a topic normally the prerogative of the 
political structure), referred to the peace proposals of the 
poli tical structure (again unprecedented), and made a statement 
against the NATO medium-range nuclear force developments (once 
again a topic normally limited to the political structure), The 
document concluded by stating that "The Committee of Ministers of 
Defence adopted a corresponding decision on the question 
discussed," (Pravda, 22 October 1983), This seems to have 
referred to the fact that, three days later, the Defence Ministry 
of the USSR anounced bilateral arrangements with Czechoslovakia 
and the GDR for the prospective stationing of "operational-
"-
tactical" nuclear missiles in those hm countries (Pravda, 25 
I 
October 1983, p, 2), This specifically-Soviet ~;~ouncement did not 
refer to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, except to state that the 
J Soviet measures were "directed at main ~taining the equilibrium in 
I -
the nuclear systems between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO", 
(For developments ~. the documents of the military structure 
since the 30~h Anniversary, see Chapter 6,) 
The Foreign Kinisters 
The earliest meeting of the foreign ministers reported that 
the meeting "examined questions connected with the forthcoming 
Geneva negotiations, regarding Germany, the signing of a peace 
treaty with Germany, and the question of the elimination of the 
occupation regime in West Berlin," (Pravda, 29 April 1959), which 
illustrates both its ad hoc nature and the need to delegate 
foreign policy discussion down from the PCC, 
The Bucharest PCC session (1966) was in fact seen as the 
start of the campLgn for an all-European conference (ultimately 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe), and in 
IA~ 
~~a~.~~ n 
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the 'no's 'European security campaign' it Vias the meetings of the 
foreign ministers which carried out the active diploma9Y under 
authorisation delegated from the PCC. The documents of these 
foreign ministers' meetings show that their main concern Vias with 
the successful convocation, and then the successful outcome, of 
the CSCE process. 
The Statement issued after the meeting of 30-31 October 1969 
spoke on behalf of "The governments represented at the 
conference ... " (Pravda, 1 November 1969), and suggested, "acting 
on the instructions of the governments", that certain issues be 
included on the agenda of the proposed all-European conference. 
(Namely ensuring the non-use of force in Europe, and extending 
equal economic relations as the basis for developing equal 
political co-operation.) 
The 21-22 June 1970 meeting of the foreign ministers also 
issued a document on the proposed European meeting, this time a 
Memorandum, again calling for the same two issues to be discussed 
but adding that an all-European conference should discuss 
creating "a body to deal with questions of security and co-
operation in Europe." (Pravda, 27 June 1970) 
The foreign ministers met again on 18-19 February 1971, but 
this time anounced that they Viere "Guided by" the PCC 'Statement 
on Europe' adopted in Berlin in the preceding December. They 
repeated that their governments (rather than the PCC) / were 
/ 
calling for the speedy convocation of the Conference (Pravda, 20 
February 1971) . Again it Vias the foreign ministers carrying out 
~ 
the joint dipIOmaC)~) by commenting that international tensions h) 
were being relaxed and that "the contributions of other states" 
had been beneficial to this process, but they balanced this by 
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objecting to the militaristic line they perceived in "The 
resolutions of the recent session of the UATO Council .. ~.", and 
also commented that the GDR still did not have full diplomatic 
relations with all states (ibid). This mixture of optimism 
tempered by unease at the activities of "certain forces" was 
repeated by the foreign ministers' next communique (Pravda, 3 
December 1971). 
The next substantive document issued by the foreign 
ministers resulted from a meeting that followed the completion of 
the CSCE. This Communique (Pravda, 17 December 1975), was the 
first issued by the foreign ministers covering a whole range of 
foreign-policy issues (CSCE, the Middle East, the UN General 
Assembly, the Vienna arms talks, and Angola), rather than the 
single issue of the all-European conference. 
Following the formal creation of a Committee of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs (CFM) in the Bucharest Reforms of 1976, European 
foreign p81icy issues have continued to be the main concern of 
the Communiques issued by the foreign ministers, though also w~th 
passing references to broader issues and the proposals of the 
PCC. No doubt the successful use of the multilateral meetings 
and documents of the foreign ministers prior to the Helsinki 
Final Act contributed to the structural developments in a 
meeting following the first session of the CFM (25-26 May 1977), 
Brezhnev expressed the conviction that the Committee \-muld help 
work tmmrds the further strengthening and improvement of the co-
operation of the Warsaw Treaty states "in international affairs, 
to the successful fulfilment of the foreign-policy tasks of the 
fraternal parties." (Pravda, 27 May 1977) In formal terms, 
hm18ver, the CFM carries out the decisions of the PCC, a 
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structure expressed, for example, by the Communique dated 15 May 
1979. 
Meetings of the foreign ministers have been increasingly 
supplemented by meetings of the deputy foreign ministers. Reports 
of these extra-structural meetings, though sparse and 
insubstantial in content, shml that the deputy foreign ministers 
have been taking over the duties of the foreign ministers in co-
ordinating t}:leir countries' positions in the various European 
fora such as the Y~drid and Stockholm conferences. Most recently 
the meetings have become the mechanism for a non-Soviet 
presentation of views on Soviet bilateral East-West foreign 
policy, since the meeting on 1 March 1985 (for example), carried 
out "an exchange of views in connexion with the commencing on 12 
March of the Soviet-American discussions on nuclear and space 
weapons." (Pravda, 2 March 1985) 
The Political Consultative Committee 
The documents issued from summit-level meetings - the PCC 
and, to a lesser extent, the extra-structural meetings of 'party 
and state leaders' - are a history of the basics of WTO joint 
foreign pOliCY, its issues and principles, over the entire length 
of the WTO's existence. The Declaration issued by the 25th 
anni versary session of the PCC was proud to declare that "the 
states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty have alvlays displayed, 
and continue to display, consistency, loyalty to principles .... " 
(Pravda, 16 May 1980). An analysis of these documents does 
indeed shovi a marked continuity (see Appendix 4). 
Thus the first 30 year.s of WTO diplomacy can be seen, as 
indeed the Preamble to the Treaty declared in 1955, as the 
diplomacy of the struggle for collective security in Europe (as 
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defined by the USSR). The documents from 1955 to the final major 
declaration before the Treaty's prolongation consistently call 
for international relations to be conducted through a series of 
inter-related 'principles' which, it is felt, would ensure 
collective security and a peaceful European continent, clearing 
the way for economic construction and material advancement. 
Likewise the peace proposals put forward in the name of the WTO 
also show continuity. It is argued that, having acted under the 
principles of international relations, the international legal 
guarantees of collective security in Europe could be codified, 
and then extended to world-vlide peace and security. In this 
respect the WTO, which is a regional defence alliance, is 
assuming a global role in what is largely the issue of bilateral 
Soviet-US nuclear relations. 
Despite this overall continuity, the documents fall into 
three rough periods: the Khrushchev years; the pre-Helsinki 
years; and the post-Helsinki years. (A fourth period of the WTO 
since the accession of Gorbachev is discussed in Chapter 6.) The 
various General Secretaries of the CPSU will be seen to have used 
the WTO in different ways, though this may not be directly 
evident from the documents as such. (This would be more a 
question for the study of Soviet internal policies.) 
The Khrushchev years 
Roughly the ten years of the WTO, from the first PCC session 
in 1956 to the first PCC session under Brezhnev, display an 
organisational inconsistency. Despi te the fact that the 1956 
Communique resolved that the body vmuld meet "not less than tvlice 
a y~ctr" (Pravda, 29 January 1956), such regular consideration wf 
"matters arising from the implementation of the Warsaw Treaty" 
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(Article 6 of the Treaty), has never taken place. Throughout the 
Khrushchev period, indeed, WTO top-level meetings were g~nerally 
held in tandem with top-level C~A meetings of the same leaders, 
reportage of v,hich dwarfed the publication of WTO documents in 
the Soviet press. Khrushchev seems to have been playing down the 
role of the WTO. Indeed, in an article by Khrushchev "vITi tten 
for the American Magazine Foreign Affairs' reprinted as a Soviet 
News pamphlet "Khrushchev on Peaceful Coexistence" (September 
1959), there are repeated references to NATO, but the WTO is 
never mentioned. Obviously it played no significant part in 
Khrushchev's foreign policy during its early years. 
In terms of the content of the documents, in the earliest 
years the WTO declarations on foreign policy were ¥dentical to 
the general Soviet concerns about encirclement, Cold War and NATO 
rearmament, and so on (documents, Pravda, 29 January 1956). The 
1956 Declaration was in fact a precis of Molotov's speech to the 
PCC (Pravda, ibid). Likewise the 1958 Declaration was a precis 
of Khrushchev's much longer speech to the PCC (Pravda, 27 May 
1958) . 
In these first-period documents, hovmver, a paradox occurs, 
since it was only in these earliest years that the PCC carried 
out anything resembling an active I diplomacy' . Not only ,;,as the 
German question of paramount importance to the policy of these 
documents, but they also covered troop levels in Europe. The 
1956 PCC session claimed that }rATO was rearming despite "the fact 
that the peaceloving European countries have already effected a 
number of measures to cut their armed forces and military 
bi..] d,s-€:! t8, !i m€:!cla:catiOTi; Pravda, 29 January 1956) in 1958 the 
PCC spel t out levels of "unilateral reductions" in WTO armed 
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forces (Communique, Pravda, 27 May 1958). This was repeated by 
the next session of the PCC <Declaration, Pravda, 5 february 
1960) v~hile sp/cifically c~lling_ on NATO, vlhich it again accused c/ 
of building up its forces, to reciprocate Soviet moves to 
disarmament. Beginning with the first PCC session under Brezhnev 
(1965), the documents became limited to the themes seen in 
AppendiX 4B. 
In the Khrushchev period, however, the biggest issue was the 
question of the division of Germany in the absence of a formal 
peace treaty, and to a lesser extent to the Berlin question. 
(These issues extended into the early Brezhnev period.) In these 
cases, Khrushchev's inconsistent approach to the role of the WTO 
is more apparent. Despite the inclusion of German issues in PCC 
documents, extra-structural meetings took place of the 'First 
Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and 
Workers' Parties of the Country-Participants of the Warsaw 
Treaty' (3-5 August 1961) and of 'The Governments of the States-
Participants of the Warsaw Treaty' (12-13 August 1961), both .of 
which meetings vmre specifically concerned with the German 
question'< 
I 
The first of the meetings was a conference "on the ? 
questions connected with the preparation for the conclusion of a 
German peace treaty", and it "instructed the corresponding 
competent bodies to prepare all the necessary foreign policy and 
economic measures, providing for the conclusion of a German peace 
treaty and the observance of its enactment, including such 
observance, which applies to West Berlin as a free city." It was 
argued that such a move was to guard "the sovereign rights of the 
German Democratic Republic" (Pravda, 6 August 1961) 1. :2 
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The second special meeting in August, which issued a 
document from Berlin dated August 13, was specifically cpncerned 
/ 
wi th the Berlin question and in particular ",hat it sa'{j' as NATO 
and the Federal Republic of Germany using West Berlin "as a 
centre of subversive acti vi ties against the German Democratic 
Republic and all the other countries in the socialist common-
weal th" which it considered were undermining the GDR's economy 
and affectine; "the interests of other countries of the socialist 
camp. " The document called on "the People's Chamber and the 
government of the German Democratic Republic and all the vmrking 
people of the German Democratic Republic" to establish a "regime" 
on West Berlin's borders 
which \llill securely blO~~ the way to the subversive activity 
against the countrIes of "the socIalist camp, so that reliable 
safeguards and effective control may be established round the 
whole terri tory of West Berlin including its border with 
democratic Berlin. 
(Pra'\Tda, 14 August 1961) 
In other words, this document \lJaS calling for the construction of 
what became the Berlin Wall, but at the same time it argued that 
such a "regime" would cease to be necessary on the conclusion of 
a German peace settlement as envisaged in the document issued a 
few days earlier (ibid). 
Judging from the content of these two documents, they could 
just as easily have been considered within the PCC rather than 
through an extra-structural process. The German question was 
after all the main concern of the Preamble to the Treaty, and the 
PCC had been established to consider issues of j oint concern. 
Within this first period of its operation, the WTO was obviously 
no.t being used for the purpose for which it was intended. This 
could imply that the Soviet UnioT' was conducting its joint 
foreign policy more on an ad hoc basis, or that it wished to 
k/ 
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treat these issues independently rather than place them vii thin 
the purview of the WTO. 
During the later years of _ the Khrushchev period, summi t-
level documents became much terser. On the second of two days of 
a CMEA session (6-7 June 1962), a Declaration was issued, 
attributed to the WTO, which covered PCC responses to a report to 
it by Gromyko "on the tallts betv18en the government of the Soviet 
Union and th~ government of the United States of America on a 
German peace settlement." and confirmed the Soviet position at 
the talks. (This Declaration actually began vii th a list of PCC 
a~endees, a format previously reserved for a 'communique'.) 
(Pravda, 10 June 1962) A year later, a meeting of the Party 
First Secretaries and the Heads of Government of the Warsaw 
Treaty states issued a 'Resolution' (Pravda, 27 July 1963) 
approving the results of Gromyko's negotiations with the USA and 
Bri tain on a nuclear test ban treaty. This extra-structural 
meeting led directly into a CMEA meeting which was itself 
follOV18d by a PCC session that issued a Communique which cover.ed 
only the discussion of a report from the WTO Commander-in-Chief 
Grechko on "questions connected with the condition of the armed 
forces of the states-participants of the Warsavl Treaty. "8 
Obviously by the end of his leadership, Khrushchev was using 
interchangeably all the multilateral mechanisms of the socialist 
communi ty. 
The Pre-Helsinki years 
Brezhnev's accession to power was quickly followed by a 
meeting of the PCC, which issued a Communique that, while 
continuing to cover the campaign for a 'German peace settlement', 
was dominated by the issue of the moment, NATO's discussions on 
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\-,Thether or not to set up a multilateral nuclear force. The PCC 
claimed that this would give."West German militarists" a9cess to 
./ 
nuclear- \-,reapons (Pravda, 22 Jan\lary 1965). The Communique also 
included a brief suggestion, in support of "The initiative of the 
Polish People's Republic", calling for "a conference of European 
states to be convened in order to discuss measures ensuring 
collective security in Europe. "4 
The Brezhnev years of the WTD, and in particular the pre-
Helsinki years (starting with 1966), show a marked use by the PCC 
of single-issue documents (in addition to the Communique), rather 
than a generic 'Declaration'. (See Appendix 3.) In this second 
period there was just one meeting of 'Party and State leaders' (4 
December 1969 - issuing a Statement on Vietnam), but it also saw 
the instigation of annual summits held in July or August at the 
r . ~rlmea. The first three of these Crimea meetings were full 
mul tilateral summits issuing j oint documents that V,Tere originally 
included in the official 'Dosuments and Materials' volumes (see 
Appendix 3), despite the fact that the sessions included full 
participation by representatives of the wider socialist community 
rather than just the members of the WTD. (Issues discussed were 
broadly similar to PCC documents, but with a greater emphasis on 
ideological questions.) The 1966 PCC, \-,Thich lasted three days, 
preceded a one-day CMEA session, and appears to have been the 
last such 'joint' conference. (In succeeding documents of both 
organisations there have been cross-references to the activities 
or proposals of the other, and the two have been associated 
wi thin the general call for closer unity and cohesion of the 
member states. ) 
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Brezhnev seems from the outset of his leadership to have 
wanted a viell-developed and comprehensive multilateral foreign-
pOlicy organisation within the WTO (see Chapter 3), though as can 
be seen in the documents the Soviet leadership in joint foreign 
policy moved from the active European diplomacy of the Khrushchev 
years to the broad declaration of commentary on the world issues 
of the moment Ccf the titles of the various PCC documents listed 
in Appendix 3), While under Khrushchev the preponderant concern 
over Germany vms accompanied by declarations of general interest 
in other issues, in the pre-Helsinki years there was not just the 
campaign for European collective security but a pronounced 
interest in out-of-area problems and the f~ll development of the 
thesis that "peace is indivisible" ~ Tyranowski, p, 116), in 
other words that global superpower relations had a direct bearing 
on the level of confrontation in Europe, that a solution to the 
mili tary confrontation in Europe could lead to a wider world 
peace, and vice versa, 
The Communique of the PCC session of August 1970, .for 
example, commented that "The main attention was devoted to the 
present situation in Europe which, in the general opinion, exerts 
major influence on the world situation as a whole," (Pravda, 21 
August 1970) This direct linkage concisely expresses the earlier 
general assertions that, for example, a USA involved in the 
Vietnam war could not at the same time be truly interested in 
disarmament (PCC Statement on Vietnam, Pravda, 8 July 1966), Thus 
what remains a purely European defence alliance was claiming a 
direct involvement in world / 'I issues; o.vyJ claiming the right to 
assert a multilateral global perspective, By the PCC session of 
1974, the Communique argued that "the easing of tensions must 
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cover all parts of the Vlorld" and was the concern of all states 
and everyone (Pravda, 19 April 1974), Such a global linkage 
continues in the documents to the present day, 
The 1966 PCC session tried to involve the WTO directly in 
the Vlorld arena, by stating that the governments represented 
declare their readiness, if the government of the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam requests it, ~o allow their volunteers to 
go-to Vietnam in order to help the Vietnamese people in their 
struggle against the American aggressors, (Statement, Pravda, 8 July 1966, 
The offer was repeated in the 1968 Declaration on Vietnam 
(Pravda, 9 March 1968), This, however, seems to be the only such 
extra-European threat of involvement, Throughout the vlhole WTO 
period the documents have included broad and unspecific 
declarations of support - apparently only moral support - for 
'national liberation' movements around the world,s 
The 1966 'Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in 
Europe' marked a high point in the WTO's tirades against the USA 
as an imperialist aggressor, and an attempt to decouple Western 
Europe from the USA: 
There can be no doubt that the aims of the United States 
policy in Europe have nothing in common vii th the vi tal 
Interests of the European peopl.es and the aim of European 
security, 
American ruling circles would like to impose their will on 
their allies in Western Europe and make Vlestern Europe an 
instrument of the United States global policy"" (Pravda, 9 July 1966) 
The rest of the Declaration was directed towards 'all European 
states' in the hope of establishing a mutual European security 
system in place of bloc confrontation, However, as the European 
securi ty campaign developed, the ailti-US diatribe subsided 
rapidly, 
The pre-Helsinki period is thus exemplified by the extension 
of a general WTO voice in wider world affairs, and the European 
security campaign, both of which were directed through the 
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issuing of individual documents in the name of the PCC. Despite 
the fact that the political structure of the allia.nce ViaS 
undeveloped and operating only on an ad hoc basis, the WTO was 
maturing as the world voice of the socialist states. The aims of 
the WTO had not changed, and their proposals for establishing 
world peace were still the same (see Appendix 4), but their 
presentation was seeming more unified and polished. 
There was only one minor crack in the cohesion, and that \I~as 
in 1968 with the 'Statement on nuclear non-prOliferation' (dated 
March 7 and issued vii th the PCC documents - Pravda, 9 March 
1968) . This statement began in the customary fashion by listing 
the names of the Warsaw Treaty states and stating that they "in 
the spirit of complete unanimity, outline the following position 
on nuclear non-proliferation". However, 'The Social ist Republic 
of Romania' was not I isted, and the Statement had to engage in 
tortuous and unusual wording by referring to "The above-mentioned 
states .... " rather than 'The states-participants of the Warsaw 
Treaty' . This was the first time that 'complete unanimity' had 
not in fact been reached (with the exception of Albania in 1961); 
but rather than ignoreJ,/the issue was seen to be important enough 
,j 
to issue an unofficial document on the matter. (This document has 
been included in the official Documents and Materials volumes -
see Appendix 3.) In fact all the document covered was to say 
that a non-proliferation treaty would lead to "favourable 
condi tions" for the end to the arms race and an end to nuclear 
weapons, and that the states had examined a draft treaty (that 
wa's not published), which it was thought "corresponds to the 
above-mentione.d task". The "above-mentioned states" declared 
their support for the draft treaty and called for the conclusion 
\.\ ! 
.''') 
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of a non-proliferation treaty. A further indication of the 
importance given to this issue vlaS that the Statement "laS 
published on page 1 of Pravda beside the Co~~unique and 
Declaration issued in the name of the Warsaw Treaty. 
The PCC session in 1974 expressed the view that peaceful 
coexistence and the principles of international relations that 
would be the basis of this coexistence "are being ever more 
widely established". This relaxation of international tensions 
",as seen to have been "decisive in the transition to the 
political sphere" of the confrontation problems around the world, 
(mainly in named South-East Asian countries), "and it creates 
favourable conditions for the struggle of the peoples for 
freedom, independence, democracy, and progress." (Communique, 
Pravda, 19 April 1974) The "constructive activity of the USSR, 
plus its socialist partners" was seen to be the main cause of 
this relaxation, as was to be seen in the convocation of the all-
European conference (ibid). The PCC called on the CSeE "to turn 
Europe into a region of truly equal co-operation among -all 
states" and in general "lay dov,'1l" principles and measures of 
international relations that would ensure security in Europe, and 
thus the conditions for economic and cultural co-operation 
(ibid) . 
After the extremely negative and aggressive language of the 
documents from the PCC in 1966, what really was the cause of the 
"relaxation of tensions" which the PCC perceived in 19747 In 
Europe there had been some measure of rapprochement between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the socialist states (and in 
particular the German Democratic Republic), and on the world 
arena there had been a Soviet-US rapprochement, including a 
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partial test-ban treaty, the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, and 
SALT- 1. But none of these was the ou tcome of WTO di pi OJJJacy or 
were multilateral East-West accords. 
In fact, the 1974 Communique continued to see cause for 
concern: "Mili taristic circles are trying to intensify the 
activities of NATO. They are continuing to increase the military 
budgets of this closed imperialist bloc." (ibid) These were 
sentiments similar to those expressed from the founding of the 
WTO and before. The Communique also saVI posi ti ve trends towards 
peace, but again such a perception was not nevI to PCC documents. 
In European terms, the only 'success' the WTO had achieved was to 
see the convocation of an all-European conference, which had not 
had a chance to reach any substantive agreement on the principles 
or policies vlhich the PCC already considered were becoming the 
norm in inter-state activities. Thus it would seem likely that 
the grm:th of what became known as detente was, in WTO terms, 
merely a change of emphasis, or a change of tone, in the 
documents of its joint foreign policy. 
The Post-Helsinki Years 
1975 saw a new type of extra-structural WTO meeting, with 
two special conferences. The first was a gathering of 
"representatives of the parliaments of the states-participants of 
the Warsaw Treaty", on the 20t-o-, anniversary of the WTO; the 
second was of "representatives of communal organisations of the 
states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty" (3-4 June). Both' 
sessions supported the results of the CSCE process and called for 
its extension, despite the Parliamentarians noting that "the 
forces of the 'col d vmr' stri ve to put the brakes on the process 
of detente" (Document, Pra.,;rda., 17 May 1975) and the communal 
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organisations claiming that NATO "continues to expand its 
military potential" (Report, Pravda, 7 June 1975). Both 
documents called for wider contacts between East and West at all 
levels. 
The PCC, as the supreme body of the WTO, meeting for the 
first time after the conclusion of the CSCE, tried in 1976 to 
create a framework for the extension of the Helsinki process. In 
its Declaration it proposed not just the broadening of political 
contacts, but also the extension of the peace process into 
'military detente'.6 To this end, the 1976 Declaration proposed 
a variety of arms-control agreements (see Appendix 4B), and in 
particular issued a Proposal (and a draft treaty on that 
Proposal) . r for the CSCE states to promise not to be the first to ( 
use nuclear weapons. (This vms the same Declaration, discussed 
in Chapter 3 on the WTO's structural development, that took the 
unusual step of spelling out how the member states of the WTO 
would continue and expand their political and economic intra-bloc 
relations. ) 
that 
The Declaration began in a very optimistic mood; it noted 
essential favourable changes have taken place in inter-
national relations in recent years; a process of relaxation 
of international tensions has begun and peaceful coexistence 
between states, irrespective of tneir soclal system, is being 
established. 
and continued that 
Najor problems which were outstanding after the Second World 
War have been peacefully solved in Europe and relations 
between European states are increasingly being switched over 
to a firm foundation of equal co-operation. (Pravda, 27 November 1976) 
The successful change in the international climate vias seen as 
being directly attributable to WTO diplomacy. 
Nore than this, the Declaration indicated that the Warsaw 
Treaty party and state leaders anticipated that the Final Act 
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promised that detente would be continuous and increasingly 
comprehensive (ibid), that it had "confirmed the territorial and 
political realities that have taken shape on the continent as a 
result of the victory of the peoples in the anti-fascist war and 
of post-war developments" (ibid) , Finally, the Final Act vlaS 
seen to have promised that international relations would be 
conducted with adherence to the principles that 'ITO documents had 
always been listing <ibid), 
In other words, it would seem that after 20 years of 
existence, the 'ITO had achieved its primary aim of peaceful 
coexIstence, and could get down to the business of developing 
economic and cultural ties for the peaceful advancement of its 
peoples' well-being, What was not suggested was either that 
Germany could be reunited or that the two military alliances 
would do more than scale down their military operations, though 
the 'lTD's willingness for mutual dissolution was repeated, The 
PCC thus did not consider the CSCE to have created a 'mutual 
securi ty system in Europe', vlhich would have implied a change. in 
the 'lTD's basic reason for existence, 
Once again, the 1976 Declaration perceived that "There are 
still forces of reaction, militarism, and revanchism", ," trying 
to distort the Final Act (ibid), which suggests that even in that 
year the 'ITO was unsure of the stability of the international 
situation, and could only conclude that all peoples struggle "to 
abolish completely the hangovers of the cold war and to 
strengthen peace and develop international co-operation," <ibid) 
After 1976, the post-Helsinki euphoria quickly 
disintegrated, While ~eeing some benefit from the CSCE process, 
such as an increased frequency of meetings between state leaders 
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(PCC Declaration, Pravda, 24 November 1978) and stronger 
poli tical contacts in general (most of which were on a bilateral 
basis) (ibid), the PCC noted that there vfaS a move to reverse 
detente and increase the military confrontation, in opposition to 
"the generally-recognised principles governing relations between 
states" (ibid), with no real move to increase economic co-oper-
ation Ci bid) . Political detente was not seen as being effective 
(i bid) . On .top of this, the PCC sa vi no end to the arms race, and 
no move to mil i tary detente (ibid). Above all, NATO VfaS seen to 
be taldng decisions on the level of its military budgets 
"entirely contrary to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act 
and they create new obstacles in the way of mutual understanding 
and peaceful co-operation among the states and peoples of 
Europe." (ibid) 
The Helsinki Final Act opened the way for a greater emphasis 
of the "principles" being enunciated by the PCC, and broadened 
the range of the WTO's specific proposals, though as Appendix 4 
ShOW~/ the general consistency of the documents remained. "The (? 
WTO, however, still had to resort to the forum of Parliament-
I 
arians (for example in 19791, to appeal over the heads of the 
./\} -
West's state leaders on such issues as Euromissiles, and to note 
(as in July 1977, only nine months after the 1976 PCc), that 
things vmre not going well for the Helsinki process. 
The Warsaw Treaty states interpreted and discussed the 
provisions of the Helsinki Final Act according to their own 
needs. The WTO documents thus do not consider "human rights" 
despite the importance attached to this in the West. Once again 
it can be seen that the WTD was not used as a major campaigning 
tool for its members. (Under Gorbachev, "humanitarian" issues 
, 
~, \ 
chapter 4 143 
began to be talked about, though this was outwi th the documents 
of the WTO - see Chapter 6.) , 
On the occasi on of the WTO' s 25 u. anni versary the PCC he I d a 
commemorative session in Warsaw to sum up the achievements of the 
Organisation and to set the tone for its future activities. The 
PCC assessed that, singly and together, the members had 
"confidently and effectively been accomplishing vitally important 
tasks" towards peace, and in general that their activities had 
shown the correctness of their political line towards detente 
(Declaration, Pravda, 16 Hay 1980). The whole tone of the 
Declaration was that the WTO had been and still was a diplomatic 
success story in the move towards peaceful international 
relations, despite also noting the attempts by militarists and 
imperialists to destabilise the general trend towards detente 
(see section 2 of the Declaration). It once again issued a 
comprehensive list of proposals, including a call for a 
multilateral East-West su~~it. 
The PCC met in 1983, for what turned out to be the last ~ime 
before the Treaty's prolongation and the 30~h Anniversary 
celebrations. The unitary Pol i tical Declaration reaffirmed the 
assessment of the 1978 and 1980 PCC documents that the 'forces of 
aggression' were still threatening world peace, with a particular 
do~~turn from the detente of the 1970s (Pravda, 7 January 1983). 
The PCC, however, was still lobbying for the Helsinki process 
!b~~ft,~o ~,Ii:/ implemented and extended. The Political Declaration ;// 
concluded with a reiteration of various arms-control proposals 
(fn its section 6). Within this list, the Communique that 
accompanied the Political Declaration drevl special attention to 
"the major new peace proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual 
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non-use of armed force, and the maintenance of relations of 
peace" vii th UATO but open to all states, and" It vias agr~ed that 
at its next meeting the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
is to study the question of further steps directed at the 
implementation of this ini tiati ve, " (Pravda, 6 January 1983) 
Meeting in April, the CFM resolved, however, for the states to 
pursue the proposal at a bilateral level with the West (Pravda, 8 
April 1983)7, 
Such diplomacy did not go well, and 1983 savi an extra-
structural meeting in June of 'leading party and state leaders' 
to continue lobbying for the PCC's proposals and to express alarm 
at the lack of progress in the various East-West talks going on 
in Europe (Joint Statement, Pravda, 29 June 1983), Even more 
unusual was that 1984 saw three documents issued in the name of 
the WID, a Proposal (11 January), another Proposal (6 March), and 
then an Appeal (7 May), (No meetings took place to issue these 
documents, vihich seem to have been agreed internally,) Only the 
third was on the proposal for a non-aggression treaty; the first 
vias on the issue of chemical-weapon-free zones, and the second on 
the non-increase of military budgets - issues that were also 
covered by the 
singled out for 
1983 Political Declaration 
particular attention, By 
but had not been 
1984 the WID was 
interpreting the progress of international relations in the 
1980s, in general since 1976, as a catastrophic failure of 
the CSCE process, and as evidence that its 30-year diplomacy and 
joint foreign policy had in fact failed, in contradistinction to 
the tone of its 25~h anniversary back-slapping, 
A sessi on of the PCC vias schedu led to take place in January 
1985, but was postponed "until a later date which is to be 
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agreed" (Pravda, 15 January 1985), presumably due to Chernenko's 
i 11-health. It would have been interesting to see what sort of 
documents .... {ere to have been issued, but in the event the Treaty 
was extended and the 30 t .h Anniversary celebrated (without any 
gala PCC session as 1980 had seen), and by the time the PCC 
session did take place (in October 1985), a new leadership in the 
USSR seemed to be taking the WTO in a new direction. (See 
Chapter 6.) 
Ideological Confrontation 
As some of the quotations from WTO documents have perhaps 
indicated, the socialist states see themselves in ideological 
confrontation with the West in general, NATO, and the USA in 
particular. The documents, in lobbying for the WTD's concept of 
I 
detente and peaceful coexistence, ~ not completely refrain from 
presenting a picture of their military opponents as inherently 
aggressive, and the WTO as the bulkwark of a 'peace-loving' 
public. In an article on the 13th anniversary of the WTO, the 
then Commander-in-Chief wrote: 
The military alliance of the fraternal socialist states 
restrains the aggressive ambitions of imperialism in Europe 
and securely bars the way to expansion against the socialist 
countries and their friends; ft is a powerful factor for 
world peace and security. (Pravaa, 14 Hay 1968) 
Such sentiments were repeated by Brezhnev in 1980, at a reception 
after the PCC session (Pravda, 16 Hay 1980). 
The documents differentiate between the political and (in 
particular) / military leaderships of the West, and the Western 
! 
public. They claim the latter group is in favour of peaceful 
relations with the socialist states. 
J 
Declaration argu~' that 
For example, the 1958 PCC 
Peace is also supported by the masses of the people and 
influential public clrcles, by many parties and trades unions 
that heed fhe demands of the workers, by scientists and 
workers in the cultural field, by clergymen, by people of 
~v~ (~\'4 
<l) 
I 
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different political outlooks in the countries of Western 
Europe, America, and other continents. 
(Pravda, 27 May 1958) 
In the 1983 PCC Political Declaration this differentiation was 
still being made, as "an lncreasingly persevering and firm 
/ ~\ 
was observed ,I countering a preceding list 
I ~l 
resolve of all peoples" 
of actions by "aggressive forces" that were undermining world 
peace and security (Pravda, 7 January 1983). Intervening PCC 
documents consistently identified an increase in the size and 
influence of the 'forces of peace' throughout the world. 
What the documents seldom do is to 'name names'. The 
'aggressive forces' are never clearly defined, and the only 
country that is named as a principal opponent of the WTO peace 
policy is the USA. In other areas the WTO proposals and peace 
demands are set beside certain NATO decisions, such as the 
multilateral nuclear force proposal (see the PCC Communique, 
Pravda, 22 January 1965), or the perceived militarism of West 
Germany (see the PCC Declaration, Pravda, 27 May 1958) and the 
right-wing bias of its military leaders (see the PCC Declarat~on, 
Pravda, 5 February 1960). 
WTO 'peace policy' seems to be aimed towards conducting 
relations be h-reen East and West, after having accepted the 
postwar poli tical balance in Europe. , Social ism' and 
'capitalism' would be allowed to develop their economies and thus 
replace military confrontation with a political and economic 
confrontation. 'Political detente' !,FJuld operate, meaning a 
greater understanding by each side of the ideological 
confrontation. This \'lOuld be a corollary to the WTO policy of 
diverting military investment to 'peaceful c~nstruction'. 
In the PCC Political Declaration of 1983, it was stated that 
the socialist 
policies ideological 
countries strictly separate in their 
issues from problems of state-to-state 
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relations, the; build their relations vii th capitalist 
on the basis 0 peaceful coexistence .... (Pravda, 7 January 1983) 
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states 
concluding that there vias a need for the co-operation of all 
social systems in esonomic matters. Such co-operation vmuld 
presumably be carried out vii thin the viider principles of state-
to-state relations, v,rhich would necessarily exclude from 
ideological confrontation any question of the post-war borders or 
political systems cf Europe. 
However, if peaceful coexistence is to be strong enough to 
allow an unrestrained exchange of political invective, the WTO 
documents would also have to take a softer line on 'capitalist 
imperialism' in international politics ami the excoriation of 
'communism' as the West's ideological opponent. 
Internal Security 
Although it may seem surprising in the West, WTO documents 
do not address themselves to the Central European political 
events of 1956, 1968, or 1950-81. In fact, the only reference to 
the WTO as a means to internal security is in an article by the 
then Chief of Staff Shtemenko (1976). 
In official terms, the Treaty (Article 3) obliges the 
signatory states only to "take counsel among themselves" on 
common international questions or if they are under attack. 
Article 4 of the Treaty, in referring to Article 51 of the UN 
Charter, obviously does not cover an internal conflict. In other 
words, the WTO is not designed to cuver civil war, or any other 
aspect of what, to the internal events in question, are political 
or ideological issues. Ccf Tyranowski, p.l07 - and footnote 6, 
Chapter 3, above.) 
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As the Chronology of meetings (Appendix 2) indicates, each 
of these three internal crises was in fact preceded by a. regular 
summit-level meeting, a level v,hich vlaS not reconvened when the 
crises took shape. The Hungarian crisis was followed by a PCC 
session only in 1958, at a time when the organisational structure 
of the WTO was in any case minimal. 
During the Czechoslovak crisis, extra-structural mili tary-
level meetings took place, but the documents of these meetings 
suggest that they covered only regular issues - "questions of 
strengthening the Warsaw Treaty Organisation" <Defence ministers, 
Pravda, 31 October 1968), and "the military preparedness of the 
troops" (military leaders, Pravda, 30 November 1968) - and in 
standard documentary parlance. The 1969 PCC session, rather than 
analysing the past, was looking to the future (see Chapter 3), 
and this meeting Vias in any case attended by Dubcek (see footnote 
9 of Chapter 3), who signed the PCC's documents. 
The Polish crisis of 1980 and after was also concurrent with 
several WTO meetings, but again these were not geared to cover.ing 
internal issues. The deputy foreign ministers (9 July 1980) 
discussed European arms control and the Madrid conference in the 
CSCE process; the Military Council <17 October 1980) discussed 
the "current activities of the Joint Armed Forces"; the Committee 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (20 October 1980) also discussed 
the European conferences, and the PCC's 1980 Declaration issues; 
the Committee of Ministers of Defence (3 December 1980) continued 
the discussion of the JAFs. 
Where the Polish crisis was treated differently was in an 
extra-structural meeting of party and state leaders. After a 
conventional communique covering the current international issues 
the concluding tvm paragraphs did refer to Poland: 
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Representati ves of the Polish United Workers' Party 
informed the participants about the development of the 
situation in the Polish People's Republic.... The 
participants in the meeting expressed confidence that the 
communists, the working class, and the "mrking people of 
fraternal Poland will be able to overcome ~he present 
di fficul ties and ".rill ensure the country's development along 
the socialist path. 
It was reiterated that socialist Poland, the Polish 
workers' party, and the Polish people can firmly count on the 
fraternal solidarity of the country-participants of the 
Warsaw Treaty. Representatives of the Folish lfnited Workers' 
Party stressed thit Poland has been, is, and will remain a 
socialist state, a firm link in the common family of the 
countries of socialism. (Pravda, 6 December 1980) 
Despi te the circumspection of the "mrding, and even allLwing 
for the fact that the formal structure "las not invoked to hold a 
meeting that was not exclusively devoted to the Polish crisis, 
the most important fact is that the WTO vlaS never formally 
invoked during the entire 'Polish August'-;- In WTO terms life 
carried on 
V 
/ 
regardless. No document covered the Polish issue 
during 1981, over the declaration of Martial La"l, or during 1982. 
Poland vIas next mentioned, very briefly, in the 1983 Political 
Declaration (paragraph 66), where "western economic 'sanctions'" 
were touched on in relation to "Polish internal affairs"; the 
single paragraph on this concluded that "Socialist Poland can 
always count on the moral, political, and economic support of the 
fraternal socialist countries." (Pravda, 7 January 1983) eIn any 
case the paragraph must be seen in relation to the surrounding 
discussion of peaceful coexistence and the need for mutually-
beneficial European political and economic contacts.) 8 
What this lack of coverage of internal issues indicates is 
not that the crises were irrelevant to the WTO, but that they 
were seen and dealt with outwith the context of the WTO. In each 
case the WTO was not an over-riding issue in the development of 
the crisis, and w~s never the sole argument for Soviet action in 
settling the crisis. The WTO member states v/ere indeed very 
i} 
-,I 
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concerned with the Polish question, but the WTO was only a small 
factor in their overall view, of what vlaS an ideological., not a 
military, issue. 
All three crises were not crises in the 'WTO, which is a 
state body, but crises in the fundamental issue of the leading 
role of the party, and the USSR's over-riding concern vii th 
. + . . malnvalnlng the ideological cohesion of its 'socialist 
com..'TIuni ty' . Thus it is not surprising that in practical terms 
the WTO did not cover these issues, for 'ideological security' is 
not a military or a joint foreign policy issue, but is covered by 
inter-party relations, v/hich are wholly outwith the 'WTO official 
structure. This need not mean that such internal issues and 
problems are not discussed by those attending 'WTO meetings. It 
means that if and when they are discussed, they are not covered 
by the agenda which leads to the published document. The formal 
operation of the 'WTO's structure cannot be used in these 
circumstances. 
chapter 4-
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In practice, through the analysis of its ~ocuments, the WTO 
has to be seen not (as implied in the Treaty), as the basis of a 
general pan-European collective security system, but as an Organ-
isation which, despite its original putatively open form (Article 
g), is an alliance of socialist countries. To this end, the 
Treaty creates the basis for joint action on the foreign policy 
of its signatories. The first paragraph of the Preamble calls 
for "a system of collective security in Europe .... vlhich vlOuld 
make it possible to combine their efforts- in the interests of 
securing peace in Europe". (See Appendix 1.) Paragraph 5 of the 
Preamble establishes the first principle of this joint action, by 
claiming that "In the interests of further strengthening and 
promoting friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance" the 
states will act "in accordance with the principles of respect for 
independence and sovereignty of states, and also with the 
principle of non-interference in their internal affairs .... " 
(i bid) . 
The Treaty commits the signatories to the non-use of force 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes in their mutual relations 
<Article 1), and affirms the desire of the signatories to work 
for comprehensive disarmament <Article 2). To these ends, the 
basis of foreign policy, Article 3 promises that "The contracting 
parties shall take council among themselves on all important 
international questions relating to their common interests .... II 
Tt. Political Consultative Committee was established in Artic'3 6 
of the Treaty to be the forum for these consultations. 
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As the discussion of the structure of the WTD has shown (see 
Chapter 3), the joint foreign policy is enunciated by the. PCC and 
put into practice at ministerial level (and since 1976 through 
the Commi tteeof Ministers of Foreign Affairs), Vii th the deputy 
foreign ministers also having a role. 
Socialist Foreign Policy 
But Vlhat, ideologically speaking, is a specifically 
socialist foreign policy? one that "muld be practised by a 
socialist political-military alliance? The Bol'shaya Sovetskaya 
Entsiklopediya (vol.24-2) explains at great length the foreign 
policy of the USSR. Unlike Soviet and Central European 
discussion of WTD foreign policy, the Bol'shaya So vetskaya 
Entsiklopediya makes it very clear that it is the party, not the 
state, ,,[hich organises Soviet foreign policy: 
Guided by the principles of Soviet foreign policy established 
by V. I. Lenin, tile Communist Party takes into account 
specific international circumstances and establishes, 
primarily at its congresses, the basic outlines of foreign 
policy. .The foreign policy of the Vlorkers' state sets as its 
goal the establishment of favourable, peaceful conditions for 
socialist and communist construction. 
The CPSU PrograTIL~e Vias said to recognise peac&ful 
coexistence, as Lenin's vieVi of "a long historical period during 
v[hich the coexistence of hom different socio-poli tical systems is 
inevi table. " Therefore" peaceful coexistence" Vii th the West Vias 
to ensure "favourable conditions in the international arena" for 
the struggle to take place between the tViO ideologies. 
As part of its overall foreign policy, the USSR also pursued 
a specifically Leninist foreign policy "jointly with the 
fraternal socialist countries"6b,~. Within these particularly 
J 
socialist relations, the CMEA and the WTD played specific roles 
Vlorking for a closer alliance and the joint building of 
communism. 
chapter 4 153 
Such an analysis of foreign policy has also been presented 
by the Central European countries. Bulgaria, for example, argues 
that its foreign policy 
is the realisation of the external functions of the Bulgarian 
Socialist State i it is the acti vi ty through vlhich tlie PRB 
expresses its attitude to the phenomena and events in 
international life, defends its national and international 
interests, and guides and directs relations with other states 
and nations. (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p.883) 
Once again the role of the party was stressed, the defence of 
socialist gains given priority, and faith in' Marxist-Leninist 
! 
theory and obligations emphasised (ibid), Socialist internation-
alism and peaceful coexistence tOltlards "relations of mutually-
advantageous and equitable co-operation" were given a special 
~ 
mention (ibid). Once again, the role of the CMEA and WTO were 
mentioned, but not given a commanding significance. 
In the Northern Tier of the alliance, a Czechoslovak 
discussion of the WTO explained that the foreign policy of the 
alliance was "based on the principles of socialist international-
ism" and that it provided "the opportunity for effectively 
linking the common interests of defending Socialism with the 
national interests and requirements of the countries of the 
social ist communi ty. " (Urban, p.61) Yet again the role of the 
party in the country's foreign policy was emphasised, with the 
WTO and the CMEA seen as contributing to an overall socialist 
communi ty (ibid, pp. 61-2) . "All-round co-operation" with the 
USSR was justified by seeing it as the "leading force" in 
socialism and communism (ibid, p.63). 
WIO Foreign Policy 
In writing specifically on the WTO, the issue of joint 
foreign policy is repeatedly mentioned. !<or example, in an 
anniversary article in 1968, the then Commander-in-Chief 
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Yakubovskii It/rote that the WTO "is a pmrerful instrument of 
political and defensive co::-operation among the countries of 
socialism." (Pravda, 14 Y..a.y 1968) In 1976, Sanakoyev described 
the WTO, through the PCC, as the "main organisational centre" for 
the co-ordination of the foreign policy of the socialist 
countries, vii th the 1976 PCC session in Bucharest issuing an 
"all-embracing programme" to this end. (c '1\ 
Such a partisan political bias for the WTO was made explicit 
by the then Hungarian Foreign Minister Istvan Roska, in an 
interview with Nagyar Hirlap for the 25th anniversary: 
The aim of the Warsaw Treaty is to ensure reassuring and 
peaceful external conditions for building socialism a~, if 
necessary, to defend the achievements -01 socialism in the 
face of any aggressor. (MTI Daily Bu]]etin vol. 15/136, 15 ¥..a.y 1980) 
However, it is difficult actually to define what this joint 
action or joint policy is, even from the WTO documents 
themselves, apart from the broad calls for peace and 
international unity. Over the years, beginning with the Treaty 
itself, the documents have called for international relations to 
be carried out under certain "principles", \'lhich have remained 
consistent though have been gradually extended and developed (see 
Appendix 4A). In one of the enunciations of these principles it 
was stated that the aim of such principles was the desire to 
'transform' the relations of the European states in order to 
"overcome the division of the continent into military groupings", 
and that the pursuit of international relations should lead to a 
"system of commitments" covering these principles behreen states 
(Foreign Ministers' Communique, Pravda, 3 December 197F'). The 
ultimate aim of such a policy, the Communique argued, was for the 
expansion of all-European co-operation in economic, scientific, 
technological, and cultural affairs. 
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Such aims and principles, when they were covered by the 
first session of the PCC in 1956, indicated further that the 
ul timate purpose of this policy v/aS to ensure the reconstruction 
of the signatory states' postwar economies. This was 
for economic and cultural development, improvement of the 
people's welfare, of the all-round development of economy and 
culture, making it possible to put at mankind's service the 
latest achievements of science and engineering. (Declaration, Pravda, 29 January 1956) 
While placing economic considerations so strongly to the fore in 
the question, of foreign policy, the Declaration argued that these 
conditions could only be achieved through an all-European 
collecti ve security system. The specific policies suggested by 
the PCC vlere for East-West "agreements" on these issues, and for 
zones in Europe where armaments would be limited and controlled. 
In his speech to the 1956 PCC session, Molotov, while 
spelling out the foreign policy issues and principles v/hich were 
to be covered in the Declaration, argued another point excluded 
from the j oint document: that the WTO states v/ere "consistently 
upholding the Leninist principle of the peaceful coexistence of 
all states." (Pravda, 29 January 1956) While the call "for 
'peaceful coexistence' did work its way into WTO documents, these 
documents are not so adamant that such policies are 'Leninist' or 
even 'socialist'. The Warsaw Treaty states are careful in such 
public pronouncements to appear politically universal rather than 
partisan in their joint foreign policy statements. 
Thus there is a paradox in WTO foreign policy, whether it is 
to be seen as socialist, or as 'international' in some other way'. 
In a 1977 article in Kiilpolitika, the then Hungarian Foreign 
Minister Frigyes Puja argued that socialist foreign policy rested 
on two principles: "proletarian internationalism and peaceful co-
existence". He further claimed that "These principles follovl 
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from the very nature of the socialist system." (MTI Daily 
Bulletin vol. 12/134, 14 May 1977) The principles of .inter-
national relations as listed in Warsaw Treaty documents (Appendix 
4A), are obviously worded to sound universally applicable; 
'peaceful coexistence' is just one of these principles, and is 
not mentioned in the founding Treaty - it is not, in fact, 
mentioned in every document. 
In comparison to this, in a book about the WTD, Kirichenko 
specifically discussed socialist foreign policy. It is useful to 
quote this at length, to shml the differences between the 
'principles' considered. 
The correctness of the principles of proletarian, socialist 
internationalism is displayed: -
- in the application by every socialist country of the 
maximum effort for the carrying out of its most important 
internationalist duty - the construction of sociali-sm and 
communism; 
- in the carrying out of such policies within their countries 
and in the lnternational arena, I>lhich promote the 
strengthening of the world socialist system as the main 
factor of contemporary revolutionary development; 
- in the establishment of friendly ties between the socialist 
countries; 
- in the solidarity with the working classes of the 
capi talist countries and its Marxist-Leninist vanguard, in 
support of their struRgles; 
- -tn the renderinR of assistance to the peoples, struggling 
for national liber~y and independence; 
- in the strengtheninR of the unity of the internatimial 
communist movement, in ~he resolute stru~Rle against faction-
alists and dissenters, revisionists to ~ne risht and 'left-
ists', a~ainst nationalism and chauvinism, agalnst imperial-
ist reaction and all of its forms of influence at work; 
- in defence of Marxism-Leninism, as international in its 
essential doctrine, as the ideological basis of the inter-
national communist movement, its strategy and tactics; 
- in the joint effort of the socialist states in the field of 
defence, mutual aid, and the combined protection of the 
interests of socialism. 
These principles are the unshakeable platform on I>lhich are 
1>1Orked. out the friendship and co-operation of the socialist 
communl ty. (Kirichenko, pp.66-7) 
The significance of such an overtly ideological exposition 
is not so much that it appeared in an obscure book on the Warsaw 
Treaty, or even that it ranks j oint defence as the final of a 
number of international principles, but that it shows so clearly 
the difference between intra-bloc policy and a truly foreign 
policy. It shows that what is displayed in the j oint foreign 
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policy documents of the WTO is indeed intended to be seen as 
more that just a partisan declaration of principles and appeals, 
is· indeed to be seen as a move towards socialist 'peaceful 
coexistence' . 
The "basic principles" of WTO pronouncements, either singly 
or in a bunch, have been issued in some form or another through-
out the 30 years of joint foreign pOlicy statements. In con-
junction with these "principles of international relations", the 
WTO itself (or the USSR alone), issues "peace proposals", 
generally calling for treaties or "agreements" to codify the 
proposals into international law. (See Appendix 4B.) But the 
declaration of principles or the recurrent plea for various 
treaties seems altogether too broad to amount to a 'joint foreign 
policy' . So what "muld a WTO as the "main centre" of foreign 
policy co-ordination imply? 
In an interview on the Budapest home service for the 30 i :.,.., 
Anniversary of the Warsaw T~ty, Hungarian deputy foreign 
minister Roska answered a question on the co-ordination of WTO 
foreign policy: 
I have a feeling that this question is slightly obsessed 
with the co-ordinated foreign policy of the Treaty, or to be 
more precise, its process and method. The member-states of 
the Treaty do not hold co-ordinating discussions on details, 
rather they co-ordinate the main pol.i tical direction. This 
is then reflected in the foreign policy and diplomatic 
actt vitie~ of all mem?er .states. In our [Hungarian] f!Jreign 
pohcy thlS means prlmarlly that we strengthen our tles ln 
every area with the USSR and the countries of the socialist 
community. (SWB EE/7952/C/13) 
WTO political statements could be seen as the 'lowest common 
denominator' of bloc foreign policy, but as Raska illustrates, 
this is not quite the point. Wi th the exclusion of the 1968 
'Statement on nuclear non-proliferation' and the 1978 'Statement 
on the KiddIe East situation' (see Appendix 3), all the documents 
have been signed by all the active members of the time. 
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Romania's non-signing of these two documents does not indicate a 
failure of the "main political direction" j Romania had .in fact 
signed the 1974 Middle East statement without breaking off 
diplomatic relations with Israel as all the other states had 
done, In fact, these bm issues do not have a direct bearing on 
the main European focus of the WTO, The signing or non-signing 
of documents rather indicates how the system, as described by 
Roska, actually works, 
It would seem that Warsaw Treaty states can carry out their 
national and external policies, in all fields, as ~ like, so 
long as they can argue that it fulfils the "main political 
direction", which would be tmmrds detente and peaceful co-
existence, and in general the principles of international 
relations (Appendix 4A), 
'approves', for whatever reason, 
This vmuld mean that the USSR 
,.J 
"r Hungary's economic policy -
/ 
as a means strengthening bloc economic security - and .\:/ 
Pomanian defence policy as a means ell defending the 
l 
WTO 
southern flank, To put it another vlay, the national fore:i:gn 
policy of a Warsaw Treaty state "corresponds to the foreign 
policies of the Soviet Union and the rest of the members of the 
socialist community, concerning its main direction," but 
) 
! 
each state also displays its 'national interests' and 'character-
istic traits' CFrigyes Puj a, MIl Daily Bulletin vol. 12/134, 14 
May 1977), 
What the WTO documents illustrate is a 'bloc foreign policy'-
not of how to act, but of how the international situation is to.~ 
interpreted, with the list of 'principles' depicting the ethos of 
the international situation as they vmuld ultimately like it to 
be, If the object of peaceful coexistence is to ensure a 
// 
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European peace and political stability then in general the '#TO 
policy could be said to have succeeded, though the internal 
economic policies have not quite created the economic benefits 
that the 1956 PCC Declaration argued the peace was supposed to 
/ permi t. 
,/ 
This state of affairs has also been created without the 
enactment of any specific WTO proposal, for example for an East-
West non-agg,ression treaty. The only two WTO 'successes' have 
been the convocation of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and its follow-up conferences, and the 
convocation of the Stockholm conference on military detente. The 
minuti~ of WTO proposals, as depicted in Appendix 4B, are in fact 
evidence of a policy that has been a resounding failure. This 
would suggest that perhaps socialist foreign policy should push 
less for specific agreements or bits of paper, and more for Vlhat 
amounts to bilateral East-West action on economic or cultural 
relationships that would eventually build up into peaceful 
coexistence through the back door. This would lead to much more 
tangible benefits than East-West declarations of accord and 
principle. 
Such an interpretation should not mean that the WTO is to be 
seen as wholly dissatisfied with the results of its joint foreign 
policy. In a 1983 anniversary article in Nepszabadsag, the 
Hungarian state secretary for defence considered that 
as the economic, political, and military strength of the 
socialist countries increased, more and more achievements 
were attained in detente: east-wes.:lt linter-state agreements, 
the SALT, the arms and troop reducf.~6n talks in Vienna, and 
acceptance of the Helsinki Flnal Ac-t/ (MTI Daily Bulletin vol. 181134-5-6, 14-15-16 May 1983) 
In a 1980 anniversary article also in Nep~~~badsag, Warsaw Treaty 
Commander-in-Chief Kulikov argued that Warsaw Treaty co-operation 
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"served and continues to serve as the efficient means of 
influencing the most important international events" allowing the 
indi vidual states "definitely to defend their positions in the 
international arena, consistently to enforce the guidelines of 
assuring peace, of detente and disarmament." (ibid, vol. 15/136, 
15 May 1980). 
That nothing was seen to be wrong vii th what the WTO had been 
achieving wa~ argued by the then Hungarian Prime Minister Janos 
Borband:/ in a speech to a 20 t .. t-o anniversary ceremony in Budapest: Y 
We continue to believe our cause to be just and trust in the 
power of world opinion struggling for peace and security and 
In the soberness of the Western politicians who recognise the 
realities of our age. (ibid, vol. 10/135, 15 May 1975) 
(However, as was seen in the section above analysing the 
documents themselves, not all the claims for WTO successes can 
actually be sustained.) 
The VTO and 'militant capitalism' 
But from a Western point of view, what are the aims of 
Soviet foreign policy in Europe? John Erickson listed them as: 
the legitimisation of the post-war status quo; norms of peaceful 
coexistence; the encouraging of East-West technological co-
operation; the discouraging of NATO and European Community 
integration; "the eventual transformation of Western pluralist 
systems from vd thin"; more recently the hindering of Western 
'flexible responses'; and always for a reduction of the US 
military power in Europe (1985). 
In WTO terms, the first three of Erickson's points do seem 
to be visible in their joint foreign policy, but the USSR alone 
seems to be pursuing the more overtly anti-Western aims. At the 
same time, the individual overt foreign policy actions by Central 
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European states seem more geared to harmonising their position 
in Europe than altogether disrupting it. 
The WTO does in fact seem to have an ambivalent, almost 
paradoxical, attitude to the West. This can be seen both in the 
references to an ideological struggle (see the section above on 
the documents), and to what could be called the 'paradox of 
mil i tant capitalism'. Ponomarev, for example, describes what he 
calls 'Lenin's theory of war and peace', which he interprets as 
shmdng that "War has always been inseparable from capitalism."; 
since imperialism is the pinnacle of capitalism, then imperialism 
is the main enemy of peace; in contrast, socialism, led by the 
~ 
October Revolution, has become the only socio-poli tical force 
"capable of assuring a just, democratic, and lasting peace." 
(1985, p.103) Writing earlier, Grechko had been almost as 
forthright when he It/rote that "imperialism carries with it the 
threa t of war." (1972) 
In the WTO documents themselves, for example the 1980 PCC 
Declaration, it is explained that the change in the balance. of 
world forces which led to "the strengthening of the positions and 
influence of socialism in the world" had meant that the 
"necessary conditions" had been created 
so that the purposeful policy of the socialist countries and 
unity of actlon- by peace-loving states and peoples may lead 
to important politlcal changes in the whole system of 
relations between states, to the strengthening of peace and 
international security. (Pravda, 16 May 1980) 
This would mean that it is up to the WTO, through its joint 
foreign policy, to lead the world to a better and more peaceful 
system of international relations. 
Qui te apart from the fact that none of the WTO's "concrete 
proposals" has ever been implemented, a paradox could lie in 
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Ponomarev's assertion that Lenin considered capitalism to be 
inherently aggressive, a view also presented by Gorbache~ in his 
Poli tical Report to +.he XXVII Congress of the CPSU 
(Naterialy .... )10. If this were to be the case, then how can 
socialism ever succeed? How could a policy of detente or 
peaceful coexistence bear fruit? Is socialist foreign policy 
having the wool pulled over its eyes by a "fily capi talist-
imperialism? Capitalism, if it is inherently aggressive, should 
inherently be unable to accept the socialist principles of 
international relations. Ponomarev had, after all, stated that 
"the ideological controversy.... directly arises from the nature 
of the two different "mrld systems .... " (1985, p.99) but he goes 
on: 
The competition between the two systems and the clash of 
ideas is a natural phenomenon rooted in the very fact of the 
existence of socialism and capitalism. Thelr historical 
confrontation must not be allowed to head for curtailment of 
~eaceful co-operation.... On a Elea of ideological incompat-
lbility of capitalism and socialism, efforts are beinR made 
to undermine the Renerally accepted norms of interna'"tional 
relations, above all, the basic principle to be observed in 
our epoch, the principle of peaceful coexistence of states 
reRardless of their social systems. (ioid, pp.99-100) 
On the one hand the WTO argues that capitalism and socialism 
can and must live together in peace, and even trade and have 
cultural relations with the other; on the other hand, in 
ideological terms, it seems to be argued that this can never take 
place, that only a socialist world can co-operate, as the Warsaw 
Treaty states are supposed to co-operate, under the principl les 
of international relations as described in the joint documents. 
WTO Unity and Cohesion 
Intra-bloc foreign policy, it is claimed, is also aimed at 
increasing the bloc unity and cohosion, at strengthening the 
socialist community against the capitalist world. (See the 
description above - Kirichenko, pp. 66-7. ) In other words, the 
chapter 4 163 
act of participating in this multilateral structure is supposed 
as such to be of benefit to ,socialism, and to the member,;;' roles 
vIi thin the socialist communi ty-, Soviet and Central European 
commentators repeatedly claim that, by acting under the listed 
principles (Appendix 4A), they have created an international 
organisation of a 'new type'. By acting in concert on foreign 
policy issues of defence, economics, and culture (all mentioned 
in the Tre~ty), they are also strengthening the ideological 
securi ty of socialism by their j oint action to strengthen its 
military and economic security. In fact, the WTO is adamant that 
this has in fact happened. As the then deputy Prime Minister of 
Hungary argued, "The international political, economic, and 
mili tary alliance of the socialist countries has been realised 
and further developed through the Warsav/ Treaty Organisation." 
Oanos Borbandi, MTI Daily Bulletin vol. 101135, 14 May 1975) 
Hungary's Istvan Roska reaffirmed this ten years later when he 
stated that "In our foreign policy this means primarily that we 
strengthen our ties in every area with the USSR and the countries 
of the socialist community." (SWB EE/7952/C/13) 
So is Hungary, or any of the other member states, doing 
this? Every Warsaw Treaty political document, and every 
bilateral communique, includes a reference to 'increasing ties', 
usually linking this in with a reference to economic co-operation 
and the CMEA. But, as one Central European specialistN asked, 
"so what's new?" Such statements are seen merely as ideological 
lip-service and conformity. The only state that is significantly 
increasing its economic ties with the USSR after 30 years of the 
WTO is Romania, through its oil trade deal of the end of 1985, 
and other such agreements. Economically, to all the other 
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states, 'reform' of whatever extent generally means going for 
bilateral trade \IIi th the West. Ideologically, this could not be 
seen as boosting socialist norms, even though it fulfils part of 
the policy of peaceful coexistence. 
National foreign policies, not just in economic terms, are 
in any case only co-ordinated in their "main political 
direction". As one of Roska's predecessors put it, the national 
"specific traits" of foreign policy "are in the first place 
manifested not in the strategic but tactical questions, thus they 
cannot be predominant." (Frigyes Puja, MTI Daily Bulletin 
vol. 12/134, 14 May 1977) but he went on to list a comprehensive 
set of individual influences on each country's foreign policy: 
economic needs; national economic resources; historic conditions 
(such as relations \ld th other states, East or West) j and "the 
workstyle of our party and state leadership". He argued that 
"There are situations in which one or another socialist country 
has greater chances than the rest." and that these chances should 
not be ignored: "If their enforcement is not contrary to the 
interests of the peoples in the other socialist countries or of 
the international working class, it is our duty to enforce them." 
This underlines that the individual states, within basic 
overall limits, see themselves as having a capacity to organise 
their foreign policies as an extension of their states' national 
internal policies. (To the Bulgarians, "Bulgaria's foreign 
policy corresponds to its internal policy and is its continuation 
in the sphere of international relations" - Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences, p.883.) So to what extent is their bilateral 
'diplomacy' co-ordina~ed, if at all? MAtyas Szuros claimed that 
Hungary's diplomacy was "co-ordinated with the socialist 
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countries" (1985, p.24) but went on to place this co-ordination 
within the bounds of full support for WTO declarations. and the 
preservation of detente. This repeats the analysis that t1e WTO 
is not designed to prescribe national policies. 
When it comes to disagreements, however, it is obvious that 
the WTO, if it is used at all to cover national bilateral 
policies, is not very efficient. Such multilateral fora are 
stuck to ~pecific agendas and timetables, and their "co-
ordinating discussions". If one Central European country is 
unhappy about another's national foreign policy, either in 
relation to the East or the West, then a Warsaw Treaty conference 
is not seen as the place to raise the issue other than in 
shrouded terms of 'advice' that "we would do it another VlaY" N. 
Such 'opinions' are never expressed at the level of official 
discussions, but can only be exchanged informallyN. Critical 
remarks on, for example, "worries about deviation from the 
socialist ideological line", or the converse considerations that 
economic reforms and trade with the West might be useful, -are 
generally voiced in the national presses, or through such extra-
structural fora as meetings of deputy foreign ministers or of 
party ideologists, v,here there are no such restrictions on the 
agenda as at meetings within the formal WTO structureN. In the 
main, diplomacy is thus left to bilateral, not multilateral, 
links. 
This once again underlines that the WTO is limited to 
general co-ordination and the reaffirmation of the alliance qua 
alliance. Such a state of affairs also gives scope for 'smaller 
European countries' to have a greater role in East-West 
relations. While bilateral superpower relations collapsed after 
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the Helsinki Final Act, many of the Central European countries 
carried on the Helsinki process at the bilateral level. At a 
time when 'War-saltl Treaty documents were bemoaning the rise in 
'Western militarism and the demise of detente, smal.ler European 
powers were quite satisfied with the new era of small-povler 
detente. As one Central European specialist put it, "We do not 
regard pan-European relations as an illusion. It has been 
functioning in practice since the beginning of the 1970s. "N The 
Helsinki Final Act is seen as the existing basis for European 
security and co-operation. For the smaller powers, this process 
was not entirely interrupted by Soviet-US tensions over crises 
either in Europe or the rest of the world. 
<It must, hov18ver, also be emphasised that, as allies of the 
USSR, the non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty states do feel some effect of 
changes in superpovler relations, and in many cases could be seen 
to be governed more by this than by NATO-WTD relations. The 
point is that they must be seen to have some autonomy to carry 
out their bilateral relations, and this autonomy does not dep~nd 
on intra-WTD influences.) 
In fact, part of the concept of the 'role of small states' 
is that their influence on superpower relations can increase in 
times of conflict or lack of detente, as 'intermediaries'. While 
emphasis has been placed on Romania's role in or statement of 
this' " Hungary at least also espouses such ideas. A further 
cOIll1llent from Roska was that 
In the current tense international situation, Hungarian 
diplomacy endeavours to make use of its possibilities and 
facili tate East-West dialogue , contribute to an improvement 
of the international atmosphere, and to the strengtliening of 
confidence among states. (SWB EE/7952/C/13) 
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Playing such an intermediary role has been considered in these 
smaller states' "national interest".N \)c't<- " y J , ) 
Roska then added that "This direction ic in harmony with the 
main direction co-ordinated within the framework of the [Warsaw] 
Treaty." (SWB, ibid) Evidence of this role is Hungary's abi I i ty 
to visit or be visited by various Western leaders, including US 
figures, at a time when the superpowers were not themselves 
directly talking to each other, or Poland's ability to visit the 
People's Republic of China. 
The WID's World Role 
But the WTO is not seen only to have a European role. 
Despite its legal limitation to Europe, it asserts a world role, 
partly through its claim that "peace is indivisible" (Tyranowski, 
p. 116), that tension in further areas of the world ~'li II have an 
impact on relations in Europe. The WTO has from the beginning 
pronounced on world issues, from obj ections to encirclement by 
imperialist military blocs (such as in the speeches to the Warsaw 
Meeting in 1955, and the 1956 Declaration), to questions. of 
national liberation movements in Africa, and US involvement in, 
say, South-East Asia. While the PCC has issued numerous single-
issue documents concerning non-European issues, these call for 
specific demands (see Appendix 3)j but on European questions the 
documents are more vague, calling for the establishment of 
"relations of peace" or a "move to detente", or issuing a call 
for a meeting to be convened to talk about these European 
matters. 
That the WTO sees a linkage between these concerns can be 
wi tnessed in, for example, the PCC' s 1974 Communique, where it 
was stated that "The states represented at the session have 
chapter 4 168 
expressed the conviction that the easing of tensions must cover 
all paTts of the world." (Pravda, 19 April 1974). Gromyko, in 
his 20 t .r, anniversary speech, claimed even more that "The impact 
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on the international situation 
goes far beyond Europe, and this has bec/lme evident to everyone 0/ 
throughout the "mrld." (Pravda, 15 Nay 1975, p.4) 
Soviet commentators also use this world-focus argument in 
explaining the WTO's strong concerns with nuclear matters. While 
Central Europe is directly threatened by tactical and theatre 
nuclear "leapons, the main WTO statements have been on strategic 
nuclear matters. It vias only under the technological 
developments of the 1970s-BOs that Eurostrategic weapons came to 
the fore, prompting the comment that 
It is only natural; therefore, that the focus of the Soviet 
programme for improving the situation in Europe is on 
measures to reduce the danger of nuclear confrontatlon on the 
continent. (Silin, p.89) 
(This could also be seen as a move to defend the USSR against the 
cri ticism by its allies concerning their mm defence needs, and 
the changes in the WTO seen since the 30 u -, Anniversary - 'see 
Chapter 6. )12 
Conclusions 
In the final analysis, the WTO is the only formal multi-
lateral agency involved in the foreign policy of the socialist 
+ . coun.,rles, hmlever limited its co-ordination has turned out to 
be. It is even more significant that important sectors of this 
structure, the Joint Secretariat and the Committee of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, have only been formally operating, or in the 
case of the Secretariat convened, since 1976 (see Chapter 3). 
But what is 'foreign policy' anyway? It seems to boil down 
to rules for the gUidance of states' relations with other states, 
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either allies or not. c,' .. . . ...,zuros (from Hungary) claims that Marx~.J 
and Lenin's concept of foreign policy is that "foreign p"olicy is 
basically a continuation of domestic policy on the international 
scene" (1985, p.16). This is not really very surprising, since a 
national political leadership will for its own internal reasons, 
including its perceptions of its relations with its neighbours, 
decide on a national socio-economic policy, and must then 
organise the foreign policy conditions to sustain this. Bulgaria 
I 
decided to pursue export-orientd: - industries based on close 
I 
ties v.rith the USSR; Romania for the autarkic development of heavy 
industry that necessitated closer ties with the Third World as a 
market for those goods. As Sziiros puts it, "in a small country, 
definite external conditions must exist for the socialist system 
of society to be able to put dov,'1l roots and to grow stronger and 
taller." (ibid, p.14) National bilateral diplomacy must have a 
theoretical framework to put around its policies, and the WTO 
states claim these to be the "principles" enunciated in their 
joint documents (Appendix 4A). In its first 30 years, the .PCC 
met about every two years, and so it was only in a position to 
gi ve such vague 'general guidance' anyvi'ay. (See the discussf;on 
of the PCC in Chapter 3, and above. ) 
The foreign ministers seem to have been formally put into a 
Commi ttee to discuss the wider issues only in recognition of 
their work leading up to the Helsinki Final Act: the deputy 
foreign ministers do not just meet outv/i th the formal WTO 
structure, but also attend even wider co-ordinating discussions 
Vii thin a forum of "UN socialist countries". Beyond this, the 
minuti~ of policy and conflicts, especially intra-bloc conflicts 
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and issues, are carried out on a non-WTO, bilateral, level, not 
just at state level but also between the ruling parties .. 
In other words, as Chapte~ 3 revealed, the WTO minimises the 
scope for multilateral relationsj in this case, substantive 
issues of foreign policy and diplomacy are neither covered in 
documents nor it seems in official multilateral discussion. The 
"main direction", that of "basic principles", v/Ould in any case 
be understood as the 'Leninist foreign policy' of peaceful 
coexistence, so it should not really need periodic meetings to 
discuss it. What the WTO does in foreign policy is to reinforce 
the ideological basis of the alliance and the relationship with 
the rest of the world. 
If the WTO does not formally co-ordinate foreign policy or 
even diplomacy, and is not designed as an efficient military 
mechanism (see Chapter 3), then all that is left is the WTO as a 
vehicle for ideological unity, reinforcing the political basis 
for the socialist community and giving it a formal character. 
But ideology is really a matter for the ruling parties, who -only 
became visibly active wi thin the structure from the 1960s, and 
predominant over the state leadership designations from the 
signing of the Protocol in 1985. In this way, the PCC has become 
a legalistic protocol method to indicate where the party controls 
./'. 
the State, and why it is the party leaders rather than the state 
leaders who take precedence on inter-state visits and occasions, 
including those involving Western delegations. In converse terms 
the rest of the WTO structure shows where the State has become 
the legitimising front for the ~arty. 
In other words, the member states can formally do v~hat they 
viant economically, and pursue the foreign policy that derives 
eC. 
Q 
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from that policy, so long as there is ideological unity, so long 
as the national leaderships can argue that they are pursuing the 
"basic principles". The analysis of the first 30 years of 
foreign policy proposals in Appendix 4B shows them to be mainly 
an extension of direct Soviet foreign policy concerns, which were 
a question of superpower politics. The specifically European 
dimension of that policy was for peace in Europe against the USA, 
in other words some form of decoupling; this would leave the 
specifically bilateral Central/West European links, which amounts 
to freedom in foreign policy within the ideological constraints 
of the WTO. 
In ideological terms, in Poland the ~arty has not been e 
usurped, Hungary is still an ally, and Romania is just an ex~me 
'--"""',J> 
of the basic model. Academics from Warsaw Treaty states 
continually argue N that basically, all the member-states are 
politically part of the same continuum, that the ideological 
unity is being maintained and is not in question. This confirms 
the WTO as a mechanism for ideological unity rather than anyth.ing 
else. The same academics also argue that the most important 
thing to look at is to understand the national and foreign 
policies of the individual states. Only then can the bilateral 
Central European and USSR relations or Soviet policy towards its 
allies be looked at. In the estimation of these academicsibid , 
in Central Europe the j oint foreign policy of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation does not figure at all. 
Other External Factors 
But to conclude that the WTO, a multilateral body, has 
little bearing on the foreign policies of its members is not to 
conclude that there are not other factors ,,:hich are bilateral, 
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and external to the WTO. Some Central European special ists'" 
argued that to study the area one should 'begin in Mosc,ow', but 
at the same time still claimed a 'national sUbstance' to foreign 
policy. Szuros pointed out that the basis of Hungary's foreign 
policy ViaS that Hungary was a socialist country (1985, p. 15) . He 
went on 
Our socialist policy must, in compliance vlith its meaning, 
differ as compared to the international policy of the other 
socialist countries, in compliance with tlie splrit of Le~in's 
theory that socialism must be built, in additlon to enforCing 
general .features, by taking into consideration the specific 
circumstances of the Kiven countries. This requlrement 
affects every field of the country's life and activity, 
including foreign policy. (ibid, p.16) 
However, unofficially, it has been pointed out that a 
foreign policy being implemented by Central European countries 
does not mean that overall goals are set by them"'. Any such 
external influences are also external to the WTO. These vlOuld 
include bilateral relations with the USSR, vlhich vmuld generally 
be carried out through inter-party, rather than inter-state, 
mechanisms. The individual room for manoeuvre in these affairs 
vmuld be bound by the individual country's relations with Mos<?ow. 
It has been suggested, including within Central EuropeN , that the 
countries of the WTO's military Northern Tier (Poland, the GDR, 
and Czechoslovakia), being of greater strategic importance, have 
less leeway to assert national obj ecti ves. 1 :;' 
Another specialistN argued that Moscow's influence on 
indi vidual allies need not be by direct intervention. Central 
Europe's lack of independence in foreign policy was due to a 
bureaucratic "permanent fear of uncertainty". Was the USSR 
watching, and y' so, how vmuld it react to a country acting in a 
I 
certain way? Th~j suggests that in carrying out their national 
policies, Central European party and state officials employ a 
\ ~ 
\ 
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self-censorship. Soviet reaction to national internal changes 
has, as this chapter has, pointed out, resulted in major 
intervention only when ideological factors, in particular the 
leading role of the party, have been in doubt. It was pointed 
outN that Hungary has never been denied oil imports from the 
Soviet Union, and Romania has never been invaded. 
In final conclusion, it must be repeated that the WTO has 
not proved to be a significant factor in socialist foreign 
policy. Research into foreign policy should therefore be geared 
not tm .... ards the analysis of the application of the Warsaw Treaty, 
but to these other external factors. 
Endnotes 
1) A booklet published by Novosti in 1984, The li'arsavl Treaty 
Organisation: alliance for peace, comments that "The states-
parties to the ''vlarsaw Treaty have long been proposing to the 
Western powers that a peace treaty be concluded Vii th the two 
German states .... " but refers to "a special statement on the 
matter" by the governments and dates it as being issued on August 
12. The booklet thus seems to be referring to the second extra-
structural meeting. 
2) After the first meeting on Germany, Albania issued its .own 
statement, v/hich vlholly distanced itself from the common line. 
This was the start of its open rift with the WTO. 
3) Soviet News 4897 (29 July 1963) issued a composite report on 
these three summit-level meetings, but quoted part of the Party 
and State Leaders' Resolution, attributing it to the PCC. 
4) See in particular A Ross Johnson The Warsaw Pact's Campaign 
for "European Security" Rand Project R-505-PR, November 1970. 
5) Quite another matter would be actions by individual Central 
European states, either in arms-trade to the Third World or 
through the sending of technical advisers. Once again these must 
be seen as national hilateral agreements, and are not covered. 
ei ther by the formal or informal 1lilll.lilateral WTO. (cf M. Radu 
led] Eastern Europe and the Third World, New York: Praeger, 
1981. ) A Polish pamphlet spoke of Polish soldiers spending 
"months and years of their life and work on peace missions .... 
§They have performed these missions for over thirty years in 
various regions of the world: Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 
nigeria, the Middle East." (Czyzewski, p. 27). This was about 
activities outwith the WTO. ".: ;, 
/ 
'I 
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6) The differentiation betvmen 'political' and 'military' 
detente had already been created, in the Communique of the 1974 
PCC, but these expressions were only linked by implication to the 
CSCE process in vlhat might- have been a reference to tne Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reduction talks of Vienna. 
7) Such a proposal had in fact first been mentioned by the WTO 
in the 1956 PCC Declaration - see Appendix 4B. 
8) Another 'regional issue' that the WTO does nQt cover is the 
war in Afghanistan. Up to the 30 t,h Anniversary, this matter v,as 
only mentioned once, by the PCC 1983 Political Declaration, v{here 
paragraph 79 calls for a settlement through the Afghan-Pakistan 
talks under the auspices of the United Naticns. 
Hmmver, in an article in Nepszabadsag <14 May 1980 - lUI 
Daily Bulletin vol.15/136) WTO C-in-C Marshal Kulikov argued that 
"The leading circles of the United States are nov, making 
desperate efforts to falsify the meaning of the friendly 
assistance provided for the Afghan people." It vias not made 
clear if this was actually aid from the Warsaw Treaty Organisa-
tion, from its individual states, or just from the Soviet Union. 
9) Note that in 1971 the foreign ministers were meeting outwith 
the formal structure of the WTO. 
10) This is the gist .of section 1 "The Contemporary World: its 
main tendencies and contradictions". Aspects of section 4 "Basic 
Aims and Directions of the Party's Foreign Policy Strategy" 
somewhat qualify such an assertion, and argue more that co-
operation is possible and desirable. 
11) See, for example, Elizabeth Teague "Pravda raises specter of 
revisionism" Radio Liberty Research RL206/85, no. 26 (3335) , 26 
June 1985. 
12) The WTO does not seem to talk in terms of a Soviet 'nuclear 
umbrella'. In fact, I knml of only one such comment: "The 
defence of the socialist countries is guaranteed by the joint 
defensive might above all by those of the Soviet Union. The 
nuclear missile shield of the world's first socialist country is 
a reliable barrier in the way of the vlarmongering plans of the 
imperialist aggressors." CNezhinsky, p.63) 
13) It was arguedN that this could have been a reason why Gierek 
was unable to "grasp his chance" for internal and foreign policy 
changes. There is a joke in Hungary that "The economists were 
Polish but the economic success was Hungarian." It would, 
however, be unwise to be too simplistic in analysing Poland's 
poli tics. 
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THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARYl 
Introduction 
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union discussed the WTO Anniversary at a 
regular meeting held on September 6, 1984 (Pravda, September 7, 
p. 1). The report of this discussion merely stated that the 
Poli tburo "approved measures.... in connexion with this great 
poli tical event", and went on to stress the role of the WTO for 
the unity and cohesion of its members, against US and NATO 
aggresslon, and for European and World peace (ibid). That this 
was apparently the first mention of the impending Anniversary is 
significant, since the Politburo merely "approved decisions" 
which It/ere presumably taken elsewhere in the Party Secretartatj 
the need to commemorate the Anniversary had therefore been under 
discussion for some time prior to the September meeting of the 
Politburo. What is also significant in the preparations for the 
Anniversary to be commemorated is that the next, and final, 
paragraph of the Politburo report stated that the meeting also 
discussed "other questions" on 
furthering the development of the political and economic co-
operation of the fraternal countries of socialism, and of the 
foreign and international policies of the Communist Party and 
the Soviet state. 
Apparently, even the 30t.h Anniversary of the only multilateral 
political-military alliance of the European socialist countries 
was just one part of a wider foreign policy of the "':'PSU. This 
confirms the analysis of Chapter 4. 
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In the event, the 30 t . h Anniversary celebrations were a 
remarkably low-key affair. The most important meeting, in terms 
of its attendees and key-note speech (by CPSU Central Committee 
Secretary K. V. Rusakov see AppendiX 7), was a "solemn 
gathering" at the Bolshoi Theatre, attended mainly by 
"representati ves of Moscow working people and the USSR Armed 
Forces" (May 14) . The most senior multilateral political 
gathering was of the Parliamentarians (May 13-15) in Budapest 
(but note that this is an extra-structural body), of vlhich the 
COI".Jllunique was the only formal document issued to mark the 
Anniversary. For an organisation that prides itself on being a 
~ 
political-military defensive alliance, it seems strange that all 
the other Anniversary meetings were of a military nature, from a 
"solemn gathering" at the Central House of the Soviet Army (May 
13) addressed by Commander-in-Chief Kulikov, through a meeting in 
Warsaw of mil i tary historians (May 13), to an 11 international 
scientific conference" held at the Academy of the Social 
Sciences, Moscow (May 14-15). <See Appendix 2.) It also S&3ems 
strange that, when such care was taken to have the meeting that 
extended the Treaty held in Warsaw, there was no significant 
meeting held there for the 30t.h Anniversary of the original 
Warsaw signing. 
The Anniversary was, perhaps, notable more for its absences. 
The most important of these, given the precedent of the 25 t .,-. 
anniversary, was that there was no celebratory session of the 
PCC, in fact no summit-level gathering at all. Also, unlike the 
PCC documents, which are given full page 1 treatment in Pravda, 
the coverage of Rusakov's keynote Anniversary speech was limited 
to page 4, the normal site for standard foreign neViS such as 
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coverage of all the lesser and extra-structural meetings. While 
the anniversary address by Rusakov was by far the longest and 
most "ddely reproduced (all the maj or Soviet newspapers and 
more), there is no obvlous reason in terms of protocol why a CPSU 
Secretary who had in Warsaw Treaty terms done no more than attend 
PCC sessions as a tail-end member of the Soviet delegation should 
be shmm precedence over the WTO Commander-in-Chief, whose 
address of May 13 was referred to in Pravda <14 May 1985, p.4) 
and given a brief summary in Krasnaya Zvezda (14 May 1985, 
pp. 1,3) . Kulikov addressed the same "solemn gathering" as 
Rusakov, but he was only mentioned as the first of a variety of 
speakers from the floor (including "Hero af Socialist Labour N. 
M. Motova, grinder at the No.1 state bearing works"). The 
newspaper text of this meeting stated that "The floor was given 
to Marshal of the Soviet Union V. G. Kulikov", ,,{hich rather 
obscures his role in the Organisation being celebrated. 
Significantly for a multilateral body, no-one from any of the 
allied countries was reported as having taken the floor after 
Rusakov. This "muld seem to be a remarkable absence for the 
principal Anniversary meeting. 
Even in the Anniversary articles published in the Soviet 
journals2 , a greater role was given to Kulikov's First Deputy, 
the Chi ef of Staff of the J oi nt Armed Forces A. 1. Gri bkov. 
While Kulikov's name was given to one article (in Kommunist) , not 
only did Gri bkov have his name given to tvID journal articles 
(Voennyi vestnik and Voenno-istoricheskii zhurna]) , but he was 
also credited with the Anniversary article in Izvestiya <14 May 
1985, p.3)8. Gri bkov further add. ",ssed the first day of the 
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Anniversary" international scientific conference" (SWB 
SU/7952/Cl/4, 16 Nay 1985). 
Whi 1 e the PCC sessi on on the 25 t,t-, anniversary issued a maj or 
foreign policy Statement and Declaration, no opportunity ViaS 
taken in 1985 to issue to the world a top-level restatement of 
the WTO's peace policy. Such a policy had not been spelt out for 
16 months, since the PCC's Prague Political Declaration of 5 
January 1983. The Parliamentarians, contrary to their ovm 
precedent, did not issue a full-blo\lm 'Document' or even 
'Appeal', but merely a Communique. Nor did the Parliamentarians 
take this opportunity to support the WTO's various standing peace 
proposals, as they had done on other occasions; instead they 
offered their support for the Address "To the Peoples, 
Parliaments, and Governments of all Countries" issued by the CPSU 
Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the 
USSR's Council of Ministers (none of which are officially part of 
the WTO's structure), to mark the 40 t -h anniversary of the end of 
the Second World War. 
Thus, just when the WTO was secure for the next 30 years, no 
opportunity was taken to reassert it as a major force either for 
international relations, inter-state relations, or even 
specifically as an international peace organisation. Judging 
only from the list of knQlrm meetings (Appendix 2) and of the 
attendees of those meetings (see footnote 9, Chapter 3), the WTO 
was on its 30-t.h Anniversary primarily in the hands of the 
mili tary. As throughout its preceeding 30 years, despite a 
preponderance of military meetings, the content of these was not 
made available beyond the pr8uictable political platitudes, along 
the lines that the practical activities of the WTO as a defensive 
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alliance were furthering peace and bringing about a relaxation of 
international tensions - v{hich was, for example, the r.E:ported 
conclusion of Kulikov's address to the May 13 "solemn gathering" 
(Pravda, 14 May 1985, p.1). 
In their general content, the published speeches and 
articles were as lacklustre as the run of events. They followed 
a unitary and predictable line that vIas 11 ttle different from the 
gist of general or anniversary articles of earlier years. Topics 
covered were: the origins of the WTO, and its defensive nature; 
the structure and the peace ini tiati ves of that structure; a 
summary of foreign policy successes attributed to WTO diplomacy; 
an extended section of anti-imperialist diatribe attributing to 
NATO, the US in particular, and especially the contemporary US 
political and military leadership, the most extreme militaristic 
anti-Sovietism and anti-socialism. The discussions did, however, 
conclude that the WTO was a useful and efficient way of 
furthering peace through the joint activities of its members, 
with the 1985 Protocol on prolonging the Treaty held up as a sign 
of the WTO's significance and of the members' commitment to 
furthering the unity and cohesion of the Organisation. If it 
were not that these comments were made in relation to a specific 
landmark in the WTO's history, they would not have been worth 
more than a perfunctory glance to ascertai n that they did not 
cover any new ground or analysis. The substance and significance 
of these speeches and articles could be s~mmarised by Kulikov's 
description of the WTO: 
The defensive military-political alliance of the fraternal 
peoples and states - the-Warsaw Treaty, created in response 
to the formation of the NATO bloc, to the intensification of 
the threat of war in Europe, here .LOW for three decades 
guaranteeing the security of the socialist countries and 
maintaining peace in Europe and throughout the world, 
confidently and effecti veli resolving the vi tally important 
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consequential problems of the present day. (Krasnaya Zvezaa 14 May 1985, p.1; Pravda 14 May 1985, p.4) 
So just vlhat was said on these standard topics? 
Analysis of the Soviet .rrticles 
The Origins 
As Chapter 2 showed, in 1955 the foundation of the WTO vms 
directly attributed to the accession of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the the West's military alliance system. The issue of 
West GermanY', hmmver, was bound up with the wider question of 
postwar Europe and its developing socio-poli tical divisions and 
confrontations. While the 1955 documents were directly concerned 
with the FRG, in 1985 this was seen as ju~t one facet of those 
times. Where the first session of the PCC tied in the current 
Soviet analysis of its encirclement with the remili tarisation of 
West Germany, in 1985 a much broader analysis vms given. To 
Gribkov CIzvestiya, 14 May 1985, p.4) the rearmament of West 
Germany represented only a "special danger" wi thi n the general 
militarism of the USA and NATO. 
Virtually all the Anniversary articles claimed an 
unexplained significance that the year of the 30 th Anniversary of 
the WTO was also the 40 th anniversary of the Victory at the end 
of the Second World War. The significance was implied in their 
discussion of the growth of 'cold war' politics. Rusakov, for 
example, took the origins of the WTO back to the postwar period 
when the Western pmmrs "had treacherously jettisoned the fine 
heri tage of the anti -Hi tIer coalition and had created the NATO 
bloc aimed primarily against the socialist countries." CIzvestiya 
15 May 1985, p.4) Just why this should require the creation of 
the WTO in 1955 was explained by Nezhinsky, when he "'lrote that 
the West's aggressive policy had necessitated the WTO when "the 
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socialist states had done all they could to prevent the division 
of the world into opposed military and political alli.ances." 
<1985, p.61) Katrich even argued that Western anti-socialism 
predated the Victory, by repeating the allegation that Western 
imperialism had wanted a separate peace vii th Hi tIer in order to 
organise a joint attack on the Soviet Union (1985, pp.52-53). To 
the Soviet Union a postwar world based on inter-state co-
~ 
operation of the kind seen in the "anti-Hitler coalition" vlOuld 
presumably have been the basis of the "all-European collective 
security system" called for by the Moscow Conference of 1954, the 
Warsaw Conference, and the resulting Warsav' Treaty. Finally, 
Kulikov explained that in the formation of the WTD, "The most 
important lesson [of the 'dar) remains, that against vtar it is 
necessary constantly and persistently to struggle, it is not 
permi tted to allow it to be unleashed." (Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 May, 
p. 1) . If this vms to be the most important correlation between 
the anniversaries of the end of the 'dar and the formation of the 
WTD, it would seem strange that it took 10 years for the "lessen" 
to have been taken by the Soviet Union. 
According to Kulikov <1985, p.68) 1945 also revealed the 
Soviet Union as a 'new force' on the world arena, giving 
"socialism and democracy" a role in international affairs; the 
USA and Britain, hoy/ever, were seen as imperialist. Kulikov 
descri bed Truman as vmnting the USA to lead the Vlorld (ibid), 
while Skorodenko argued that the US military and political' 
leadership vmnted to use its nuclear monopoly to bomb the USSR 
<1985,,(;, , p. 62). Britain's role in this new anti-Soviet 
imperialism Vias seen in Churchill' s Fulton, Missouri, speech 
(Kulikov, 1985, p.68; Katrich, 1985, p.53). 
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From this inauspicious start to the postwar years, the 30t.!-· 
Anni versary articles charted- the rise of NATO as an aggressive 
alliance and what Rusakov considered vIas the "threat of a new 
war" (Izvestiya, 15 May 1985, p. 4). Gri bkov in Iz'V~esti}ra <14 
May, 1985, p.3) referred to the US's nuclear threat, the US 
unleashing an arms race and transferring its weapons and military 
technology to Western Europe, and the creation of a system of 
mili tary ba~es close to "our borders". The articles saw the 
conclusion of such a series of developments to have been the 
rearmament of West Germany and its inclusion in NATO and the WEU. 
Nezhinsky Cp.61) saw the vlhole of the 1945-55 period as part of a 
,/ 
policy of the US 'imperialists and monopoly capitalists' to carry 
} 
out 'power politics and the rol]fr~)·back of socialism', manifested 
/'/"\ . .1, 
in the II, posi tions of strength "' policy that "las obj ected to so 
much in the origins and early documents of the WTO. As with the 
other writers during the 30 th Anniversary, Nezhinsky concluded 
that after ten years of such opposition 
the socialist countries "lere compelled to take the necesqary 
measures to ensure their security .... 
Thus, the signing of the Warsaw Treaty was an objective 
necessity brousht about by the conditlons in which the 
European sociallst countries had to live and act; .... 
Cibia, p.62) 
However, unlike the other writers, Yakovlev sought to "emphasise 
certain elements" of these conditions. He considered that the 
need for security had come to require a military basis for the 
social needs of economic and political unity (1985, p. 16). Such 
an argument would suggest that the WTO was formed not for any 
external reasons such as NATO, but merely that its time had come 
fqr reasons internal to the socialist community. 
\ 
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Ideological Origins 
Another aspect of the Anniversary's subtle changing of the 
foreign-policy position of 1955 is that a number of the 
Anniversary articles see the founding of the WTO as an example of 
""hat they consider to be Lenin's teaching on the principles of 
socialist co-operation and socialist international solidarity (eg 
Kulikov, 1985, pp.71, 67), and the necessity of the unity of 
socialist countries in the face of the aggressiori of imperialism 
(Smorigo, p.27), indeed for the defence of socialist gains 
(Svetlov, p. 25). This directly contradicts the attempt during 
the WTO's formation to deny any ideological bias in the Treaty 
(cf Chapter 2), or indeed in the wording of its peace initiatives 
to present a non-ideological, 'universal', face (cf Chapter 4). 
The Defensive Posturp 
As a corollary to the ideological posture the articles, as 
throughout the history of the WTO, claim that the Organisation is 
only there for defensive purposes and has no aggressive or 
expansionist intentions. Gri bkov (Izvestiya 14 May 1985, p.~), 
repeats the assertion that the WTO is a 'new type' of alliance, 
that unlike the capitalist blocs the WTD, being a socialist 
alliance, is purely defensive even that this is something 
inherently socialist. Kulikov places the 'collective self-
defence doctrine' as being the "single military-strategic basis" 
of the alliance of "the fraternal peoples of the socialist 
countries and their armies" 0985, p.71) ,,"hich he ties in vlith a 
description of the Organisation's ideological basis being 
'proletarian internationalism' and 'class solidarity' (ibid). By 
being .Able to place the formation of the WTO at the end of a 
chronology covering the formation of NATO and the rearmament of 
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the Federal Republic of Germany, Skorodenko, for example, is able 
to argue that the WTO was a defensive response to "the aggressive 
NATO bloc and the other military-political alliances of 
imperialism." (1985-a, p.62) In a further' effort to portray the 
WTO as a defensive alliance, Svetlov (1985, p.30) calls on his 
readers to compare the 1984 statements from the foreign ministers 
of both NATO and the WTO, arguing that the NATO foreign ministers 
revealed aggressive and militaristic aims while the WTO Committee 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs were offering peace proposals. 
In yet another favourable comparison with nATO, Yakovlev (1985, 
p.17) argues that the WTO's defensive posture can be seen no 
further than in its open membershi p4, "l'hich he does not see in 
}TATO. 
Structure 
To Gribkov CIzvestiya, 14 May 1985, p.3) the 'peace-loving 
character' of the WTO could even be seen in the Organisation's 
structure; he, as with the other articles, combined a potted 
analysis of the WTO's structure with a history of i ts p~ace 
initiatives. For Gribkov (ibid) this defensive nature could be 
especially seen in the way the political structure (PCC and CF~), 
has been the channel for proposals that have found their way into 
the World's political fora. 
r' 
E<.ren Rusakov, in the keynote address of the whol e 
Anniversary CIzvestiya, 15 1'..o.y 1985, p.4), saw the need to 
explain to his audience in the 1'..o.y 14 t·M "solemn gathering." 
(surely soldiers, politicians, and other poli tically-acti ve 
pr.oletarians), just what bodies the WTO consisted of, how they 
inter-related, and what they did. For example that se~oions of 
the PCC "formulate large-scale, long-term proposals enjoying 
broad international support." while the CFM in 
~'Z 
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Its regular activity promotes the effective implementation of 
a forelgn policy llne co-ordinated at the hignest level and 
the translation of this line into specific co-ordinated steps 
in favour of peace and internationa security. -(i bid) , 
As Chapter 3 explains, this is sta~dard WID historiography, and 
it seems ludicrous to have to include it in such a time and 
place. Nezhinsky (1985, p.63) even felt the need to stress yet 
again that the WID vias the "main centre" of its members' foreign 
policy co-ordination. (cf Chapte- 11 \ ..". / 
Dn the question of mi li tary co-ordination within the WID, 
Gribkov (1985-0., p.13) repeated that it was the role of the PCC 
to be the 'cornerstone of military co-operation', and tied this 
in ideologically with Lenin reportedly saying that war depends on 
various issues, which were seen to be covered by PCC decisions: 
economYi science and technologYi moral-political factorsi and 
military factors. Hov18ver, he paid greater attention to the 
WID's military structure (he lists only the Cml1, Joint Command, 
Joint Staff, Military Council, and Joint Armed Forces cf 
Chapter 3), and how they work together to co-ordinate and improve 
the military co-operation of the allies. Ihis is in keeping with 
the way the Anniversary minimised the political side of the WID. 
Political Initiatives 
In his Anniversary article, Kulikov (1985) considered the 30 
years of the WID to be 30 years of a struggle for peace Cp.72). 
The collective decisions and joint initiatives of the PCC, 
translated by the CFM into a mechanism of co-operation and co-
ordination, had, by the 1970s, achieved "the consolidation of the 
political and territorial realities existing in Europe." (ibid) 
Skorodenko (1985-0.) explained that this achievement, in the 
Helsinki Final Act, was in fact the result of PCC activities 
which had led to the recognition of the German Democratic 
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Republ ic, the treaties v{i th the Federal Republic of Germany of 
the early 1970s, the 1971 agreement on West Berlin (which he 
descri bed as a Treaty), the development of bilateral relations 
vdth the West, "and others" (p.63). To this impressive list, 
Svetlov (1985) added the post-CSCE fora and the Stockholm 
Conference, plus the proposals contained in the 1983 PCC 
Political Declaration Cp. 72) . Gribkov <1985-b), who described 
the Helsinki Final Act as the "main success" of the WTO Cp. 84), 
even (1985-a, p.12) included mention of the Soviet-US Geneva 
talks on nuclear and space weapons. 
But can such international issues really be considered as 
foreign policy successes for the WTO? Certainly, as Chapter 4 
detailed, the only one of these issues that was covered by WTO 
documents before the event was the campaign v,hich led up to the 
CSCE. (This excludes WTO policy on the German Question that v;as 
not backed up by concrete proposals in the manner of the European 
Security Campaign.) Where the WTO definitely covered these 
J 
issues was as a post-hoc commentary on existing development3 on 
I 
the international scene. Even the developments in bilateral 
relations with the West were the result of national foreign-
policy decisions (see Chapter 4) andC~ore)created the environment 
in which the WTO operated: than vice versa. 
\ 
(The Stockholm 
Conference, v,hile also being a WTO proposal, was set up mainly 
through bilateral diplomacy rather than the persistent public 
declarations of the European Security Campaign. ) 
The CSCE v;as referred to by Svetlov (1985, pp. 30-31), as 
p'art of the postwar political consensus, and the recognition of 
Europe's territorial-political realities, its treaties and agree-
ments, and necessary for the development of East-West relations. 
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Svetlov also refered to the Prague Political Declaration (January 
1983 PCC) , for its repetition of the WTO call for carrying out 
international relations under accepted principles, Unlike the 
other Anniversary articles, he also spelt out in great detail a 
number of "major practical steps" in the WTD's programme to 
strengthen European security, end the arms race, and move towards 
disarmament (pp,32-33), The measures he listed are just some of 
the ones detailed in Appendix 4B; hov18ver, despite Svetlov's 
reference to the 1984 CFM: statement, the measures he listed do 
not entirely correspond to what was proposed then,S 
In a grandiose assessment of the WTD's role in World 
politics, Kulikov asserted that the people of the socialist 
countries '{iere proud that the WTO "vias and remains the initiator 
of all the peace ini tiati ves" (Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 11ay 1985, 
p, 1), Strangely, this was said to a military, rather than a 
primarily political, audience; but certainly it is a rather one-
sided analasis, If, as Chapter 4 argues, the WTD's initiatives 
have not substantially changed over 30 years, then KulikGv's 
statement is even more ludicrous, Certainly, as Chapter 4 
pointed out, these 'initiatives' have had remarkably little 
success in foreign policy terms, so they should not really be 
seen as something to boast about, 
Military Structure 
In military terms, '{ihile all the peace-campaigning had been 
going on, the 'military might of the Joint Armed Forces' had for 
30 years been 'holding back aggressive imperialism', According 
tb Gribkov <Izvestiya, 14 May 1985, p,3), the WTD had been 
strengthening its members' defence-potential, 
mili tary 
construction, and military training, through measures formed" in 
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accordance vii th the Treaty." Once again, Gribkov reminded his 
readers that the military alliance is organised to ensure each 
country's equal status, and he claimed that this could partly be 
seen in "'1'he Joint Armed Forces, in the composition of which each 
country apportions contingents of its forces and fleet." In 
other words, as was noted in Chapter 3, Gribkov is revealing that 
even after 30 years, the J AFs were not a unitary body of the 
socialist forces. 
In his article in Voennyi vestnik (1985-a), Gribkov reminded 
his readers of the mi I i tary structure of the WTO, assuming the 
level of ignorance that Rusakov assumed for the political 
structure. He took his readers from the PCC's overall role, down 
through the CDM as the centre of co-ordination and taking 
'important decisions', to the Joint Command 'resolving crucial 
problems' in its main function of co-ordinating the Joint Armed 
Forces and realising the plans for their equipment, with the 
:M:ilitary Council making recommendations for the benefit of the 
military might and the Joint Staff acting as the "working bor;iy" 
of the military structure Cp.14). However, in his concurrent 
article in Voenno-istoricbeskii z1IUrnal, Gribkov mentioned that 
the military co-operation on the basis of PCC decisions was also 
put into practice by "the national military bodies". He did not 
see any problem of co-ordination or of such decisions over-riding 
national sovereignty or national aims: 
The co-ordinated decisions and recommendations, which are 
taken by the Committee of Ministers of Defence and the 
Military Council of the Joint Armed Forces, are carried out 
by the allied armies, since they are worked out collectively, 
by taking into account the interests of the armed forces of 
each country. (1985-b, p.B8) 
Gribkov continued that the Joint Staff works in close contact 
with "national General (Main) Staffs" to help put the decisions 
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into practice, and that the ul ti:mate aim of such military co-
operation vlaS to improve military strength, readiness, structure, 
and technologies, against the NATO threat (ibid). 
As the section on the military structure in Chapter 3 ShOV1S, 
the structure as officially described, and which was reaffirmed 
by Gribkov, is not particularly efficient. What Gribkov seemed 
to be saying, after 30 years of its operation, was that the 
Warsaw Treaty structure does not seem to have a fully 
prescriptive role over the national military structures. Even 
though he argued that the Central European countries participate 
"collectively" in the WTO structure, the actual role of the non-
Soviets in this structure is in doubt, even without taking into 
account the unspecified role of the party structures, in which 
the CPSU predominates. In fact Gribkov began by saying that the 
decisions "are carried out" by the armies, and only refers to the 
Joint Staff 'working closely' with the national military 
structures (ibid). As concluded in Chapter 3, the actual 
practice of military co-operation is unclear. 
In referring to the national contingents of the Joint Armed 
Forces, Gri bkov (l985-b, p.88) specified that the basis of the 
JAFs are in fact the Soviet forces. Skorodenko (1985-a, p.66) 
extended this Soviet dominance by specifying that Soviet aid is 
the basis of the military-economic and scientific-technical 
potential of the WTO, but since he refered to the role of the 
CMEA Complex Programme as developing economic integration leadins 
to "effective measures" on defence, there could be some doubt as 
to just how much co-operation, albeit dominated by the USSR, 
there is. 
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The Role of the Party 
In contradistinction to most of the earlier writings on the 
"WIG, in the 30't.h Anniversary articles a much more open role v,ras 
given to the ruling parties. For example, in his analysis of the 
development of the military bodies of the "WIG, Kulikov v,ras able 
to write that 
As a result of the communist and workers' parties and the 
peoples of the fraternal countries an essential. structure v,ras 
created of the organisation and structure of the armies and 
fleets, high qyall ty displayed of their tech7.ical equipment, 
material-technlcal provision, the level of operational and 
mili tary preparedness of the commanding staff and forces was 
promoted, tne boldest and most fundamental review in the 
armed forces of the allied armies. 
<1985, p.74) 
~~en addressing the Soviet and Joint Armed Forces representatives 
Kulikov explained that the ,tq.rties were _ not only behind the e 
material level of the forces, but had in fact been working for 30 
years on the various forms of military co-operation, and had been 
furthering the readiness of the Joint Armed Forces and "of each 
of the national armies, strengthening their military fraternity." 
(Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 Y~y 1985, p.3) According to Rusakov, it was 
the intervention of the parties that ensured that the JAFs had 
"everything necessary to repulse any aggression." (Izvestiya, 15 
May 1985, p.4) 
Nezhinsky, however, limited the role of the ruling parties 
to helping with the "constant improvement" of the WIO through the 
participation of their delegates in the vmrk of the Political 
Consultative Committee (1985). If we accept the official account 
of how successful the PCC is, despite its limited frequency of 
convocation (see Chapter 3), then it would be possible for the 
parties to influence all aspects of the life of the WIO. But as 
Chapter 3 concluded, it would be highly irregular for the ruling 
parties to limit their active participation to the PCC. Katrich, 
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though, regarded "the leadership of the communist and workers' 
parties of our countries" (and the Marxist-Leninist ideology as 
the· theory behind their policy), as of paramount importance to 
the successful activity of the WTO (1985, p.55). 
While not being explicit as to the party direction of the 
WTO's political activities, Katrich, as a "Colonel-General of 
Aviation, Deputy COJIL.'Uander-in-Chief (Air Force)" of the Joint 
Armed Forces, would perhaps be better placed than Nezhinsky to 
see at first hand that "the communist ideology" and "leadership 
of the communist and workers' parties", including through the 
activities of political-workers within the forces (ibid, p.56), 
" do in fact have a day-to-day role wi thin at least part of the 
T.rrn Vi J.L.I. 
Both Katrich (ibid) and Gribkov (1985-a, p.14) stressed the 
role of ideology in the acti vi ties of the forces, and in this 
respect Gribkov also specified that 
A great place in the life and activities of the allied 
armies is occupied by the co-operation of the political 
bodies, which are realised on the basis of the declsions of 
the communist and worl\:ers' parties. 
0985-b, p.90) 
While still not being specific concerning the parties' role 
in non-military affairs, perhaps a general indication of just how 
explicit this has become can be seen in that unlike all previous 
documents issued from the PCC or extra-structural summmi t-level 
meetings, the Protocol on the Treaty's prolongation \'las not 
signed by both a state and a party representative (some of which 
vmuld have been the same person) , but by all the party' 
First/General Secretaries, only some of whom were able to sign 
concurrently as having a state position. 
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Anti-Westprn Diatribe 
A common element in all the 30 u ··• Anniversary presentations 
is that, having established to their own satisfaction the WTO as 
a peace-loving and defensive alliance, and having shown a 
chronology of its ini tiati ves, they then described NATO, 
"militarist imperialists", and above all the USA, as being 
precisely the opposite, the initiator of all the military 
policies that the socialist countries claimed to be opposing (by 
both diplomacy and armed preparedness). In summing up the period 
of the WTO, Yakovlev virote: 
Today, as also three decades ago, the NATO bloc 
to offer Europe and the world any thins, other 
military plans, new militaristic preparatlons, new 
the arms race. 
<1985, p.18) 
is unable 
than new 
rounds of 
Rusakov claimed that the vlhole military expansion of the WTO 
to the achievement of strategic parity wi th ~rATO vlaS necessary 
"since vlhat was ultimately at stake was the fate of socialism and 
the future of human civilisation itself." (Izvestiya, 15 May 
1985, p.4) In other words, if it were not for socialism's 
defensi ve response to the armed aggression of NATO, there vlO.uld 
be no stopping the expansionism and militarism of the West. 
Rusakov went on to explain socialism's military preparations by 
claiming that imperialism, "primarily US imperialism", wished to 
upset "the present correlation of forces in the World", in other 
words the strategic parity between NATO and the WTO (ibid). 
In terms of chrono] ogical events, however, the articles 
generally go from having presented the origins of the WTO as a 
I 
response to aggressi01and the enSUing years 
f 
WIO foreign policy, for example with the 
)h bf a success for 
Helsinki Final Act,! 
1" 
straight into arguing that the West, and espet.;lally the USA, 
nonetheless still vlants confrontation rather than co-operation, 
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particularly in the post-CSCE period. (This corresponds to the 
coverage of inter-national affairs in the documents of tQe PCC -
cf Chapter 4.) The Annivers~ry documents therefore ignore 
military events for the bulk of the WTO's existence, and instead 
take their lead from the Soviet Union and recount how in the 
post-Helsinki period the USA has, in their vieVl, acted 
aggressi velyj the issues of cruise missiles, Pershing-2 missiles, 
and the size of the US military budget are repeatedly mentioned 
(eg Gribkov, 1985-a, p.13j Svetlov, 1985, p.28). Gribkov 
concluded (19S5-b, p.86) that the US has turned to a strategy of 
'direct confrontation', and considered this to be seen in its 
militarisation of space and its development of chemical weapons. 
He also saw (1985-a, p.13) the current West German policy to be 
once again revanchist and militarist, questioning the poshmr 
borders (which the USSR considers to have been settled by the 
West German treaties of the early 1970s and by the Helsinki Final 
Act) and is thus once again a great threat. 
On such specific issues, Rusakov argued that the West-· s 
'Group of Seven' had "recently" presented "the same policy of 
strength, de facto encouragement of revanchism and persistent 
aspiration to interfere in the socialist countries' internal 
affairs and impose on the peoples .. rays they have rej ected. ",,,. 
Rusakov even specified President Reagan's speech on the 40t.h 
anni versary of the end of the War, in Bi tburg cemetary in West 
Germany, as "an act of blasphemy" and evidence of revanchism.' 
(Izvestiya, 15 May 1985, p.4) 
One other accusation against the West, but not mentioned 
earlier in WTO documents, was that several of the writers saw in 
the West an attempt to wage '" psychological war'" against the 
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socialist countries (eg Gribkov, 1985-b, p.87; Smorigo, 1985, 
p.24; Slmrodenko, 1985-0., p. ~5). Just how this policy manifests 
itself was not properly explained, though since it was often 
mentioned in relation to Reagan's 'crusade' against socialism, it 
could be seen as just part of the ideological confrontation of 
East and West discussed in Chapter 4. 
Such an irascible attack on capitalist-imperialist-Western-
militarist-revancnist policy and anti-Sovietism is not new, and 
can only be expected from an Organisation that is in opposition 
to such forces. However, as Chapter 4 indicated, the strength 
and vehemence of such attacks changed according to the times. 
-The 30 t . h Anniversary of the WTO occurred towards the end of a 
peak in hostility, and was followed in November of the same year 
by "the spirit of Geneva" ",hich resulted from the Reagan-
Gorbachev summit. 
The Effica~y of the First 30 Years 
The Communique issued by the Anniversary meeting of the 
Parliamentarians assessed that throughout its period of operat.ion 
the WTO had 
reliably served the protection of the historic sains of 
socialism and the development of all-round co-operatlon among 
the allied states, and lias played an outstanding role in the 
preservation and strengthening of peace in Europe and 
throughout the World. (Izvestiya, 15 May 1985, p.5) 
Once again this was a predictable description, and could equally 
have been used for any of the Organisation's other anniversaries, 
books, or articles. The only difference is perhaps a tone that a 
30~h Anniversary requires a slightly greater sense of conviction. 
But, as was pointed out at the start of this chapter, the rest of 
the Communique and the other keynote speeches failed to make any 
particular foreign-policy use of such an Anniversary. 
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Where some of the Anniversary documents did go further than 
earlier documents was in ~lacing the WTO wi thin the broader 
context of the socialist community. vlhile Menzhinskii had placed 
the PCC alongside various bilateral and multilateral fora of both 
the Parties and the states <1980, p. 27), Smorigo v,rrote in the 
context of the Anniversary that 
The central place in the realisation of the joint efforts 
of the fraternal countries for the defence of the gains of 
socia ~ism and the prevention of a new vlOrld v,rar beIongs to 
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. 
<1985, p,29) 
While this seems to be one of the most outspoken laudatory 
assessments of the WTO, it should perhaps be seen in context, as 
an analysis read on a specific historic occasion rather than in a 
general treatise on the life of the socialist states. On the 
occasion of the Treaty's 30-1:.1"1 Anniversary, and not qUite a month 
after the extension of the Treaty's operation, it would be 
necessary to justify the existence of the Treaty in strong terms. 
However, Nezhi nsky, 0.1 so wri t i ng f or the 30u • Anni versary, was 
just as circumspect as early vrri ters: 
Together with the fraternal socialist countries' (bilateral] 
treaties of friendship and mutual assistance and their co-
operation wi thin the framevlOrk of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, the Warsaw Treaty was a powerful 
international legal factor, cementing all the fraternal ties 
among European socialist countries. (1985, p.62) 
Such an analysis of the WTO's overall significance is consistent 
with the conclusions of the WTO in context, presented in Chapter 
7. Outwi th the 30 t .l-, Anniversary, but also v,rrHing in 1985, 
Ponomarev argued that the cause of building the all-round 
security and consolidation of the socialist states "is also 
effecti vely served by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation" (p. 118) . 
In a similar vein, but discussing the general integration of 
the allies, Savino'l, vrri ting immediately after the 30t-h 
Anniversary, argued that the WTO carried out "a historical 
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contribution" to this integration "by means of the regular .... 
collecti ve and bilateral meetings at the highest leveL," (1986, 
pp.224-5) (But the Qilateral meetings are not part of the vlTO's 
formal structure - see Chapter 3 above.) 
It would therefore seem likely that an extraordinary 
assessment such as Smorigo's is really an aberration. 
Kulikov's address to the military gathering argued that the 
,,!TO had seen a 30-year struggle to improve the international 
si tuation in favour of peaceful coexistence and the, equal-in-
rights co-operation of states (Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 May 1985, 
p.l). This is the basic explanation of what the WTO is for, and 
can be traced back to the Itmrding of the Treaty itself (see 
Appendix 1). Katrich, however, gave it a wider scope, arguing 
that the WTO was "not just a military alliance of states, but an 
all-round mechanism of effective poli tical, economic, 
ideological, and military co-operation." (1985, p.54) 
The WTO did not gain its "central place" overnight. The 
introduction in Izvestiya to Rusakov's address to the "sol-emn 
gathering" of May 14 said only that the WTO "has bpcome a 
reliable bastion of peace, revolutionary gains, and the people's 
creative labour." <15 Nay 1985, p.4 - emphasis added). The 
introduction continued that the member-states 
have been loyally serving the development of the socialist 
countries, tlie safeguardlng of their sovereignty, security, 
the inviolability of their borders, and the implementation of 
a peace-loving foreign policy course. (i bid) 
So the WTO, founded in 1955 as a response to the militarisation 
of West Germany, had grown over the years to cover joint defence, 
j oint foreign policy, co-operation in both these fields and in 
poli tics, economics, and ideology, and the general "development 
of the socialist countries", 
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In arguing for its usefulness, Rusakov even claimed that the 
very act of belonging to the WTO had "promoted the consol.idation 
of the political weight and international authority of each state 
belonging to it"; moreover, the existence of the WTO had 
influenced "our planet's moral-political cl imate" by acting as a 
model for national liberation movements in showing a better form 
of vlOrld organisation than the imperialist one (ibid): a 
stirring ass~ssment indeed for an Organisation vii th the "central 
place" in its members' inter-relations. 
The WTO in Practice 
Wi th the Anniversary assessment of the WTO so favourable, 
how did its practice measure up? In the analysis of its 
political initiatives and successes (see above), the \'-lriters were 
adamant that the WTO had played an effective and leading role in 
East-West relations. Nezhinsky took this further, and argued 
that since one of the "main aims" of the WTO ViaS "to defend 
socialist gains", it had successfully acted to "give a collective 
rebuff to imperialist intrigues against the cause of peace and 
democracy. " <1985, p.60) However, his examples of these 
successes were unusual. As evidence that the WTO operated to 
protect socialism he argued that the Organisation had pooled its 
military, economic, and political resources in the defence of 
Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in the 1980s 
(ibid, p.65); as evidence that the socialist countries had given 
aid against US imperialism, he referred to Cuba, Vietnam, Korear 
Laos, Kampuchea, the movements of national liberation, and 
Nicaragua (in that order). In strictly historical and 
documentary terms, the WTO had played no role in the 'defence' of 
Hungary in 1956; the 'defence' of Czechoslovakia in 1968 had been 
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carried out by a group of countries in, but not the entire 
membership of, the WTO (see footnote 6, Chapter 3); the 'd~fence' 
of Poland was carried out "ii thout any action by the WTO beyond 
official and bilateral expressions of concern and support. (cf 
Chapter 4.) In terms of aid to other countries, the WTO 
documents have at various times mentioned the countries Nezhinsky 
refers to, but with the exception of offering to send 
, volunteers' :to Vietnam (see Chapter 4), the documents have only 
offered moral or ideological support. In the examples cited, 
this does not deny that the member states took action either 
through bilateral or extra-WTD collective means. To cite them as 
'successes' for the WTO, however, is to ascribe a regional 
defence body with both an internal-security role, and a wider, 
'out of area', role. These "muld seem unusual, if not dubious, 
'successes' to claim for an Organisation originally intended as a 
model for pan-European collective security.? 
As was noted in the introduction to Chapter 3, one of the 
functions of the WTO has been to increase the 'unity and 
cohesion' of the member-states. (See also Chapter 6.) Quoting 
the Pol i tburo report mentioned at the start of this chapter, 
Nezhinsky argued that the existence of the WTO II, is inseparable 
from the steady build-up of the unity and cohesion of the 
socialist countries and their joint action against the aggressive 
militaristic policy pursued by the USA and its NATO allies .... '" 
(i bid, p.60) He also claimed that the Warsaw Treaty meeting of 
:March 13, 1985 (during the Chernenko funeral), reaffirmed the 
need to increase unity and cohesion, and to work for greater co-
ordination (ibid, p.66), though this is not directly evident from 
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the meeting's report (Izvestiya 15 March 1985) where these issues 
Vlere referred to but in brief .and predictable wording. 
Taking into account the analysis of his article (from the 
origins of the Treaty onwards), Nezhinsky concluded by noting 
that the Protocol on the Treaty's prolongation vias signed on 26 
April 1985 (op cit, p. 99). He implied that since the WTO was so 
useful and effective it could not but be extended; the socialist 
community could not carryon without it. Such an explanation for 
the significance of the Protocol vias also used by Kulikov 0985, 
p.67) who stated that the Protocol itself was an indication of 
the member-states' unity of action on foreign policy, economics, 
politics, the work of the parties, the work of the military, and 
the strengthening of their cohesion, in the fight for peace and 
against the West. Rusakov told his audience that 
The Warsaw meeting [26 April 1985) confirmed the necessity 
of the socialist countries' multilateral military-political 
alliance. It demonstrates with renewed strenp;th the 
determination of the allied socialist countries' lraternal 
parties and peoples to continue to strengthen their unity and 
cohesion, jOlntly defend socialism's posltions, act in a co-
ordinated manner in international affairs, and strive for 
lasting peace on earth. (Izvestiya, 15 May 1985, p.4) 
The extension of the WTO seems to have become fundamental to 
the continued presentation of the socialist community as a multi-
national force in _ vlOrld affairs. Writing after the event, 
Savinov 0986, p.247) summarised Yakovlev's Anniversary article 
and said that it concluded that the 'current international 
situation' ie US militarism, West German revanchism, the 
Anni versary' s critique of the West in general - required the 
continued existence of the WTO and its greater unity. While 
Savinov's summary is simplistic, it nonetheless captures the 
basic view of all the Anniversary presentations. 
chapter 5 200 
Taking this all into account - the presentation of the work 
of the VTO, the explanation for vlhy it was prolonged - it might 
be ·seen that, after 1985, the VTO exists because it existed. 
Given that the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 show that whatever 
the unspoken justification, its stated vmrkings and effects do 
not really amount to much beyond a show of ideological unity. The 
socialist states could not get avlaY with allowing the Treaty to 
lapse. Even given its limited practical role, international 
events in the 1980s could not be seen to be carried out with the 
system of bilateral ties that existed in the early 1950s. The 
Anniversary presentations do not, and presumably could not, admit 
this; therefore they ignored the question by focussing on why the 
Treaty vlaS formed, how it was structured, and just how effective 
and useful it was. 
Central European Assessments 
The 30~h Anniversary of the signing of the Varsaw Treaty did 
not go unnoticed in Central Europe. The Summary of World 
Broadcasts covered a wide range of speeches and newspaper 
articles for the occasion (EE/7952/C). (See also the Anniversary 
bi bliography at the end of this chapter.) To a very great 
extent, the scope of the treatment was the same as that in the 
Soviet Union. 
While not going into the historical roots so much, the 
origins of the VTO were again analysed as a response to the Vest, 
as "an inevitable countermeasure to the acti vi ties of the most 
aggressive forces of imperialism" (Bulgarian Foreign Minister 
Pe-tur Mladenov, SWB EE/7952/C/7-9) and especially to NATO and the 
remilitarisation of West Germany (Czechoslovak commentator Jirina 
Dupalova, ibid, C/l0). The Polish commentator Hofman argued that 
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"we have to conclude that relations in Europe are not better now 
than they were thirty years ago. 
better." <p.8) 
Different, yes, but not 
The GDR Foreign Minister said that the WTD was a defensive 
alliance, 
operation 
defending peace and consolidating socialist co-
and friendship, reliably protecting socialist 
construction (SWB EE/79521C111-12). "The GDR IS membership of 
this alliance stressed the force of the commitment to do 
everything so that '."iar never again emanates from German soil." 
(i bid) 
The Central European reporting does not seem to have covered 
the structure of the WTD to the same extent as the Soviet 
articles and speeches (but see SWB, ibid, C/13, where it was 
cmrered in an interview with Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Istvan Roska). Hovlever, the WTD's contribution to peace '."Jas 
covered in great detail. Hungarian Deputy Premier Lajos Czinege, 
speaking to the meeting of WTD Parliamentarians, told his 
audience that in fulfilling its aims the WTD had been maintaining 
peace "not only in the military but in the political sense too" 
through its peace initiatives (MTI Daily Bulletin vol.20/134, 14 
l<1ay 1985). The Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov, 
addressing a meeting in Sofia, said that the WTD "became a 
generator of proposals and initiatives to the benefit of detente 
and for the promotion of all-European co-operation and at the 
same time a dynamic factor for their realisation." (SWB· 
EE/7952/CI7-Q) GDR Foreign Minister Dskar Fischer stated that 
the· WTD had made "more than 100 proposals to reduce step by step 
the danger of war by effective measures of arms limitation and 
disarmament." (ibid, Cll1) Reports in the Polish party daily 
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Trybuna Ludu claimed that 11 The consistent activities of the 
socialist camp .... 11 had led to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, 
/ 
the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the SALT agreements, and the 
CSCE Final Act (ibid, C/16-17). (As discussed above, these vmre 
also 'successes' claimed by Soviet articles, but in most cases 
the WTO played little or no visible part.) 
Surprisingly, the non-Soviet coverage of the Anniversary 
does not seem to have made any particular mention of the role of 
the parties or overtly ideological matters. This is unlike the 
treatment in the Soviet media as outlined above. 
As with the Soviet articles and speeches, the West was 
criticised for being aggressive, militaristic, and revanchist. 
Unlike the Soviet treatment the Central Europeans do not seem to 
have been quite so strident in their criticism as the Soviets. 
The West VI3.S criticised for the breakdown of the vl3.rtime all iance 
and the division of Europe (Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov, 
ibid, C/7-9), and US President Reagan was seen to follow Truman, 
Churchill, Adenauer, and Dulles, for vl3.nting "to halt the 
progressive development in the world in order to advance 
imperialism" (Czechoslovak commentator Dupalova, ibid, C/l0). 
Mention was even made of the USSR not having been allov18d to 
accede to NATO CHofman, p. 6) . Hofman also sav, a rise in jingoism 
in the USA, and a new militarism and revanchism in West Germany, 
"lhich he depicted as a US bastion in Europe (p. 8). Nonetheless, 
no attempt VlaS made to paint a picture of an inherently 
aggressive enemy, which some of the Soviet coverage seemed to do. 
While this may be seen as an example of each of the Soviet 
Union's all ies acting as 8. bridge to the West at a time of 
re nevled superpower confron ta t i on (cf Chapter 4), it seems more 
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likely to be evidence of a general difference in national foreign 
policy positions for each of the WTO member states. 
Where the Soviet allies definitely concurred Vlith the Soviet 
Union Vias in their assessment of the efficacy of the first 30 
years of the WTO. The Czechoslovak Defence Minister Vaclavik's 
Order of the Day saw the history of the WTO as "The decisive 
factor in preventing the aggressive forces of imperialism from 
unleashing ~ world war and in ensuring peace in Europe; it 
permanently ensures the collective security of its members and 
the inviolability of their frontiers." (SWB EE/7952/c/18). The 
Bulgarian Defence Minister Dzhurov saw the Treaty as having 
"inaugurated a qualitatively different, higher stage in the 
relations among the socialist states .... " it had become a 
reliable guardian, "a powerful bulwark of all revolutionary 
forces and of the national liberation movements." (ibid, C/17-18) 
The GDR Foreign Minister Fischer so. ';1 the liTO as "the main source 
of the posi ti ve changes ';lhich have been accomplished since the 
end of the Second World War in Europe. The decisive initiatives 
for a durable peace have emanated from it .... " (ibid, C/11-12 -
this echoes the assessment by WTO C-in-C Kulikov, Pravda, 14 May 
1985, p.1, referred to above). The Hungarian Deputy Premier 
Czinege, in his address to the Parliamentarians' meeting, saw the 
WTO as having fulfilled its aims of guaranteeing socialist 
construction and maintaining peace, and that there hdd been 30 
years of a "decisive contribution to the development of the 
international situations" (MTI Daily Bulletin vol. 20/134, 14 May 
1985) . 
Overall, then, it can be seen that the Soviet Union and the 
Central Europeans treated the 30 th Anniversary of the signing of 
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the Warsaw Treaty in general unison, but giving allO\llance for 
national requirements in their presentations. 
Conclusions 
Anniversaries are not just a time for reflexion, which the 
articles and speeches carried out admirably, but also a time to 
look to the future and consider what may happen next. This is an 
opportunity that all the presentations singularly missed. Having 
explained its history and j usti fied its prolongation, tlley seemed 
to assume that stating what a good job the WTO vias doing 
sufficiently marked the occasion. The only reference to the 
future was in calling for greater unity and cohesion, and greater 
co-ordination of affairs, vlhich are standard. calls in all intra-
socialist bilateral and multilateral communiques. There was no 
attempt to hint at further structural developments (though Polish 
press comment reiterated almost verbatim Gorbachev's remark at 
the signing of the Protoc11 [Pravda, 27 April 1985] that the WTO 
states "are forced to think how to further strengthen their 
defensi ve structures" - SWB EE/7952/C/16-17). Nor was there any 
attempt to signal concessions for the East-West negotiating fora, 
or to offer grounds for a relaxation of tensions. The articles 
merely restated existing positions, 'peace initiatives', and the 
anti-Western diatribe of the moment. 
The 30tt", Anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Treaty for 
Friendship, Co-operation, and Jrlutual Aid, appears to have been a 
chore, an 'event' that had to take place, rather than a gloriou~ 
time for celebration. With the exception of the 
Parliamentarians, who are not an official part of the structure, 
and ignorins the 'military historians', none of the participants 
at the meetings even had to travel from their normal place of 
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residence. With the exclusion of any summit-level or ministerial 
meeting from the festivities, the Anniversary seems to have been 
organised to cause the minimum of fuss and disruption. Perhaps 
they vmuld rather not have celebrated the occasion at all. 
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Endnotes 
1) For a complete list of the knmm anniversary meetings, see 
Appendix 2 of the chronology'of meetings. . 
2) For a list of the known anniversary articles, see the specific 
bibliography for the Anniversary at the end of the chapter. 
3) There was no corresponding article in Pravda in 1985, but page 
4 of the May 14 issue did have a small article covering the Nay 
13 "solemn gathering" and another anouncing the publication of 
the Skorodenko book (for which see footnote 2 above). 
4) Article 9 of the Warsav, Treaty. 
5) Svetlov refers to "military" and "international-legal" 
measures. For the former he lists: no new theatre or inter-
mediate nuclear v?8apons in Europe; nuclear free zones; a ban on 
chemical weapons; the non-increase and then reduction in military 
budgets; and the mutual reduction of forces. For the latter he 
lists: a treaty on the no-first-use of nuclear weapons; a non-
aggression treaty; and confidence-building measures in 
conjunction with the Stockholm Conference (1985 pp.32-33). 
The 1984 session of the Committee of Foreign Ninisters called for 
a ban on nuclear weapons, a ban on chemical v?8apons, a nuclear 
test ban, confidence-building measures, the non-militarisation of 
space, European nuclear-free zones, a general nuclear freeze, the 
non-first use of nuclear weapons, and action on military budgets 
(see Appendix 4B). 
6) Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the UK, and the USA, met in Bonn for their 11th regular economic 
summit, on 2-4 If..ay, 1985 (Keesings XXXI 33635). Being only ten 
days before Rusakov gave his address, this would indicate that in 
this instance, at least part of the speech was prepared close .to 
the time of its delivery, This shows both an attempt at 
topicali ty (the meeting was reported in Pravda on Nay 3".:.1 and 
5t.t-·, 1985, p. 5), but also a limited time for multilateral 
conSUltation on the keynote address of the 30th Anniversary. 
7) As I argue in Chapter 4, the internal-security role is a 
question of ideological, not military, security. 
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THE WTO SINCE 
GORBACHEV'S ACCESSION 
Gorbachev, Closer Co-operation, and Structural Changes 
The Warsaw Treaty party and state leaders met Mikhail 
Gorbachev for the first time in his nevi leading role (he had 
never been listed as attending a WTO meeting - see footnote 9, 
Chapter 3), on 13 March 1985, at a "friendly meeting" in Moscow. 
They were gathered "in connexion v/ith the death of K. U. 
Chernenko"j despi te its ad hoc nature, the meeting was 
speci Hcally described as a WTO meeting CIzvestiXEt, 15 March 
1985, p.1). In carrying out their 'exchange of views' all the 
standard topics of past WTO meetings were covered, and in 
particular questions of detente and disarmament (ibid). Tvlice, 
however, the report referred to the vdder ideological question. of 
unity: 
Common resolve was expressed also in the future to improve 
all-round political interaction, economic, ideological, and 
other co-operation. 
It was stressed, that in conditions of a complicated 
international situation the consolidation of the unity and 
cohesion of the fraternal countries, the greater co-
ordination of their acti vi ties on the internatIonal arena 
acquire special Significance. (i Did) 
The issue of "unity and cohesion" is not nevi to the WTO. 
Arguably, the whole concept of establishing the Organisation was 
to further this aim, and in some form or another the issue has 
appeared in all the main Warsaw Treaty documents from the very 
start. Behind this, however, the issue has a greater meaning, 
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though one of ideology rather than the practicalities of 
organising a mi1itary-politica~ alliance. 
But, as the first meeting with Gorbachev shov18d, he, like 
his predecessors, saw the need for the WTO to express an interest 
in the closer co-operation of its members, and in all fields. 
Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev made this interest public 
vii thin official Warsav{ Treaty documentation. Brezhnev raised the 
issue in a report to the CPSU Central Committee in 1965 (see 
Chapter 3); Gorbachev mentioned it just over a month after 
becoming General Secretary of the CPSU. 
In his speech to the reception following the signing of the 
-Protocol extending the Treaty, Gorbachev referred once again to 
the WTO's "lillingness to dissolve itself in conjunction with the 
dissolution of NATO. Noting that NATO "does not have such an 
intention" and was in fact acting aggressively and building up 
its conventional and nuclear arms, he concluded: "And this makes 
us think now of further enhancing the Warsaw Treaty Organ-
isation." (Pravda, 27 April 1985, p. 2. ) The rest of the spee~h 
again covered general WTO issues. In conclusion, and presumably 
by way of a toast, he said: 
To the further co-operation of our parties and states, 
their stronger unity and cohesion on the rrinciples of 
Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. 
Let the fraternal alliance of socialist countries - the 
Warsaw Treaty - grow stronger! (ibid) 
Once more, Gorbachev was pointing out the role of the WTO in 
advancing the ideological issue of unity. 
The question of "further enhancing" the WTO did not go a1;:ay. 
The opening paragraph of the Statement issued by the next session 
of the r0~ (Sofia, 22-23 October 1985), specifically stated that, 
havi ng discussed the "situation in Europe" and international 
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relations in general "There viaS also a fruitful discussion of 
topical problems of further developing the co-operation of the 
/ . 
states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty." (Pravda, 24 October 
1985, p. 1.) Only then did the Statement begin a normal treatment 
of "the situation in Europe" and the rest of the world. (See 
Appendix 4 for the issues discussed, which included some not 
covered in the first 30 years of the WTO.) 
At the extraordinary meeting of "the highest leaders" (Party 
and state leaders plus Foreign '''iinisters), held in Prague on ! 
Gorbachev's return from his su~~it with US President Reagan (21 
November 1985), the issue was again mentioned, though in slightly 
mi Ider terms. Tagged on to the terse resume of the limited 
international issues arising from Gorbachev's report, the parties 
and states reaffirmed their resolve to work for better relations 
in Europe and around the world, and stated that 
They are unanimous that under difficult international 
condi tions, the unity and cohesion of the allied socialist 
countries, class solidarity and growing co-operation in every 
field are of paramount importance. -
(Pravda, 22 November 1985, p.1) 
They seemed to go back to the wording of the report from the 
meeting at Chernenko's funeral eight months previously, rather 
than to the suggestion for "further enhancing" the WTO of seven 
months previously. 
It took another four months before the question of amending 
the structure seemed finally to be resolved. The Foreign 
Ministers' Communique from the meeting of 19-20 March 1986 began 
its final section (section 5, the section usually devoted in WTO 
documents to such ideological issues), by calling for Warsaw 
Treaty unity and cohesion to be strengthened in the face of the 
existing international situation. By this time, just over a year 
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from Gorbachev's accession, it seemed that nothing much ViaS going 
to change in their formal and structured inter-relationships: 
The sta,tes represented, at the meeting ,reaffir::u the imp,ortance 
of thelr defence alilance for ensurlng thelr securl ty and 
peaceful development, for strengthening European and 
uni versal peace. They wi 11 further cl osel y co-operate in 
international affairs, in outlining and implementing an 
agreed policy of peace, security, and international co-
operation. (Pravda, 21 March 1986, p.4) 
In other words, there was to be no amendment to the practice of 
conducting national and joint foreign policies (as described in 
Chapter 4). The role of the WTO vmuld remain the general aims 
and principles, but no more. 
A further indication that the structural status quo was to 
be maintained in the inter-relations of the member-states was to 
be seen in the paragraph that followed in the CFM Communique, 
where "The significance· was pointed out of the developing of 
mutual economic relations deepening and improving co-operation 
vii thin the CMEA framevmrk" .. " i the implementation of the 
comprehensive programme for science, technology, and socio-
economic co-operation was needed for "the strengthening of the 
international positions of the socialist states and the achievi'ng 
of the aims of their peaceable foreign policy," (ibid) There was 
to be no ti nkeri ng wi th the structure, no amendment to the 
limited co-ordination and political-military-economic practice of 
the bloc. As the next paragraph in the Communique saw it, there 
was still a nee.d for a comprehensive international security 
system and peaceful coexistence, which would be achieved through 
, constructi ve co-operati on' between the members of the WTO and 
g~vernments, parties, 'public organisations', and movements 
"concerned vlith the destinies of peace on Earth" (ibid). Not 
even the tried, tested, (but largely unusuccessful - see Chapter 
4), 'peace policies' of the history of the WTO were to be 
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altered. The original Treaty had called for "a system of 
collective security in Europe" and had remained op.en to 
individual accession by other statesj the March 1986 CFM seemed 
to be calling for a policy of encouraging 'public organisations 
and movements' to encourage their states and political parties to 
such an end. The WTO was to pursue peaceful coexistence in its 
/-~-, 
~---'" international relationships-until then. 
Changes to the Notification Documents 
Since the accession of Gorbachev in the USSR and the 30 t .h 
Anni versary of the WTO, certain significant changes have been 
seen in the documents of notification of meetings of the 
Committee of Ministers of Defence, the Military Council, and the 
deputy foreign ministers. 
On 3 September 1986 Pravda Cp.4) issued a report on a 
meeting of the deputy foreign ministers. The subject of the 
meeting, the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna opening later in 
1986, vias not unusual, and was mentioned as normal as a brief 
statement of fact. This document was unusual because, for the 
first time, notification was given of who had attended the 
meeting. Previously, the Soviet press had mentioned only the 
Soviet delegate, if it mentioned anyone by name at all. 
Most significant of all, however, were the meetings of the 
Mili tary Council <12-14 November 1986) and of the Committee of 
Ministers of Defence (1-3 December 1986). Unlike the pre-
Anniversary meetings described in Chapters 3 and 4, the meeting. 
of the 1I[C was reported in Pravda <15 November 1986, p.5) as 
having discussed "the question of the results and conclusions 
8te~ning from the meeting of the General Secretary of the CC CPSU 
11, c; ...... Gorbachev vii th the President of the USA R. Reagan in 
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Reykjavik." Notification that the Military Council \>las a forum 
used by the WTO for the discussion of such topics had never 
pre~v"iously been made. :. 
The Report on the MC meeting continued: 
The Military Council has pointed out the important 
contribution made by the allied socialist states to ensuring 
peace, and stressed the need for building up joint efforts in 
the struggle for eliminating nuclear weapons, reducing 
conventional \>leapons, and strengthening international 
security. 
Concrete measures have been outlined to maintain the troops 
and naval forces, assigned from the allied armies and starf 
of the Joint Armed Forces, at a level guar~nteeing the 
preservation of military parity between the Warsaw Trea~y and 
the NATO 'bloc. (ibid) 
Such a discussion, stressing the role of the Central European 
countries and some of their European security concerns 
(particularly the balance of conventional weapons~ was entirely 
unprecedented from a body ",hich earlier official analysis had 
limited to the discussion of joint training (see Chapter 3). 
This meeting of the MC 'vIas quickly followed by a regular 
session of the CDM. For the first time, a Communique was issued 
(rather than a report in Pravda titled "On the results of the 
regular meeting .... ") Also for the first time a list of 
attendees 'vias given, and it was stated that "Moreover" leading 
staff from the Ministries of Defence and from the Joint Command 
took part. As 'vIith the meeting of the Military Council a month 
before, the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Reykjavik was discussed. 
The defence ministers also discussed the initiatives of the 
Budapest PCC of six months earlier, previously only the concern 
of the foreign ministers. Once again the report of the meetin~ 
'vIas without precedent in that it discussed political issues 
rather than the "practical activities" of the armed forces, and 
commented ..,hat the meeting 
/ 
expressed the profound anxieties 9J the aggravation of the 
military-political situation on th~ European continent and in 
the 'vlOrla as a result of the activities of the USA and 
(vl / 
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NATO .... 
(Pra.'vda, 4 December 1986, p.4) 
In general, these changes could be seen as a result- of the 
overall changes in the WTO in the Gorbachev peri~d, though they 
would have to be seen to persist for this to be certain. 
The I)elayed CFK Keating 
Wi th such unremarkable conclusions on WTO foreign policy 
under a new Soviet leader, it must be peinted out that the 
Committee of ·Ministers of Foreign Affairs had been scheduled to 
convene not in March 1986, but in June 1985 - the Communique of 
the previous CFM session of 4 December 1984 had specified this 
CIzvesti.ya, 6 December 1984, p. 4) . A delay of nine months seems 
remarkable at a time vihen the general state of international 
relations "continued to be tense and dangerous" (CFM Communique, 
Pravda, 21 March 1986, p.4). It is even more remarkable vihen, 
with the structure designed to allow policies to be elaborated at 
ministerial level (see Chapter 3), nothing formal was being seen 
to be done to elaborate the suggestion of an amended structure. 
At the time the meeting vlaS originally planned to be held, there 
vias much speculatation in the West that WTO Commander-in-Chief 
Kulikov had been sacked, and replaced by Soviet Marshal Ogarkov, 
as a comeback from his having been earlier sacked as Soviet Chief 
of Staff. Such speculation, v:hile indicative perhaps of an 
'. Ii 
1, li~ "), 
internal Soviet factionalism over military and security policy, 
was later put down to a case of misinformation deliberately ? 
promulgated by Moscow'. In the event, it was suggestedN that the 
delay was "probably" due to Soviet discussion of Gorbachev's new 
thinking on security, plus that the USSR had a new Foreign 
Minister2 who had no real experience in the post, not even having 
been a deputy Foreign Minister. 
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Gorbachev's "ne"l security concept" 
That under Gorbachev ther:e "laS a move by the Soviet leader-
/ 
ship to develop a 'new security policy' was greeted with marked 
enthusiasm in at least some official Central European quartersN • 
According to one specialist speaking in the spring of 1986, "the 
perception of military security has changed completely"; this 
expert dated evidence of such a change in thinking back to 
Gorbachev's official visit to France in October 1985. In a 
speech to French Parliamentarians, he had signalled a move in the 
Soviet arms-negotiating position: Gorbachev, talking of medium-
range nuclear weapons in Europe, claimed that "we consider it 
possi ble to conclude a corresponding agreement separately, out-
side direct connexion with the problem of space and strategic 
arms." (Vizi t .... , p.49) This offer was repeated in part 2 of 
the Sofia PCC Co~~unique (Pravda, 24 October 1985, p.l). 
By the time of the 27t.h Congress of the CPSU, this apparent 
shift in basic negotiating positions had become a full-blown 
security policy. In part 4 of his keynote Political Report, 
Gorbachev discussed the "fundamental principles" of "an all-
embracing system of international security". Such a system would 
embrace not just military and political aspects, but "muld also 
be intiI"uately tied to economic and "humanitarian" concerns. The 
mili tary "fundamental principles" were standard concerns of WTO 
documents, such as the arms race and the disbanding of military 
alliances; the political "sphere" again included concerns seen in 
WTO references to 'principles of international relations' (cf 
Appendix 4). Even the "economic sphere" of the new security 
concept contained issues covered in the sections on wider inter-
national affairs in some WTO documents, such as ending economic 
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"discrimination" (sanctions, blockades), and a new vmrld economic 
order covering such things as Third World debt, and shifting 
military investment to civil development and the peaceful use of 
ou tel' space. Gorbachev IS conc8pt of "humanitarian" aspects to 
securi ty began with "co-operation in the dissemination of the 
ideas of peace} disarmament and internationa.l s8curi ty" as part 
of moves for greater mutual understanding and concord; then went 
on through -,4 genocl",e, a}.-artheid, and other forms of 
discrimination; "international co-operation in the implementation 
of the political, social, and personal rights of people"; 
questions of divided families, marriage, and contacts between 
people and organisations; and finally co-o-peration in culture, 
art, science, education, and medicine. (}faterialy . ... , pp.74-
76. ) 
The aim of such principles (which Gorbachev saw as stemming 
logically from the CPSU Programme, and in keeping "lith "our 
concrete foreign policy initiatives" - ibid, p. 76), was "to make 
peaceful coexistence the highest principle of state-to-state 
relations" (ibid) . (Such a paramount importance for peaceful 
coexistence should surely have already been explicit, including 
from the history of WTO documents and materials.) The importance 
of this analysis, however, vias later explained''i as being that 
such "ne"l thinking" stJP4~/ to maintain "an optimal level of 
security "Jhich is just enough" vIi thin a military balance, a move 
from conceiving "equality of numbers" to "equali ty of 
capabili ties". The "level of security" would also be conceived 
in. terms where relaxation in political, economic, or humanitarian 
spheres of security would be seen to contrn .. te to the mil itary 
balance, and so become a factor in Soviet considerations of 
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balances or imbalances at all levels of the military sphere, a 
d f · . t . of' S . t b d d' t ld~IJ'I re e lnl lon o~ OVle num ers an expen 1 ure . 
/ 
Whether or not this did indicate a genuine shift in Soviet 
security thinking, or was just one side of an internal Soviet 
debate or factional dispute, is of course unclear. Gorbachev 
did, however, in his address to the 11t.~) Congress of the SED Ci8 
April 1986), go on to offer v~hat VlaS seen in the West as another 
indication of a shift in Soviet defence policy. Towards the end 
of his speech he stated that the USSR suggested 
substantial reductions in all components of the land forces 
and tactical air forces of the- European states and the 
relevant forces of the USA and Canada deployed in Europe .... [covering] the territory of all of Europe - from the AtIantic 
to the Urals. 
(Pravda, 19 April 1986, pp.1-2) 
He also tied this in to simultaneous reductions in "operational-
tactical nuclear weapons" 3 . As another apparent shift in Soviet 
policy, Gorbachev went on to state that 
The question of dependable verification at every stage of 
this process offers itself. Both national technical means 
and international forms of verification are possible 
including, if need be, inspection on site. (i bid) 
It must be stressed that the speech in France, the Politipal 
Report to the CPSU Congress, and Gorbachev's address to the SED 
Congress, were all unilateral Soviet moves, with no obvious 
official WTO involvement. The WTO did eventually participate in 
this process, in the PCC Communique from Budapest (11 June 1986). 
Opening part 2 of the Communique, and referring back to the 
"goals and tasks" set by the previ ous PCC (Sofia, 23 October 
1985), it was stated that "The allied socialist states strive to 
create an all-embracing international security system covering 
both the mil i tary and political, and economic and humanitarian 
fields." <Pravda, 12 June 1986, p. 1) This was using, 
unattributed, the Gorbachev/CPSU wording, rather than the 
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original Warsav; Treaty call for "an all-European system of 
co11ecti ve security". The. Communique went on directly to specify 
that the "fraternal countries' foreign-policy line" was 
"expressed in the decisions of the Congresses of their leading 
parties .... " The PCC covered the familiar WTD issues and 
proposals (see Appendix 4) , but included the offer on 
verification "up to and including on-site inspection. The states 
represented at the meeting are prepared to reach agreement also 
on any additional verification measures. " This took, 
unattri buted, Gorbachev's proposal from the SED Congress, but 
also extended it slightly. 
It must also be stressed that, in the sa.me period since 
Gorbachev's accession, Soviet security interests have still 
largely focussed on the super-power relationship and nuclear 
weapons, neither of which is directly covered by the WTD. While 
the Central European countries have an interest in these matters, 
they do not directly participate in the questions of a Soviet-US 
summit, a nuclear test moratorium, or 'Star 'Wars'; nor, indeed, 
are these matters associated vii th their national foreign or 
security policies. 
The PCC has continued to pay attention to the Euromissile 
question, by supporting the USSR in its call for the 
total liquidation on a mutual basis of the Soviet and 
American medium-range missiles in the European zone, on the 
understanding that Britain and France will not build up their 
respecti ve nuclear armaments and the United States w111 not 
l1ana over its missiles - strategic and medium-range - to 
other countries. 
(Communique part 3, Pravda, 12 June 1986, PBf,2) 
But the PCC only followed this by promising that 
In the event of the total liquidation of American medium-
range missiles in Europe the Soviet enhanced-range 
operational-tactical missiles will also be removed from tEe 
territory of the GDR and ~zechoslovakia. (ibid) 
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The Soviet missiles offered for bargaining Viere, however, placed 
in Central Europe under bilateral agreements, and only sanctioned 
by· the extraordinary CDM (Pravda, 22 October 1983). It also 
leaves open the question of Soviet SS-20 missiles, not covered by 
the WTO, Vlhich in Western terms Vlere the cause of the US cruise 
and Pershing-II missiles in the first place. Thus the PCC in 
this instance VIas not making a realistic proposal 
"Unity and cohesionn vd.th Gorbachev 
The Central European states were still being asked to pledge 
their interest in strengthening their "unity and cohesio~', and 
"developing co-operation in all fields". In the Communique of 
the Budapest PCC (11 June 1986), part 4 opened by stating that 
the meeting devoted "special attention" to these matters, and 
made special note that the states vJanted to "increase active co-
operation in international affairs, in the elaboration and 
transition into life of a co-ordinated foreign policy .... " 
(Pravda, 12 June 1986, pp.1,2) 
'While calls for "unity and cohesion" have alvlaYs been. a 
factor in the states' multilateral and bilateral relations, it 
seems strange that this PCC session should have seen the need to 
give a separate mention to co-ordinating their foreign policies. 
/C5~). Was' fl0~ that what the PCC and 'WTO vrere there for anyVlay? This / 
./ 
ViQuld seem to confirm the conclusions of Chapter 4, that the WTO 
has not until noVl done more than co-ordinate the basic directions 
of the foreign policies to be carried out nationally by each of 
the member states. Asked about the striving for unity and 
cohesion, Central European specialistsN are quite blase about the 
matter, and see it as just another pieGe of lip-service to the 
USSR. This too would seem to confirm that the WTO does no more 
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than issue generalised statements that do little to affect 
national policies. 
The Budapest PCC Co~~unique followed the reference to unity 
and cohesion by repeating the willingness for mutual dissolution 
wi th NATO, and then irmnediately referred to exchanging experience 
in such matters as socialist construction, exchanges in 
economics, science, technology, and culture, "and widening 
contacts betvleen work collectives, the publiC, local and tourist 
contacts, and of deepening co-operation in other spheres .... " 
(ibid) . At this extent, "unity and cohesion" seems to become a 
catch-all for ,,~hat is in fact an ideological cormni tment to bind 
the socialist states together into a wider community. While this 
,,:auld explain the need for a separate rider for the WTO to have 
to mention foreign poliCY co-operation separately, it raises the 
question of what ",as happening in this field during the first 30 
years of co-operation. 
One military expertN could not explain this, and in fact 
could only repeat that, under Gorbachev's ne,,; security concept, 
there vms for the first time a genuine multilateral consultation 
in defining joint security, a genuine bringing-together of all 
the Warsaw Treaty states, a genuine move towards "unity and 
cohesion". This expert argued that, for the first time, the 
Central European countries were given the opportunity to voice 
their concerns and opinions directly, and before a Soviet-US 
summit (the Sofia PCC session in 1985, prior to the Reagan-, 
Gorbachev meeting in Geneva in November 1985), and they were also 
gi ven an immediate report by Gorbachev afterwards (the Prague 
"highest leaders" meeting; 21 November 1985). "This would never 
have happened under Brezhnev," said the expert, "rho described it 
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as an example of "a more mutual and democratic concept" of Soviet 
relations vii th Central Europe. Gorbachev, he said, .was also 
self-cri tical, not just accusing his partners of a "lack of 
understanding" but pointing to his and the USSR's ovrn faults and 
vieaknesses. 
Officially, even in the Gorbachev period, the WTO has given 
only "a historical contribution" to the work of integration: 
The fraternal states supremely execute the decisions and 
further improve the mechanism of their political co-
operation, including- hY. means Q.i. the regular and efficient 
cB.rrying out of cOl lecti ve and bilateral meetings at the 
htghest level (Savinov, 1986, pp.244-5, emphasis added) 
This underlines the fact (see Chapter 7), that even in a period 
of enhanced intra-bloc co-operation, the wro has not been seen as 
the sale, or even the most important, means of \~orking for the 
unity and cohesion of the socialist countries. 
The European Focus 
A commentary on the Sofia PCC of 1985 remarked that "The 
participants in the meeting gave priority to the situation in 
Europe." (Mikhailov, p.45) This, it was argued, was because that 
was where NATO faced the WTO, and where the most conventional and 
nuclear weapons were concentrated (ibid). The Budapest PCC 
Communique of 1986 ended its part 4 by stating that "Europe is in 
need of a revival of detente .... " which would help to end the 
split on the continent (Pravda, 12 June 1986, pp.1, 2). It has 
been suggestedN that, under Gorbachev, the Central European 
countries have had some success in 'giving priority' to the 
European element of international security - which VIas, after 
all, the original motivation for the Treaty. 
Continuing the poJ; cy, begun in 1984, of issuing single-
topic statements Dutvli th the PCC sesGions~ an Address vias issued 
chapter 6 221 
(Pnn.,Yda, 9 April 1986), on European nuclear-free zones. "'hile 
the PCC has also continued to issue single-topic documents, they 
hav9 so far in the Gorbachev period been principally European in 
focus (see Appendix 3).4 
One question for the future, then, is going to be whether or 
not the non-Soviet states visibly manage to influence the focus 
of the WID. 
Central Europe and the WID 
Ihe Prague meeting of the WID's "highest leaders" (which 
included the Foreign Ninisters but not the Defence "Ministers), 
"took place by their mutual agreement" (Report, Pravda, 22 
November 1985, p.1). But it was not a full session of the PCC. 
vlhile noting that "the unity and cohesion of the allied socialist 
countries, class solidarity and grovi"ing co-operation in every 
field are of paramount importance. " (i bid) , it did not 
participate in the debate, noted at the start of this chapter, 
which seemed to indicate discussion of proposals to amend the 
structure of the WID. In fact, such a meeting is indicative. of 
what seems to have been the outcome of that debate. Central 
Europe, it seemsN , did not want greater official co-ordination or 
a ~'lider official structure. While Central Europe welcomed the 
greater opportunity for discussion between the members of the 
alliance, it "mnted this co-ordination to take place on an extra-
structural level. 
Ihere \tIGre two reasons for this. Firstly, the extra~ 
structural meetings of the WID, particularly those of the deputy 
foreign ministers, were not bound either by agendas dictated by a 
formal convocatlLln, which would have been limited by the topics 
officially covered by the Organisation, nor were they bound by 
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the need to reach formal agreements and compromises that could be 
contained in an official document or communique. To keep 
structural changes unofficial would be to permit the 
comprehensi ve discussion of all issues -and disputes that arose. 
A specialistf'.l argued that if a meeting is delayed it is because 
there are disagreements - there would not be a meeting unless it 
is known in advance that there is going to be agreement that can 
be contained in an official report. 
Secondly, any extension to the formal co-ordination of 
foreign policy would, it seemsf'.l, involve the onus for individual 
countries to open up their national policies to the perusal of, 
and therefore to official objections from, the allies. This vias 
not just on the level of the Soviet Union relating to Central 
Europe, but also to relations within Central Europe. It v:ould 
mean that if one country wished to visit, or be visited by 
leaders from, another country outwith the alliance (British Prime 
Minister Thatcher visiting Hungary; Poland's Jaruzelski visiting 
China), then it would have to ask its allies for their views ,on 
this, raising tensions and objections to an official, structural 
level, ~ what are at present national foreign policies. Such '., " \ 
moves are, for example in HungaryN, seen as its national foreign 
policy prerogative. 
The Communique of the Bucharest CFM (15 October 1986), 
contained a reference to the fact that the Romanian Foreign 
Minister "informed the participants of the meeting of the recent, 
decision of the Socialist Republic of Romania to start in this 
year to reduce by five percent its arms, forces, and military 
expendihl1'e." (Pravda, 16 October 1986, p.4) Apparently, Romania 
tried to get the other countries to agree to such a unilateral 
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move as welp·l. Military budgets have, of course, been a 
consistent aspect of WTO concern (see Appendix 4), and ]:lave no 
doubt been the subject of much ~iscussion and bargaining, part-
icularly during times of economic crisis or stringency. But no 
previous WTO document has given official sanctioning to such a 
move by any of the countries. The only remotely comparable 
occurrences "mre the references in the earliest PCC COTIh'TIuniques 
to reductions in Soviet military manpower (see Chapter 4), but 
they v,ere intended to be seen in a superpower context, rather 
than in terms internal to the WTO. 
The Future? 
As can be seen from Appendix 4, the WTO has continued to 
speak out on many of the customary topics of its first 30 years, 
but there has been a further extension of these topics during the 
Gorbachev period. While the general textual content of the 
communiques has remained the same, it is possible that there has 
been a subtle I maturing' of the documents. All the standard 
phraseOlogy of anti-imperialist, anti-militarist, diatril:>e, 
remains, but it migbt be seen that altogether the documents have 
become generally terser overall. 
Thile the WTO is safe until the year 2015 (barring the 
establishment of an all-European system of collective security), 
and will not as yet be modifying its formal structure, all the 
other questions remain. Politically, for example, just what 
influence will the non-Soviet members have? What will be their-
contribution to socialist foreign policy? How united will that 
policy be? How ideologically united will it be? Militarily, 
there are the questions of reliability, of the Romanian 
contri bution, of costs- and vleapons-distri butions, and all the 
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questions of doctrine, all of which will be subsumed "':\"";~ the 1: 11 
question of just what role the WTO plays or will play in the 
j oint defence of its members, and how much the Soviet Union will 
amend its national security policy to involve its allies. 
Wi th a new Soviet leader attending the SUTIL'1li t-level 
meetings, the question arises of just whom he will be talking to 
and ~Wh-oin he will be negotiati~g7 Succession questions have 
already been arising vlith regard to Bulgaria, HungaryS, Romania, 
and Czechoslovakia, vlhile the question of the party and military 
balance in the Polish leadership has also been raised. Though 
the role of personalities in defining policies and national 
positions must not be overstated, they~ certainly have an 
influence. While there are unlikely to be disruptions to the WTO 
on a scale with those surrounding the post-Brezhnev and early-
Gorbachev period, a series of changes in the Central European 
leaderships over the next fevi years must have some impact, both 
in terms of alliance politics and also national economic, social, 
and foreign policies. There is also the possi bi li ty of a new 
Soviet Defence Ninister being taken, as vias Grechko, from the 
post of Soviet "First Deputy Minister of Defence, Commander-in-
Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the states-participants of the 
Warsaw Treaty". 
Finally, there is of course the chance that political or 
arms agreements between the superpowers, or through multilateral 
political or arms talks such as the CSCE follow-up conference~J 
will require adjustments to the internal proceses of the WTO, 
such as through the need to change its balance of forces or 
weapons procurement, or lead to changes in th~ inter-state 
relations of Europe. 
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All this is, of course, mere speculation at this stage. 
Endnotes 
1) Counterpoint, "A Periodic' }Jewsletter On S07iet Active 
l1easures" (Vol.l #6, September 1985, p.1) claimed that "Vitaliy 
Yevgenievich Lui", also known as "Victor Louis", and described by 
Counterpoint as a professional distributor of disinformation, was 
the source of the putative leak on Ogarkov 
2) Edvard Shevardnadze replaced Gromyko - Pravda, 3 July 1985, 
pp.l, 2. 
3) The Soviet description of such weapons as the shorter-range 
rockets deplo'yed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia as a 'response' to 
the USA's cruise and Pershing-II weapons. See the report of the 
extraordinary CDM (Pravda, 22 October 1983). 
4) An exception has been the ad hoc issuing of a Statement on 
the US bombing of Libya (Pravda, 17 April 1986, p. 4). Its 
significance could be that it was issued at all, an example of 
the WTO's ability to respond quickly, albeit without a meeting, 
to an issue of international affairs. The question still arises 
as to how its text was co-ordinated in order to be issued as a 
joint document. 
5) It was reportedN that during his talks with K~d~r prior to 
the Budapest PCC (1986), Gorbachev expressed concern that the 
Hungarians should become more expl ici t over who viaS to succeed 
K~darj Gorbachev is also said to have voiced Soviet views on 
possible Hungarian candidates to replace K~dar. 
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CONCLUSIONS: THE WTO IN CONTEXT 
Summary of Chapters 
This thesis has focussed on Soviet and Central European 
wri tings on the WTO. I have attempted to show what the original 
documents and writings have said about the WTO, from its origins, 
through its structure and development, to an analysis of its 
documentary history and the WTO's role in the j oint foreign 
policy of the socialist states. The question of the military 
role of the WTO, while featuring prominently in the original 
wri ti ngs, has been shovm, through the analysis of the structure 
and documents, not to amount to more than a loose assembly of 
intent to be allies. 
Cbapters 1 and 2, in detail ing the historical roots and 
specific origins of the WTO, showed that, while a form -of 
military alliance already existed, the post-Stalin leadership 
took the opportunity, in the form of the London and Paris 
Agreements that incorporated the Federal Republic of Germany more 
closely into the West's political and military alliance, to 
create a more formal basis to the 'social ist community' - and 
then promptly did nothing. As the follovling chapters showed, in 
its infancy the WTO vias not only an extremely unsophisticated 
Organisation, but in both political and military terms was 
largely ignored by the Soviet Union and its allies. The 
Organisation as originally created in 1955 cannot have been 
designed to be a significant body within the socialist community. 
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Chapter 3 discussed in depth the structural development of 
the WTO. This shov,red that, while the original sources themselves 
are often scanty and at times contradictory, a fairly complete 
picture can be created of just how the structure of the WTO 
operates or, as is concluded, is designed not to operate. 
While quite a sophisticated system of political and military 
bodies has developed, the WTO is still not intended to be a full~ 
time or supreme organisation wi thin the socialist community. In 
its early years the structure amounted to little more than a 
mechanism for issuing bland joint statements of propaganda to the 
Sovi et cause. A military structure began to emerge, but this 
still did not amount to an over-riding alliance, seeming to 
concentrate more on co-ordinating existing inter-relationships 
that had been developed and still seemed to operate on a national 
or bilateral basis. 
In foreign policy terms, the main overt reason for the WTO, 
no formal structure existed until late 1976. This does not mean 
that foreign policy was not co-ordinated or carried out, jus;t 
that it was done inefficiently, on an ad hoc basis - thus serving 
to underline the minimal scope of the Organisation. The WTO, in 
both political and military terms, seems to have developed 
unevenly, almost unplanned, as if the formal structure was forced 
to adapt to the de facto unofficial mechanisms that must have 
emerged only as the need arose. This is underlined by the fact 
that there is still an extensive ad hoc extra-structural series 
of bodies formally tied, in documentary terms if in no other way, 
to ·the main structure. Foremost vii thin this are the regular 
meetings of the deputy foreign ministers. While the newspaper 
reports from these meetings are still very brief and generally 
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uninformati ve, unofficial reportsi'l, 1'-1 cite the meetings of deputy 
foreign ministers as the primary forum for genuine debate and 
negotiation betv .. een the members of the alliance. 
This must, however, be seen as being yJi thiIl the inter-state 
structure. Quite separate from the formal structure of the WTO 
remain the extensive, and mainly bilateral, inter-party ties. 
Official accounts of the WTO regularly contain remarks giving the 
parties a leading role in the delineation of foreign policy and 
mi li tary affairs. In its earliest meetings the WTO attendees 
were identified only by their state roles; the second session of 
the PCC (1958) had first secretaries of the parties attending, 
but not generally as heads of delegations; it was only from the 
third session of the PCC (960) that the WTO became formally 
dominated by party delegates. (See chapter 3 footnote 9.) Yet 
to this day, there is still a fa~ade of placing the decisions and 
policies of the WTO in an inter-state context. 
Official analyses do not restrict treatment of foreign or 
mili tary policies to a discussion of the WTO. Even books and 
articles specifically on the WTO will refer to extra-structural 
meetings, pol icies shaped outvJi th the WTO (principally in Party 
documents and decisions of Party Congresses), and issues outwith 
the immediate scope of the WTO (generally Soviet-US nuclear 
relations) . Chapter 4 showed that even within the formal 
documents of the WTO, the issues covered are not dealt with 
exclusively by the WTO. Furthermore, they are dealt with by the, 
WTO only in the broadest terms. Even when it is acknowledged 
that the PCC I policy' is carried out by the foreign ministers 
(on' y formally convened Vii thin the structure since 1976), "-::"e 
minist8rs theInsel ves do not seem to take. the policy much further 1 
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Policies such as proposals to hold East-West conferences seem to 
be dealt with through formal .diplomatic channels - ther~ is as 
yet no evidence that a full-time WID 'office' exists to carry out 
policy on behalf of the combined members'. Chapter 4 also shm18d 
I'IJ ! 
that the members thems~lies do not seem to see the concept of 
'joint foreign policy' in restrictive terms, arguing that 
national foreign policies are only co-ordinated by the WID along 
the broadest lines, and in broad ideological terms of an ultimate 
series of 'principles of international relations'. Ihe chapter 
concluded that the main significance was to see the WID in these 
ideological terms. Where there were influences on national 
policies, they occurred fully outwith the scope of the WID. 
Chapter 5 shm18d how the 30t.~) Anniversary of the signing of 
the 'Warsav{ Treaty Vlas celebrated, and how the speeches ~~c1 \..A.u.u. 
articles subtly rewrote the origins and development of the wTO. 
All in all, the occasion was shovm to be something of a non-event 
- not even the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of 
the WID was acknowledged as such in the Soviet coverage of -the 
keynote speech and meeting of the whole Anniversary. 
Chapter 6 discussed how things have changed, and how they 
have also stayed the same, since the radical changes in the 
Soviet leadership, which just happened to coincide with the 
extension of the period of operation of the Warsaw Treaty and the 
subsequent 30 t .h Anniversary. It tried to show how things might 
be changing vii thin the methods and operation of the WID, in· 
particular towards a possible extension of the influence of the 
Central European members. 
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Placing the WTO in Context 
The conclusion that would seem to be dravm from this 
analysis is that, in itself, the Varsaw Treaty and all that 
follows from it does not amount to very much, either in political 
or mi 1 i tary terms. The best vmy to understand the WTO vml.lld be 
to place it in the context of the all-round relations of the 
Soviet Union with Central Europe. Indeed, this is where many 
official Soviet and Central European writers themselves place the 
Organisation. 
Menzhinskii, whose description of the WTO structure features 
in Chapter 3 above, prefaced his discussion of that multilateral 
structure by vrriting that 
Wi thin the framevmrk of the social ist community 
com~rehensive (political, economic, cultural, SCientific, 
etc, and intensi~e co-operation between the fraternal states 
is realised .... 
the leaders of the fraternal parties have regular 
meetings, as on the multilateral, so on- the bilateral level: 
exchange visits, the Crimea meetings, conducting sessions of 
the Pol.i tical Consul tati ve Committee of the Organisation of 
the Warsaw Treatx. 
CMenzhinskii, p. ",7) 
Thus Menzhinskii was emphasising that everything he was about to 
say about the WTO would have to be seen as lying within the wider 
context of the inter-party and inter-state relations of the 
social ist countries. The members of the WTO must be seen to 
inter-relate outvli th the context of the WTO. As Alexandrov put 
it, "The Warsaw Treaty Organisation plays an important role in 
the life of world socialism, vlhere co-operation is developing 
rapidly along all directions." <p.16) 
In such an analysis, even a multilateral political-military 
alliance only has "an important role", not an 'overwhelming' or 
even 'paramount' role. In the "life of vmrld socialism", joint 
military or foreign policy is not seen as a particularly 
important means of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the 
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alliance, it becomes just another means to that ideological end. 
Alexandrov stressed that "All political aspects of the life and 
development of socialist s-ociety .... " vIBre discussed through the 
bilateral_and multilateral party links, and that "no additional 
mechanism for such international activities is necessary." (p.17) 
Such links viere especially at the level of Central Committee 
Secretaries (ibid, p.16). He went on to imply that the role of 
inter-state ties (8.11d thus the WTD>, was being minimised or 
circumvented (ibid, p.17). 
Even in military terms, the role of the WTO W8.S minimised by 
its one-time Commander-in-Chief: Grechko wrote that "The 
[military] alliance of the socialist armies-constitutes a part of 
the general economic, political, military and cultural co-
operation between the fraternal states." (1977, p.319) Tyranowski 
stressed that through its role as a forum for "adopting a joint 
political line, a common attitude" the WTO was more than just a 
framework to prepare for joint defence (p.118). He merely 
referred to the WTO as being "one of the organisational forms. of 
the community of socialist states." (ibid) 
Such an overall assessment of the role of the WTO was not 
even omitted from the 30t.h Anniversary analysis: 
Together with the fraternal socialist countries' [bilateral] 
treaties of friendship and mutual interest and their 
association wi thin the framework of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, the Warsaw Treaty was a powerful 
international legal factor, cementing all the fraternal ties 
among European socialist countries. 
CNezhinsky, p.62) 
In other words, when the WTO was being praised for its usefulnes9 
and efficacy, it 'Vias being placed 'Vii thin the overall socialist 
communi ty as just another factor in the 'Vlider ideological role of 
"cementing all the fraternal ties".2 
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Writing in 1980, Savinov, in a major analysis of the 
structure of the WTO, also placed the Organisation wi thin this 
vlider context. After stressing the role of both bilateral and 
multilateral inter-party meetings to discuss policies in every 
field, he only then added that II important problems are examined 
in the meetings of the Political Consul tati ve Committee .... II 
(p.22). But even this minimisation was extended, since he went 
directly on to add "and in the sessions of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance. II (ibid) More than this, he stated that the 
Crimea meetings bebleen Brezhnev and the leaders of the fraternal 
parties and states "have great significance" (i bid) , an 
assessment he later changed to "One of the most important forms 
of co-operation .... " (ibid, p.24)3. Article 8 of the Warsaw 
Treaty l,T'=l r-"(....(.0 also interpreted as signifying that the states had 
agreed a 
readiness also further to develop bilateral and multilateral 
co-operation in all spheres of the economy, in the 
utilIsation of the attainments of scientific-technolosical 
progress for the further grovlth of the material and Splrl. tual 
prosperity of the people of the socialist countries, to act 
together vd th the other country-members of the C:MEA all the 
more to complete the Complex Programme .... " . (ibid, pp.22-3, p.23) 
Therefore not only was the WTO to be seen as just another facet 
! 
of the overall ties, but ( the significance of its multi-
lateral role and its military role was not to be seen as 
particularly important. 
Savinov went on to discuss the particular issue of joint 
foreign pOlicy, but stated that "An integral element .... " of this 
was 
the mutual visits of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
fraternal countries, during which go on an eXChange of views 
on questions of the co-ordination of practical acti vi ties, 
concrete actions on the international arena. (ibid, p.26) 
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These were issues also covered in the sessions of the WTO's 
Committee of Kinisters of Foreign Affairs, but he saw as 
"integral" non-WTO meetings - in fact bilateral meetings - for 
the fOrI.0.tion of the "practical activities" of foreign policy 
(ibid) . In his assessment, the WTO's role vms once again being 
limi ted and minimised, restricted to a general policy guidance 
rather than to prescribe national foreign policies. <This was 
the cl,nclusion of Chapter 4 above.) In this field, Savinov alsG 
mentioned "periodic" meetings of the deputy foreign ministers, 
both bilateral and multilateral, and he stated that 
Close connexions exist behleen the correspondinp; executive 
departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, oetween the 
Embassies of the fraternal countries. Traditional co-
operation of the socialist coutries [tak-es place) in the [UN) 
and in other international organisations. (i bid) 
Quite obviously, in this official c,ssessment, the sessions of the 
Foreign Ministers ,,ri thin the formal structure of the WTO are just 
one small part of the overall foreign-policy relationships of the 
wider socialist community. 
As this thesis has argued, the conclusion must be that the 
WTO is not as important as the prevailing image of it either as 
presented by the East or considered by the West. If the 
functions it carries out are carried out on a wider level outwith 
the Organisation, then, as Chapter 4 concluded, the real purpose 
of the WTO must be seen in ideological terms. It is a symbol of 
the "socialist community" as an 'international-legal body' j or, 
as one Central European special ist put i tN, the formal 
relationships of both the WTO and the CMEA have become the 
"symbolic framework" of the interdependence and j oint historical 
development of the bloc. While another specialistN claimed that 
since 1968 the USSR has not had a 'common policy' towards its 
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allies, merely a string of separate policies on defence, 
economics, or \frhatever, the former specialist pointed out that 
the WTO's symbolism has become that of being a body \florking 
against disintegration: the presence of a formal structure has 
required attention from the members, and thus a visible show of 
participation''l. 
At the ultimate level, the ideological significance of the 
'no has become one of bloc identity, which itself has become a 
realpolitik justification for the WTO. A Central European 
expertN argued that the West, in dealing with the leaders of the 
ruling parties, has accepted by default the "postwar realities of 
Europe" in ,;{hich the leading parties are the de facto authority. 
One vievl quite prevalent in Central EuropeN is that, in 
binding the states together within the socialist community, the 
USSR has been acting as the region's gendarme. By forcing the 
members themselves to accept the symbol of unity, it has 
contained the bickering and animosity over, for example, what 
remain unresolved issues of borders and ethnic minorities in,the 
region4 • While the formation of a military alliance and the WTO 
might be seen as one source of the peace that has existed in the 
region since the Second World War, it has been pointed outN that 
this has only stopped Central Europe itself sorting out the roots 
of the prevailing problems and issues, and has stopped the states 
reaching a level of political development ~nd geopolitical 
stability more conducive to a working and effective alliance.A 
Final Conclusions 
The WTO, then, exists because of the existing political-
economic-social-military division of Europe. Gi ven that the 
socialist community exists, that, as Grechko argued, it vias 
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founded on a "class proletarian solidarity", "determined" by the 
social unity of tho building of communism, economic unity, 
ideological unity, and military-strategic unity <1977, p.323-4), 
then the WTO must be accepted as a logical possibility. That it 
does not in fact operate as the West would expect it to is due to 
an insufficient understanding of what the "socialist community" 
entai ls. It is to be hoped that this thesis has gone some way to 
providing the basis for an informed reappraisal of the political 
and military ties Viithin that cOJ"'uIDunity. 
But even this thesis has been unable to be entirely 
comprehensi ve. The statutes of the various WTO bodies, both as 
they first existed and as some were I re~ised I in 1969, still 
remain "perfectly secretION. There is still the question of the 
"other documents" agreed in 1969 (see Chapter 3), and those 
referred to in the preamble to the Legal Convention (see Appendix 
1), plus the problem of the mix beb-men the official structure 
and the extra-structural bodies. The machinery seems to exist 
noVi for a possi bili ty that there ,,/Ould be an effeci<i ve 
multilateral co-operation, but even under Gorbachev the USSR is 
still going it alone on various issues of international policy, 
including policy that directly involves the WTO (see Chapter 6). 
Another question is Vihether or not extra-structural bodies such 
as the meetings of Parliamentarians will intensify, and begin 
seriously to voice something closer to a grass-roots view on the 
issues covered by the WTO. 
All this is not to conclude that the WTO is entirely 
unimportant and not worth investigating. If only because it is 
the oole multilateral political-military alliance of th~ 
socialist states (and therefore it is arguable that the WTO is 
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more significant than the OlEA in political terms), it must be 
studied. However, Western interest in the WTO, and the p~esent-
ation of the WTO as the West's nemesis, perhaps obscures the real 
issues of the national and bilateral activities of the socialist 
states; activities, such as arms-sales and the supply of military 
advisers to the Third World, that are carried out beyond the 
formal scope of the WTO. There are the questions of the economic 
development of the individual states, the nature of their 
political and military activities and reliability, the qualified 
level of national Central European independence on certain 
matters, and the all-important inter-relationships of the member-
states, at both party and state levels, not just between the 
Soviet Union and the individual Central European states but also 
amongst the non-Soviet countries themselves. 
Once these and other issues and relationships can be 
properly understood, the military significance, potentials, and 
activities of the WTO's members, both nationally and multi-
laterally, can be analysed properly, and placed correctly within 
the scope of the socialist community. Then the workings of these 
relationships, either through the WTO or elsewhere, can be 
correctly analysed and responded to by the West. 
Reporting in 1984, BrlJget Bloom of the Financial Times vITote 
that NATO had not had an official 'strategic analysis' of Soviet 
aims "since the mid-1960s. Ministers thus do not have an agreed 
guidance as to what NATO believes Soviet intentions might. 
actually be .... " (30 May 1984, p. 35). As this thesis has shovm 
(particularly Chapters 3, 4 and 6), a lot has happened wi thin 
Central Europe and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation since the mid-
1960s. Number-crunching of tanks and the definition of doctrines 
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and strategies can never replace the understanding of the 
pol i tical basis of the stateE:~ \'~hich operate those tanks. 
Endnotes 
1) The Daily Telegraph (21 November 1986, p.6) reported a 
"direct approach" from the WTO for talks on conventional arms, 
but explained it. as from "t.he Soviet Union, v~hich sent. the 
message through Italy". NATO insisted on East-We.st talks on a 
bilat.eral basis, since NATO is not a supranational body. 
2) Equally,. the OlEA can be seen as just another apsect in the 
t.ies of t.he socialist community. It$ significance could be 
assessed in these political rather than practical terms given 
that, like the WTO, it could be seen as generally unimportant as 
regards its overtly-perceived functions. 
3) Savinov \'las referring to the multilateral sessions ouhli th 
the WTO (1971-73 inclusive) and the series-of bilateral meetings 
from 1976 onwards. The post-Brezhnev leaderships discontinued 
these meetings. See Appendices 2 and 3. 
4) It h:='5 been suggestedN that the Romanians have recently told 
the USSR that Romania considers that the USSR only holds 
Bessarabia "on lease". 
/\ 'J 
" 
('\ ; h\~; 
\-1 \.~·i,.n 
1 +-}," 
'") "".,---. 
h l(:~l :>~-'j]Cl,~i-}Jl;-' (1, ,- ~-l{JT, LriJ:-
\ ;'H to j_Tl \d ;_:;_ ,'-J.T;tJr 
appendix 1 238 
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE 
between the People's Republic of Albania, the People's Republic 
of Bulgaria,. the Hungarian People's Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian 
People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and 
the Czechoslovak Republic 
The contracting parties, 
Reaffirming their desire for the organisation of a system of 
collective security in Europe, with the participation of all the 
European states, irrespective of their social and state systems, 
which would make it possible to combine their efforts in the 
interests of securing peace in Europe, 
Taking into consideration at the same time the situation 
obtaining in Europe as the result of the Paris Agreements, which 
provide for the formation of a new military grouping in the shape 
of the 'Western European Union' together with a remili tarised 
Western Germany in the North Atlantic bloc, which increases the 
threat of another vlar and creates a menace to the national 
security of the peaceloving states, 
Convinced that, under these circumstances, the peaceloving 
states of Europe should take the necessary measures for 
safeguarding their security, and in the interests of maintaining 
peace in Europe, 
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Guided by the purposes and principles of the United Nations 
Charter, 
In the interests of further strengthening and promoting 
friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance, in accordance 
with the principles of respect for the independence and 
sovereignty of states, and also with the principle of non-
interference in their internal affairs, 
Have resolved to conclude this Treaty of Friendship, Co-
operation, and Mutual Assistance, and have appointed as their 
authorised representatives: 
The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic 
of Albania - Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
of the People's Republic of Albania, 
The Presidium of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic 
of Bulgaria Vylko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 
The Presidium of the Hungarian People's Republic - Andras 
Hegedus, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungar.ian 
People's Republic, 
The President of the German Democratic Republic 
Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, 
Otto 
The State Council of the Polish People's Republic - Joseph 
Cyrankiewicz, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Polish 
People's Republic, 
The Presidium of the Grand National Assembly of the Rumania~ 
People's Republic Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the Rumanian People's Republic, 
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The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics - Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, ~hairman 
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 
The President of the Czechoslovak Republic - Viliam Siroky, 
Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, 
Who, having presented their credentials, found to be executed 
in due form and in complete order, have agreed on the following: 
Article 1 
The contracting parties undertake, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations Organisation, to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force, and to 
settle their international disputes by peaceful means so as not 
to endanger international peace and security. 
Article 2 
The contracting parties declare their readiness to take part, 
in the spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international 
undertakings intended to safeguard international peace and 
securi ty and they shall use all their energies for the real-
isation of these aims. 
Moreover, the contracting parties shall work for the adoption, 
in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this 
matter, of effective measures towards a general reduction of 
armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons 
of mass destruction. 
Article 3 
The contracting parties shall take council among themselves on 
all important international questions relating to their common 
lnterests, guided by the interests of strengthening international 
peace and security. 
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They shall take council among themselves immediately, whenever, 
in the opinion of anyone of them, there has arisen the threat of 
an armed attack on one or several states that are signatories of 
the treaty, in the interests of organising their joint defence 
and of upholding peace and security. 
Article 4 
In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several 
states that .are signatories of the treaty by any state or group 
of states, each state that is a party to this treaty shall, in 
the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-
defence in accordance ",ith Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations Organisation, render the state or states so 
attacked immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with 
other states that are parties to this treaty, by all the means it 
may consider necessary, including the use of armed force. The 
stat.es that are part.ies to this treaty shall immediately take 
council among themselves concerning the necessary joint measures 
to be adopted for the purpose of restoring and upholding inter-
national peace and security. 
In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations Organisation, the Security Council shall be advised of 
the measures taken on the basis of the present article. These 
measures shall be stopped as soon as the Security Council has 
taken the necessary measures for restoring and upholding inter-
national peace and security. 
Articlp. 5 
The contracting parties have agreed on the establishment of a 
joint command for their armed forces, which shall be placed, by 
agreement among these parties, under this cOT"u1"uand, which shall 
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function on the basis of jointly defined principles. They shall 
also take other concerted measures necessary for strengthening 
their defence capacity, in order to safeguard the peaceful labour 
of their peoples, to guarantee the inviolability of their front-
iers and territories and to provide safeguards against possible 
aggression. 
Article 6 
For the purpose of holding the consultations provided for in 
the present treaty among the parties to the treaty, and for the 
purpose of considering problems arising in connection with the 
implementation of this treaty, a political consultative committee 
shall be formed in v:hich each state that is a party to this 
treaty shall be represented by a member of the government, or any 
other specially appointed representative. 
The comlni ttee may form auxiliary bodies for which the need may 
arise, 
Article 7 
The contracting parties undertake not to participate in any 
coali tions and alliances, and not to conclude any agreements the 
purposes of which vmuld be at variance with those of the present 
treaty. 
The contracting parties declare that their obligations under 
existing treaties are not at variance with the provisions of this 
treaty. 
Article 8 
The contracting parties declare that they will act in the 
spirit of friendship and co-operation v;ith the object of 
furthering the development of, and strengthening the economic and 
cul tural relations between them, adhering to the principles of 
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mutual respect for their independence and sovereignty, B.nd of 
non-interference in their internal affairs. 
Article 9 
The present treaty is open to be acceded to by other states -
irrespective of their social and state systems v1hich may 
express their readiness to assist, through participation in the 
present treaty, in combining the efforts of the peaceloving 
states for the purpose of safeguarding the peace and security of 
nations. This <::l.r.+ <-A\ ... V of acceding to the treaty shall become 
effecti ve, y;i th the consent of the stB.tes that are parties to 
this treaty, after the instrument of accession has been deposited 
with the government of the Polish People's Republic. 
Article 10 
The present treaty is subject to ratification, and the 
instruments of ratification shall be deposited vl'i th the govern-
ment of the Polish People's Republic. 
The Treaty shall take effect on the date on which the last 
ratification instrument is deposited. The goveJ!lIllent of. the 
Polish People's Republic shall advise the cther states that are 
parties to the treaty of each ratification instrument deposited 
with it. 
Artide 11 
The present treaty shall remain in force for 20 years. For the 
contracting parties which vlill not have submitted to the govern-
ment of the Polish People's Republic a statement denouncing the 
treaty a year before the expiration of its term, it shall remain 
in force throughout the following ten years. 
In the event of the organisatlon of a system of collective 
securi ty in Europe and the conclusion of a general European 
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treaty of collective security to that end, which the contracting 
parties shall unceasingly seek to bring about, the present: treaty 
shall cease t.o be effective on the date the general European 
treaty comes into force. 
Done in Warsaw, on May 14, 1955, in one copy each in 
Russian, Polish, Czech, and German languages, all the texts being 
equally authentic. Certified copies of the present treaty shall 
be transmitted by the government of the Polish People's Republic 
to all the parties to this treaty. 
In witness whereof the authorised representatives have signed 
the present treaty and have fixed thereto their seals 
By authorisation of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of 
the People's Republic of Albania - Mehmet Shehu, 
By authorisation of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of 
the People's Republ ic of Bulgaria - Vylko Chervenlwv, 
By authorisation of the Presidium of the Hungarian People's 
Republic - Andras Hegediis, 
By authorisation of the President of the German Democratic 
Republic - Otto GrotevlOhl, 
By authorisation of the state Council of the Polish People's 
Republic - Joseph Cyrankiewicz, 
By authorisation of the Presidium of the Grand National 
Assembly of the Rumanian People's Republic - Gheorghe Gheorghiu-
Dc}, 
By authorisation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the-
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Nikolai Aleksandrovich 
Bulganin, 
By authorisation of the president of the Czechoslovak Republic 
- Viliam Siroky. 
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English text: Soviet News 3165, May 16, 1955 
Note: Rodionov, and Malt'sev (1980), both give on their page ten 
the follovling list of dates for the ratification of the Wars<lw 
Treaty. The dates in brackets· are explained as the date of the 
handing over of the documents of ratification to the government 
of the Polish People's Republic. 
19 May the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic. 
21 May the President of the German Democratic Republic 
(24 May) 
25 May the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
(1 June) 
25 Mayan extraordinary session of the State Assembly of tf).e 
Hungarian People's Republic (2 June) 
26 May the President of the Czechoslovak Republic (27 May) 
28 May the third extraordinary session of the People's 
Assembly of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (31 ¥~y) 
28 ~1a y an extraordi nary sessi on of the Peopl e' s Assembl y of 
People's Republic of Albania (4 June) 
30 May a session of the Great National Assembly of the 
Rumanian People's Republic (3 June). 
Article 10 of the Treaty states that "The Treaty shall take 
effect on the date on which the last ratification instrument is 
deposi ted. " Thus the Treaty came into effect on June 4, 1955, 
the date of Albania's deposition of ratification, but, unlike the 
treatment of the Legal Convention in the same official volumes, 
no date is given by Rodionov or Mal'tsev for the coming into 
effect of the Treaty. The official table of ratification notes 
(similar to the wording noted in the discussion of Albania in 
Appendix 6), that "since 1962 the representative of Albania has 
not taken part in the wad;: of the Warsa'vl Treaty Organisation". 
Presumably this is why the Warsaw Treaty historians do not wish 
the 4u -. June date to be registered. Strangely, Yakubovskii .did 
specify June 4 as the date of the Treaty coming into force (1971, 
p.22) and Savinov did the same (1980, p.l1). 
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FORMATION OF JOINT COK¥~ND OF THE ARMED FORCES 
OF THE STATES THAT ARE PARTIES TO THE 
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND XUIUAL ASSISTAnCE 
246 
Under the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and ~utual 
Assistance bet.ween the People's Republic of Albania, the People's 
Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian 
People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and 
the Czechoslovak Republic, the states that are parties to the 
treaty have taken the decision to form a j oint command of their 
armed forces. 
This decision envisages that general questions pertaining to 
the strengthening of the defence capacity and to the organisation 
of the joint armed forces of the states that are parties to the 
treaty 'dill be examined by the Political Consul tati ve Committee, 
which v,rill take appropriate decisions. 
I. S. Konev, ~arshal of the Soviet Union, has been appoint~d 
commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces allotted by the 
states that are signatories to the treaty. 
The assistants appointed for the commander-in-chief of the 
joint armed forces are the Ministers of Defence and other 
mili tary leaders of the states that are parties to the treaty, 
who are vested with the command of the armed forces of each state 
that is party to the treaty, allotted to the joint armed forces. 
The question of participation of the German Democratic Republic 
in 'measures pertaining to the armed forces of the j oint command 
will be exaThLned later. 
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A staff of the j oint armed forces of the states that are 
parties to the treaty 'dill be ,::c.et up under the commander-~n-chief 
of the j oint armed forces and this staff will include permanent 
representati ves of the general staffs of the states that are 
parties to the treaty. 
The headquarters of the staff will be in Moscow. 
Distri bution of the j oint armed forces on the territories of 
states that are parties to the treaty v,rill be carried out in 
accordance vii th the requirements of mutual defence in agreement 
among these states. 
English +r-..~"+ , veL'>.. \.0 • Soviet News, 3165, May 16, 1955 
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CONVENTION 
concerning the legal status, pri vi leges and immunities of the 
Staff and other administrative bodies of the Joint Armed Forces 
of the states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty 
The governments of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the 
Polish Peopl'7' s Republic, the Socialist Republ ic of ROI"uania, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak 
People's Republic, 
guided by the principles of the Treaty on friendship, co-
operation, and mutual assistance, signed in Warsa,,! on 14 May 
1955, 
taking into acccunt the Decision of the states-participants of 
the Warsaw Treaty, taken at the session of the Political 
Consultati ve Committee on 17 March 1969 in the city of Budapest, 
noting that the general tasks and appointment of the Staff and 
other bodies of administration of the Joint Armed Forces &re 
defined by documents, accepted by the states-participants of the 
Warsaw Treaty, 
bearing in mind the Statute of the Joint Armed Forces and Joint 
Command of the states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty, 
being conscious, that for the fulfilment of the tasks, laid on 
the staff and other bodies of administration of the Joint Armed 
Forces, they should [be granted] legal capacity, privileges and 
immuni ti tes, 
have come to agrement on the following: 
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Article 1 
1. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces consists of g53nerals, 
admirals, and officers of the s:ates-participants of the Warsaw 
Treaty, which under the fulfilment of official duties are granted 
pri vileges and immunities in connexion with the present 
Convention, 
In the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces vfOrk also employees, 
apportioned by the state [vIhere the staff is located), part of 
vIhom enj oy the privileges and immunities in the conditions 
provided for in the present Convention. Categories and numbers 
of employees, enjoying the privileges and immunities, are co-
ordinated by the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces with the General 
(Rain) staffs of the armies of the states-participants of the 
Convention. A nominal roll of these employees annually , ~ .L C> 
communicated by the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces to the 
General (Main) staffs of the armies of the states-participants of 
the Convention. 
2. For the purposes of the present Convention the term «Staff 
of the Joint Armed Forces» stands for also the other bodies of 
administration of the Joint Armed Forces of the states-
participants of the Warsaw Treaty. 
3. The place of residence of the Staff of the Joint Armed 
Forces is the city of Moscow. 
Article 2 
The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the states-participants 
of the Warsaw Treaty is a legal enti ty and in aim of the 
carrying out of problems, for which it was created, it is 
capable: 
a) to conclude agreements; 
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b) to acquire, lease, and [dispose of] equipment; 
c) to appear in court. 
Article 3 
1. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces enjoys on the territory 
of each state-participant of the present Convention the legal 
status, privileges and immunities to be provided for in the 
present Convention. 
2. Premises of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces, its 
property, assets, and documents, irrespective of the place of 
their situation, enjoy immunities from any form of administrative 
and legal interference with the exception, that the Staff itself 
is denied immunities in some individual instances. 
3. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is free from basic 
taxes and dues on the territories of each of the states-particip-
ants of the present Convention. This condition does not apply to 
payment for the actual condition of maintenance and the communal 
public services. 
4. The Staff of the J oi nt Armed Forces is free from customs 
charges and of the restrictions on the [import] and export of 
goods, intended for the officials' use. 
5. The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces enjoys on the territory 
of each of the states-participants of the present Convention no 
less favourable conditions on relation first and foremost, and 
tariffs and to rates of mail, telegraph and telephone connexions, 
than that, which in this country is utilised by the national 
military command or diplomatic representatives. 
Article 4 
1. The officials of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces on the 
territory of each state-participant of the present Convention for 
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the fulfilment of their official duties are granted the follov/ing 
privileges and immunities: 
a) inviolability of all papers and documents: 
b) the same customary privileges and terms of their personal 
baggage, which are granted to officials of diplomatic represent-
ations in the present country; 
c) freedom from p(rsonal duties and from [basic] taxes and dues 
in relation to salary alloviance (wages) , of payments to 
indi viduals of the personnel of the Staff of the Joint Armed 
Forces posted to their countries: 
d) immunity from personal arrest or detention, and also from 
the jurisdiction of legal and administrative institutions in 
relation of all activities, which must be accomplished by them in 
the capacity of officials. 
The status of points «b» and «c» conform [?apply) to members' 
famil ies, living together with officials of the Staff of the 
Joint Armed Forces. 
2. The Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and .his 
deputies, in addition to the privileges and immunities, stated in 
point 1 of the present article, enjoy on the territories of all 
the states-parties of the present Convention privileges and 
immunities, given in this country to diplomatic representatives. 
Appointed persons receive diplomatic cards. 
3, The privileges and immunities, provided by the present 
article, are being granted to be mentioned in their persons 
exclusively in the interests of the carrying-out of their 
official [duties). 
The Commander-in-Chief of tne Joint Armed Forces by agreement 
with the Minister of Defence of the corresponding state has the 
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right and duty to retract the immunity of officials of the Staff 
in every event, "then immunity impedes the implementation of 
justice ::::.nd the denial of immunity does not prej udice the aims, 
in connexion with which it was granted. 
4. Officials of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and 
members of their families are presented by the Staff special 
identi ty cards, confirming the right in privilege and immunity. 
Officials of the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and members of 
their families are free from compulsory residence permits and 
registration. They are registered by the Staff of the Joint 
Armed Forces. 
5. The status of points 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the present article 
do not apply to the mutual relations of the officials of the 
Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and the members of their families 
with the bodies of the country, the citizens with which they are, 
or the country, on the terri tory of which they ahmys live. 
6. Persons, who enjoy the privileges and immunities, envisaged 
in the present Convention, are obliged to respect the laws of the 
state, on t.he t.erri tory of which they are situated, and not to 
interfere in the internal affairs of the given state. 
Article 5 
In the event of the denial by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Joint Armed Forces of the immunity of an official of the Staff, 
provided for by Article 4 of the present Convention, in relation 
of this person, who committed a criminal or administrative-
offence, conforms the legislation of the country, on the 
territory of which the offence [was committed], and affeg' ts the 
bodies of military justice, competent for the question of the 
pursuit of the punishable deed. 
appendix 1 253 
Bodies of military justice of the states-participants of the 
present Convention are able mutually to address. amongst 
themsel ves with the petition to deny legal aid in relati.on to 
separate matters. Such denial will be examined 
[sympathetically]. 
Article 6 
1. The present Convention will be subject to ratification of 
the signing by its states in conformity with their constitutional 
procedures. 
2. Ratification papers will be placed in the keeping of the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re publics, which is 
nominated depository of the present Convention. 
3. The Convention "'Jill enter into force on the day of the 
handing over to the custody of the deposition of the ratification 
documents by any three of the states. In relation to other 
states, signing the Convention, it comes into force on the day of 
the handing over to custody of their ratificatiorn documents. 
4. Possibly vexed questions, arising from the interpreta~ion 
and application of the present Convention, \'lill be resolved by 
the states-participants of the given Convention through 
discussi;ons between the national commands or through diplomatic 
channels, or found by other measures according to agreement. 
5. The present Convention is composed in one specimen in the 
Russian language. The Convention will be handed over to the 
custody of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, v:hich will distribute certified copies of it to the 
goverTI~~nts of all the other signatories of it of the states, and 
also to notifiy these governments and the Staff of the Joint 
Armed Forces on the handing over to custody of each document. 
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To the certification of which the undersigned, of due form on 
such authorised agents, signed the present Convention. 
Concluded in the city of Moscow 24 April 1973. 
translated by me from the text in Mal'tsev (1986) 
Mal'tsev mentions in a footnote on p.160 that the Convention came 
into force on 21 November 1973. This does not :?eem to have been 
recorded in the Soviet press at the time. 
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PROTOCOL 
On prolonging the period of validity of the Treaty of Friendship, 
Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance, signed in Warsa", on May 14, 
1955. 
The member states of the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, 
and Mutual Assistance - the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the 
Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic - have decided to sign the present protocol 
and agreed to the following: 
Article 1 
The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, 
signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955, shall remain in force for the 
next tvlenty years. For the contracting parties, which a year 
before the expiry of this period of time shall not present to the 
Government of the Polish People's Republic statements of 
denunciation of the treaty, it shall remain in force for another 
ten years. 
Article 2 
The present protocol is subject to ratification. The 
instruments of ratification shall be presented for deposition to 
the Government of the Polish People's Republic. 
The protocol shall enter into force on the day of the 
for deposition of the last instrument of presentation 
ratification. The Government of the Polish People's Republic 
shall inform the other member states of the treaty of the 
presentation for deposition of each instrument. of ratification. 
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Done in Warsaw on April 26, 1985, one copy in the Bulgarian, 
Hungarian, German, Polish" Romanian, Russian, and Czech 
languages, all texts being of equal value. Certified copies of 
the present protocol shall be sent by the Polish People's 
Republic to all the other parties to the protocol. 
For the People's Republic of Bulgaria: 
Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council of 
the People's Republic of Bulgaria. 
For the Hungarian People's Republic: 
J~nos K~d~r, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party. 
For the German Democratic Republic: 
Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central C01lllni ttee of the 
Social ist Unity Party of Germany and President of the State 
Council of the German Democratic Republic. 
For the Polish People's Republic: 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, First Secretary of the Central Committee·of 
the Polish United Workers' Party and Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the Polish People's Republic. 
For the Socialist Republic of Romania: 
~acolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist 
Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Romania. 
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of 
the Communist ~arty of the Soviet Union. 
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For the Czechoslovalr Socialist Republic: 
Gustav Husak, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Czechcslovakia and President of the Czecho-
slovak Socialist Republic. 
English text: Smriet News 6272, 1 May 1985 
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,)~Q LJ __ 'V 
CHRONOLOGY OF MEETINGS 
This AppendiX lists all the known meetings of bodies, both formal 
and extra-structural, of the WTO. It covers the period from the 
formation to the end of 1986. 
In the "Body ll\:eeting" column, names placed wi thin quotation marks 
are the description used in the documentary source. (Appendix 3 
contains a DocuIT?ntary History listing these sources.) 
Abbreviations are listed on p.xii. 
l2a.1a 
1954 
Nov 29-Dec 2 
1955 
May ll-May 14 
1956 
Jan 27-28 
1958 
May 24 
1959 
Apr 27-28 
1960 
Feb 4 
1961 
Mar 28-29 
Aug 3-5 
Aug 121 
Sep 8-9 
1962 
Jan 30-Feb 1 
Jun 7 
1963 
Feb 28 
Jul 25 
Jul 26 
1964:2 
1965 
Jan 19 
Jan 19-20 
Jf..ay 10-18 
May 14 
Nov 24-25 
1966 
Ma y 27-28'"' 
Jun 17L~ 
Jul 4-6 
Place 
Moscow 
Warsaw 
Prague 
Mosco';l 
~iarsaw 
110scow 
Moscow 
Moscow 
Warsaw 
Prague 
MoscoVl 
Warsaw 
Moscow 
Moscow 
Warsaw 
Warsavi 
sub-Carpathian 
military district 
Moscow 
Warsaw 
Moscow 
Mosco\t, 
Bucharest 
~ meeting 
CECSPSE 
CECSPSE 
PCC 
PCC 
Foreign Ministers 
PCC 
PCC 
First Secretaries 
[governments' Statement] 
Defence Ministers 
Defence Ministers 
PCC 
Defence Ministers 
First Secretaries and Govern-
ment Heads 
PCC 
Defence Ministers 
PCC 
Ministers of Defence, Chiefs 
of Staff, heads of MPAs, and 
others 
military representatives and 
diplomats 
Commander-in-Chief, 
deputy Defence Ministers 
Defence Ministers 
Foreign Ministers 
PCC 
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Nov 14-17 
1967 
Feb 8-10 
Nov 13-17 
1968 
Feb 26-27 
Mar 6-7 
Oct 29-30 
Nov 26-29 
1969 
Feb 12-13 
Mar 17 
May 12-16 
ifuy 20--21 
Oct 30-31 
Oct 30-Nov 3' 
Dec 3-4'; 
Dec 9-10 
Dec 22-23 
1970 
Jan 26-27 
Apr 27-28 
May 21-22 
Jun 21-22 
Aug 20 
Aug 31-Sep 2'"' 
Oct 27-30 
Nov 17-207 
Dec 2 
1971 
Feb 18-19 
Mar 2-3"" 
l~ar 15-19 
May 12-15 
Aug 2','" 
Oct 26-29 
Nov 30-Dec 1 
1972 
Jan 25-26 
Feb 9-10 
Apr 11-12 
Jul 31 10 
Oct 17-20 
1973 
Jan 15-16 
Feb 6-8 
Apr 24 
l1ay 16-17 
Jul 30-31 12 
Oct 18-19 1 "" 
Oct 30-Nov 1 
1974 
Feb 6-7 
~..ar 26-27 
Apr 17-18 
liov 19-21 
Budapest 
vlarsaw 
Dresden 
Berlin 
Sofia 
Moscovl 
Bucharest 
GDR 
Budapest 
Warsaw 
Berlin 
Prague 
Prague 
Moscow 
Moscow 
Moscow 
Sofia 
Budapest 
Sofia 
Budapest 
Moscow 
Dresden 
Varna, Bulgaria 
Prague 
Berlin 
Bucharest 
Budapest 
Budapest 
Berlin 
Warsaw 
Warsavl 
Prague 
Berlin 
Bucharest 
Minsk, USSR 
Moscow 
Warsaw 
Moscow 
Sofia 
Dresden 
Prague 
Bucharest 
Budapest 
Warsaw 
Berlin 
«military leaders» 
Foreign Ministers 
«1 eaders of army cadres» 
deputy foreign ministers 
PCC 
Defence Ministers 
«military leaders» 
«military representatives» 
PCC 
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«Chiefs of the General Staffs» 
deputy foreign ministers 
Foreign Ministers 
«military leaders» 
Party and State leaders 
MC 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers 
MC 
CDM 
Foreign Ministers 
PCC 
«generals and officers of the 
MPAs» 
MC + «chief army officers» 
PCC 
Foreign Ministers 
CDM 
«Chiefs of the General Staffs» 
MC + «delegations» 
MC + «army leaders» 
Foreign Ministers + «groups of 
advisers amd experts» 
PCC 
CDM 
MC 
MC + «military leaders» 
Foreign Ministers 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers l1 
MC 
«leaders of army political 
bodies» 
MC + «military leaders» 
CDM 
MC 
PCC 
MC + «delegations») 
appendix 2 
1975 
Jan 7-8 
Jan 29-30 
lfL3.r 19-20 
Apr 22-24'4-
May 14 
Nay 14''''-15 
May 19-21 
Jun 3-4 
Moscow 
Moscow 
vlarsavl 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers 
deputy foreign ministers 
Central Co~~ittee of the 
Moscow 
Budapest 
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Council of 
Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, 
"commemorative conference" 
Warsaw 
vlarsavi 
Prague 
Parliamentarians 
MC + «delegations» 
({delegates of communal 
organisations» 
Jul 31-Aug 1'6 Helsinki 
Aug 5-6'17 
Oct 27-30 
Nov 18-19 
Dec 15-16 
1976 
May 25-27 
Jun 22-23' ''C' 
°"3 
Nov 25-26 
Dec 10-11 
1977 
Feb ?21-2320 
Nay 16-20 
May 25-26 
Jul 5-82 " 
2::-~: 
Sep 5-9:;;::::0: 
Oct 17-20 
Oct 262 4-
Nov 29-Dec 2 
1978 
Feb 16'"'['; 
Apr 24-25 
Nay 16-19 
26 
Oct 16-19 
Nov 22-23 
Dec 4-7 
19'79 
Apr 23-26 
May 14-15 
:27 
Sep 3-6:2'=3 
Oct 6:2:=' 
Oct 16-17 
Oct 29-31 
Nov 2230 
Dec 4-6 
Dec 5-6 
1980 
May 14-15 
~LOSCOW 
Bucharest 
Prague 
Moscow 
Kiev 
Varne 
Bucharest 
Sofia 
Berlin 
Prague 
Moscoy; 
Leningrad 
Moscow 
Sofia 
«Staff of the JAFs» 
Budapest 
({Staff of the JAFs» 
Sofia 
Budapest 
Berlin 
Moscow 
Berlin 
Warsaw 
Budapest 
Minsk 
Prague 
Bucharest 
«Staff of the JAFs» 
Warsaw 
Berlin 
Warsaw 
MC + ({military leaders» 
CDM 
Foreign Ministers 
MC 
PCC 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers 
MC 
CFM 
Parliamentarians 
MC + ({mil i tary 
representatives» 
CDM 
CFM 
MC + «delegations» 
MC + ((delegations» 
PCC 
CDM 
MC + «delegations» 
CFM 
{(ideological workers» 
Parliamentarians 
MC + «delegations» 
CDM 
CFM 
PCC 
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B.ppenclix 2 
If..ay 15 
MD.y 20-23 
Jun 16-18 
Jun 720-722"': 1 
Jul 8-9 
Oct 15-17 
Oct 19-20 
Dec 1-3 
Dec 5 
1981 
Jan 19-20 
Apr 21-23 
Oct 27-30 
Dec 1-2 
Dec 1-4 
1982 
Apr 26-29 
Oct 20-22 
Oct 21-22 
1983 
Jan 4-5 
Jan 11-13 
Jan 27-28 
Apr 6-7 
Apr 26-28 
Jun 28 
Oct 13-14 
Oct 20 
Oct 26-29 
Nov 9-10 
Dec 5-7 
Dec 20-21 
1984 
Jan 11"::2 
Feb 14~3'3 
~iar 534 
Apr 19-20 
Apr 24-26 
May 3-4 
May 1",'.5 
Oct 17-19 
Dec 3-4 
Dec 3-5 
1985 
~r 1 
Mar 13"''':;: 
::-:7 
Apr 26 
May 13 
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Budapest "gala evening .... a cultural 
programme vlaS presented by the art ensembles of 
the Soviet Southern Army Group stationed in 
Hungary, the 'Silesia military zone of the Polish 
People's Army, and the Hungarian People's Army." 
Moscow MC + «delegations» 
Minsk 
Warsaw 
Prague 
Prague 
Warsavl 
Bucharest 
Moscow 
Berlin 
Sofia 
Budapest 
Bucharest 
MOSCOVl 
Berlin 
Warsaw 
Moscow 
Prague 
Prague 
Bucharest 
Prague 
Bucharest 
Moscow 
Sofia 
Berlin 
Lvov 
Sofia 
Sofia 
Warsaw 
MOSCOVI 
Budapest 
Prague 
Warsaw 
Sofia 
Berlin 
Budapest 
Moscow 
Moscow 
Warsaw 
* 
Central House of 
the Soviet Army, 
Moscow 
* 
Parliamentarians 
«MFA workers» 
deputy foreign ministers 
MC + {(delegations» 
CFM 
CDM 
Party and State leaders 
deputy foreign ministers 
MC + «delegations» 
MC + «delegations)) 
CFM 
CDM 
MC + «delegations» 
MC + ((delegations» 
CFM 
PCC 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers 
CFM 
MC + «delegations» 
Party and State leaders 
CFM 
extraordinary CDM 
MC + «delegations» 
Parliamentarians 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers 
Proposal issued 
Party and State leaders 
Proposal delivered 
CFM 
MC + «delegations» 
deputy foreign ministers 
Appeal delivered 
MC + «delegations» 
CFM 
CDM 
deputy foreign ministers 
Party and State leaders 
Party and State leaders 
* 
«Soviet mil itary figures, J AF 
representatives» (Kulikov 
report) 
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May 13 
:r.~ay 13 
l1ay 13 
11ay 13-15 
May 14 
May 14 
May 14 
l1\:ay 14 
11\:ay 14-15 
Joray 20-23 
;::~~ 
Oct 22-2389 
Nov 12-14 
Nov 21 40 
Dec 2-5 
1986 
l1ar 8 
Mar 19-20 
Mar 21 
Apr 94-1 
42 
Apr 16 
Apr 23-25 
Jun 10-11 
Jun 27 42: 
Sep 2 
Oct 14-154 4-
Nov 12-14 
Dec 1-3 
Endnotes 
Prague, Ministry 
of Defence 
Warsaw 
Poland 
Budapest 
Bol'shoi Theatre 
entatives of Moscow 
Armed Forces» 
Sofia 
GDR 
Szekesfeh~rvar, 
Hungary 
Academy of the 
Social Sciences, 
Moscow 
262 
«JAF representatives», meeting 
with Czechoslovak Minister of 
Defence 
«military historians» 
«chairmr.:Jfi of mi 1 i tary youth 
bodies» 
Parliamentarians 
({solemn gathering» of «repres-
working people and the USSR 
«official meeting» 
«WTD defence attach~s in GDR» , 
meeting with GDR Defence 
Minis"";er 
({WTD defence attach~s in 
Hungary», meeting vii th 
Hungarian Defence Minister 
«scientists, diplomats, Warsa'v~ 
Treaty national military 
leaders, guests from Asian 
socialist countries and Cuba» 
end of the first 30 years 
Budapest 
Sofia 
Berlin 
Prague 
Berlin 
MC + «delegations» 
PCC 
MC 
«highest leaders» 
CDM 
Budapest deputy foreign ministers 
Budapest CFM 
Warsaw {(editors of the central bodies 
of the presses of the country-participants of the 
Warsaw Treaty» participated in a {(round table» 
session of representatives of party newspapers etc 
on how to propagandise peace policies 
Appeal delivered 
GDR Party Congress joint statement on US bombing 
of Libya 
Warsaw MC 
Budapest PCC 
Berlin deputy foreign ministers 
Warsaw deputy foreign ministers 
Bucharest CFM 
Bucharest MC + «senior executives of the 
defence ministries and the command agencies of the' 
Joint Armed Forces» 
Warsaw CDM + «leading staff of the 
Ministries of Defence .... and the Joint Command» 
1) Kulikov (1980-b) dates this statement August 12; Yakubovskii 
(1975-b) dates it as August 13. Pravda published it on August 
14, dated August 13. There is no indication of how this 
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statement vIas a.greed bet\-,een the various governments, or whether 
there was a formal meeting to agree on it. 
2) Yakubovskii (1975-b) anct'Kulikov (1980-b) list only hilitary 
manouevre's as taking place -in 1964. 
3) A sourceN comments: "Unpublicised meeting (follo\'ling 
unpublicised meeting of deputy ministers in February) to consider 
proposed changes in the WP JAF structure in preparation for PCC 
meeting, Bucharest, 4-6 July" and cites Borba [the Jugoslav party 
newspaper] as its source. 
4) Yakubovskii (1975-b) and Kulikov (1980-b) both give the sole 
date of this meeting as June 17. Pravda gives no starting date, 
but comments that it "ended" of June 17. 
5) The original documents for this meeting list the attendee 
countries, \'lhich \'lere the members of the WTO, without specifying 
it as a vlTO meeting. Yakubovskii (1975-b) does not list it, but 
Kul ikov 0980-b) does, and states that it was attended by the 
lead-ers of the "country-participants of the Warsav! Treaty". 
6) This meeting is listed by both Yakubovskii 0975-b) and 
Kulikov (1980-b). 
7) Yakubovskii (1975-b) and Kulikov (1980-b) list this as "A 
military-science conference of leading \'lorkers of the rear of the 
allied armies .. . ,II 
8) This vias deferred from a meeting planned for December 21-23, 
1970 - see Izvestiya, December 23, p.2. 
9) The Party leaders met in the Crimea. Al though there was a 
wider attendance than the members of the WTO - it was in fact the 
membership of the CMEA - who discussed \'lider Party issues, t~is 
meeting was listed by Yakubovskii (1975-b) and Kulikov (1980-b), 
and its final document was included in Mal' tsev (980). However, 
as Appendix 3 indicates, this document was excluded from Mal'tsev 
(1986) . 
10) as footnote (9) above. 
11) The text of this treaty was published in Krasnaya zvezda on 
April 27, 1973, and listed its signatories without giving them 
any State or Party designation. Yakubovskii (1975-b) and Kulikov 
(1980-b) specify that the signatories were the deputy foreign 
ministers. Both these sources, plus Menzhinskii <1980, p.39, 
footnote) say that it came into force on November 21, 1973, after 
full ratification. 
12) see footnote (10) above. 
13) this is listed by Yakubovskii (1975-b) and Kulikov (1980-b) 
14) see footnote (6) above. 
15) Yakubovskii (1975-b) and Kulikov <1980-b) describe this as 
"a military-science conference of the Joint Armed Forces, 
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dedicated to 20 years of the Warsavl Treaty Organisation." cf 
also footnote (7) above. 
16) Kulikov (19S0-b) lists this as a meeting betvleen Brezhnev 
and the Party leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries at the CSCE, 
"in the course of which 1.:ook' place an exchange of views on 
questions of the extending of fraternal relations between parties 
and countries, and also on some questions of an internat.ional 
character and questions, concerning the all-European meeting." 
The role of det.ente vIas emphasised. 
17) Kuli};:ov <19S0-b) refers to this as "a meeting of leading 
staff of military-scientific bodies of the general (Nain) 
sstaffs, military publishers, and chief editors of the military-
theoretical journals of the armies of the states-participants of 
the WarS3\'J Treaty. II 
18) According to Kulikov (1980-b), this was "a meeting of 
leading staff of the political bodies of the armed forces of the 
states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty, dedicated to an 
exchange of experience in the fields of ideological activities." 
19) Kulikov (19S0-b) lists that in July-August, 1976, there were 
meetings in the Crimea. See also footnote (12) above. 
20) The starting-date for this meeting is unclear. 
21) Despite listing the Parliamentarians' meeting of 1975, 
Kulikov (1980-b) omits mention of this one. 
22) See footnote (19) above. 
23) Kulikov Cl980-b) lists t.his as a meeting "of chief editors 
of the central military nm'ispapers of the countries of the Warsaw 
Treaty" covering ideological and military-educational problems, 
and "the psychological training for war". 
24) Kulikov Cl9S0-b) includes reference to this "theoretical 
conference" attended by representatives of "all the fraternal 
armies of the states-participants of the Warsaw Treaty", in 
honour of t.he 60th anniversary of the Great October socialist 
revolution. 
25) Similar to note (24) above, this time a "scientific 
conference" on the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces 
26) See footnote (22) above. 
27) See footnote (26) above. 
28) Kulikov Cl980-b) reports that "The participants of the 
meeting exchanged experiences of vmrk concerning the training of 
the' personnel of the fraternal armies in the spirit of socialist 
patriotism and internationalism, in the spirit of irrecon-
cilability/intransigence to bourgeois and revisionist 
ideologies." 
29) Kulikov 
Berlin} 'r,,?here 
Cl980-b) lists 
he "anounced 
that 
the 
Brezhnev gave 
acceptance of 
a speech in 
the Soviet 
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governmen t, after consu 1 ta t i on I'd th the governments of the other 
states-particip-ants of the ~larsaw Treaty, the agreement to the 
unilateral reduction in the order of the number of Sovi~t forces 
in Central Europe, and also to reduce the quantity of nuclear 
[sredstv -means] of medi um range, based in the western regions of 
the USSR, in the event if NATO fails in the plans of the 
supplementary allocation of nuclear vieapons in West Europe." 
This appears to be the only arms-proposal Kulikov refers to 
that is not otherwise part of a formal 'no meeting. 
30) Kulikov <1980-b) includes another "theoretical conference" 
by representatives "of all the fraternal armies of the states-
part-icipants of the Warsaw Treaty", and mentions its "theme": 
"the stnmgthe1ling of the unity and co-operation of the countries 
of the socialist commmuni t.y in the principle of Marxism-Leninism 
and socialis't internationalism." - cf footnote (25) above. 
31) The actual dates are unclear, and were not included in the 
report in Krasnaya Zvezda (June 25, p. 3). 
32) There is no mention in the coverage in Pravda of a meeting 
having issued this document. 
33) This Vias an ad hoc meeting during Andropov's funeral events. 
There vias no corresponding meeting after Brezhnev's death. 
34) The text in IZ!,-7esti)-7a (March 6, p. 1) indicates only that "On 
agreement between the states-participants .... " the Proposal VIas 
delivered. There is no indication of a full meeting having taken 
place. 
35) The text in Pravda (]{ay 8, p.1) implies that the Appeal was 
delivered 'n'i thout a specific prior meeting, as a follovl-on from 
the Prague PCC of January 1983. The covering text merely says 
that "On agreement betWEen them [the states-participants of the 
WTo] on May 7, 1984, a message .... " v:as sent. 
36) This was an ad hoc meeting during Chernenko's funeral. See 
also footnote (32) abovet 
37) SWB SU/7951/c/l Ob.y 15, 1985) refers to a Soviet TV broad-
cast including a recorded statement by Kulikov "said to have been 
made at a March meeting of the Warsav{ Treaty Military Council 
members and generals and officers of the staff of the Joint Armed 
Forces". Pravda in that month had no mention of such a meeting. 
38) According to the end of the CFM meeting of December 3-4, 
1984 (Izvestiya, December 6, p.~), a further regUlar session of 
the CFM vias scheduled for Warsaw in June of 1985. This meeting 
never took place. The next recorded meeting of the CFM occurred 
in Budapest on March 19-20, 1986. I was told by Central European 
specialist that this delay was caused by the accession of 
Shevardnadze as Soviet Foreign Minister with no previous foreign 
policy experience, and by the maj or theoretical upheaval caused 
by Gorbachev's "new security concepts" (for which see Chapter 6). 
39) This PCC (O.ession was scheduled for January 1985, but a 
'Joint Anouncement' (Pravda, January 15, 1985) reported that the 
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session was "postponed till a later date which is to be agreed". 
This was presumably due to Chernenko's ill-health. 
40) Gorbachev held this "mutual discussion" during his return 
from his Geneva summit wit.h US President Reagan. 
41) Pravda (April 9, p.l) treated this as y,rith footnote (35) 
o.bove. 
42) The BBC World Service neY.Js reported on April 15 that the 
Warsa';{ Treaty representatives at the Stockholm Conference had 
issued a j oi nt statement on the US bombing of Libya. This ';.JaS 
never reported in the Soviet press, but on April 16 the BBC news 
report.ed t.he statement issued from the GDR Party Congress which 
vias published in PraT,,Tda on April 17, p.4. 
43) This was reported in Nepszabadsag and Neves Deutschland, but 
not in the Soviet press, as a meeting to hear a report from the 
chief Soviet delegate at the Geneva nuclear and space weapons 
talks. 
44) Although describedN as a regular meeti!!:g, this vmuld seem to 
have been timed to permit Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to 
report on the just-ended Reagan-Gorbachev mini -summi t in 
Reykj aT.lik. 
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DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
This Appendix details the official source of all the relevant 
documents listed in AppendiX 2 (Chronology). 
'I:- denotes documents listed in the official 'Documents and 
l1aterials' volumes (Rodionov, 1975; Mal'tsev, 1980j Mal'tsev, 
1986) 
<9 denotes those 1 isted in the earlier volumes, but not in 
1>1al'tsev (1986) 
o denotes documents listed in the earlier volumes, not listed in 
Mal'tsev (1986), but v:hich were inlcuded in the Hungarian-
language edition of 1985 
Abbreviations are listed on p.xii 
date 
1954 
Dec 2 
1955 
l1a.y 14 
1956 
Jan 28 
1958 
May 24 
1959 
Apr 28 
1960 
Feb 4 
1961 
l~ar 29 
Aug 5 
~ 
Moscow Conference 
Warsaw Conference 
PCC 
PCC 
Foreign Ministers 
PCC 
PCC 
First Secretaries 
Aug 12/13 "governments" 
Sep 9 Defence Ministers 
1962 
Feb 1 Defence Ministers 
Jun 7 PCC 
1963 
Feb 20 [Geneva Disarmament 
COllL.':' ttee] 
Feb 28 Defence Ministers 
dor.ument and source 
Declaration of the Governments 
'l:-Treaty Pra,,!da, May 15 
'l:-Joint Command Pravda, May 15 
-l-communique Pravda, May 15 
*communique 
-l-Declaration 
*communique 
'tDeclaration 
Pravda, 
Pravda, 
Pravda, 
Pravda, 
*draft non-aggression 
Jan 29 
Jan 29 
May 27 
May 27 
treaty Pravda, May 27 
*Communique Pravda, Apr 29 
Communique Pravda, Feb 5 
*Declaration Pravda, Feb 5 
tCommunique Pravda, Mar 31 
Report Pravda, Aug 6 
*Statement [on 
West Ber 1 i n] Pra~Tda, Aug 14 
'fReport Pravda, Sep 10 
'fReport Pravda, Feb 2 
*Declaration Pravda, Jun 10 
*draft non-aggression 
treaty Pravda, Feb 21 
report Kr,Zv. ) Mar 1 
Jul 25 First Secretaries and 
Government Heads *Resolution Pravda, Jul 27 
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Jul 26 
1965 
Jan 19 
Jan 20 
Nay 14 
Nay 18 
Nov 25 
1966 
Jun 17 
Jul 6 
Nov 17 
1967 
Feb 10 
Nov 18 
1968 
Feb 27 
J<l:ar 5 
Oct 30 
Nov 29 
1969 
Feb 13 
¥..ar 17 
J<l:ay 16 
¥.ay 21 
Oct 31 
Nov 3 
Dec 4 
Dec 10 
Dec 23 
PCC tCommunique Pravda, Jul 28 
Defence Ministers ,report 
PCC fCommunique 
10th Anniversary report 
military leaders report 
Pravda, Jan 20 
Pravda, Jan 22 
Pravda, May 15 
Pravda, J,~ay 19 
C-in-C, deputy defence 
ministers report Pravda, llov 26 
+Kr.Zv., Nov 27 
Foreign Ministers 
PCC 
fReport Pravda, Jun 18 
Communique Pravda, Jul 7 
tStatement on US Aggression in 
Vietnam Pravda, Jul 8 
268 
tDeclaration on Strengthening Peace 
and Security in Europe 
military leaders 
Foreign Ministers 
leaders of army 
cadres 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
PCC 
Defence Ministers 
military leaders 
miH tary 
representatives 
PCC 
Pravda, Jul 9 
report Pravda, }Iov 19 
freport: In the interests of 
European Security 
_ Prar,7da, Feb 11 
report Pravda, Nov 19 
Pravda, Feb 28 
Prav'da, Mar 9 
report 
,*Communique 
tDeclaration on the Threat to Peace 
Created by the Expansion of US 
Aggression in Vietnam 
Pravda, Mar 9 
tStatement on nuclear non-
proliferation [excluding 
Romania] Pravda, Mar 9 
report Pravda, Oct 31 
report Pravda, Nov 30 
report Kr.Zv. , Feb 14 
fCommunique Prav'da., Mar 18 
fAddress to the European 
Countries Pravda, Mar 18 
Chiefs of the General 
May 17 Staffs report Pravda, 
deputy foreign 
ministers *Report Pravda, Nay 22 
Foreign Ministers tStatement [concerning all-European 
conference] Pravda, }Iov 1 
military leaders report Izvestiya, Nov 5 
Party & State 
leaders *Communique Pravda, Dec 5 
tSta tement: Put an end to 
aggression in Vietnam 
Pravda, Dec 5 
MC report Pravda, Dec 11 
CDN tReport Pravda, Dec 24 
appendix 3 269 
1970 
Jan 27 deputy foreign 
Apr 28 
VJ.ay 22 
Jun 22 
Aug 20 
Oct 30 
Dec 2 
1971 
Feb 19 
Mar 3 
Mar 19 
May 15 
Aug 2 
Oct 29 
Dec 1 
1972 
Jan 26 
Feb 10 
Apr 12 
Jul 31 
Oct 20 
1973 
Jan 16 
Feb 8 
Apr 24 
May 17 
Jul 31 
Nov 1 
ruinisters 
MC 
CDM 
Foreign Ministers 
PCC 
MC, chief army 
officers 
PCC 
Foreign Ministers 
CDM 
Chiefs of the 
General Staffs 
MC 
Crimea 
MC, army leaders 
Foreign Ministers 
prr 
'-''-' 
CDM 
MC 
Crimea 
MC, military 
leaders 
Foriegn Ministers 
CDM 
l1C 
Crimea 
MC, mi li tary 
leaders 
'fReport 
report 
'fReport 
iCommunique 
'fMemorandum 
the holding 
conference] 
t-Communique 
Pravda, Jan 28 
Pravda, Apr" 29 
Pravda, May 23 
Pravda, Jun 24 
[on questions concern-
of an all-European 
Pravda, Jun 27 
Pravda, Aug 21 
report Pravda, Oct 31 
Communique Pravda, Dec 2 
t-StatemeDt: Strengthening Security 
and Developing Peaceful 
Co-operation in Europe 
Pravda, Dec 4 
t-Statement: Aggravation of 
Situation in the Region of 
Indochina Pravda, Dec 4 
t-Statement: For the Restoration of 
a Lasting Pe~ce in the Middle East 
Pravda, Dec 4 
t-Statement: End Imperialist 
Provocations Against the Independ 
ent States of Africa 
Pravda, Dec 4 
t-Communique Pravda, Feb 20 
tReport Pravda, Mar 4 
report Pravda, Mar 20 
report Pravda, May 16 
0report 
report pT"'-'::l TTr1<o Nov 2 .L U YUU, 
*CoIIL.'lluni que Pravda, Dec 3 
Communique Pravda, Jan 27 
*Declaration on Peace, Security 
and Co-operation in Europe 
Pravda, Jan 27 
t-Statement on the Continuation 
of US Aggression in Indochina 
Pravda, Jan 27 
'fReport 
report 
0report 
report 
'fReport 
'fReport 
Pravda, Feb 11 
Pravda, Apr 13 
Pravda, Oct 21 
Pravda, Jan 17 
Pravda, Feb 9 
*Legal Convention 
Kr.Zv., Apr 27 
report Pravda, May 18 
0report 
report Pravda, Nov 2 
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1974 
Feb 7 
1!,ar 28 
Apr 18 
Nov 21 
1975 
Jan 8 
Jan 30 
l.w.r 20 
May 15 
May 21 
Jun 4-
Oct 30 
Nov 19 
Dec 16 
1976 
May 27 
Nov 26 
Dec 11 
1977 
Feb 23 
May 20 
J.w.y- 26 
Jul 8 
oct 20 
Dec 2 
CDl1 
MC 
PCC 
MC 
CDM 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
Parliamentarians 
~~C 
representatives of 
'f.Report 
report 
/ Communique 
*-Statement 
Pravda, Feb 8 
Pravda, Mar 29 
Pravda, Apr 19 
"For a lasting and 
just peace in the Middle Ras'c" 
Pravda, Apr 20 
*Statement "For a lasting peace 
in Vietnam and for ensuring the 
just national interests of the 
Vietnamese people" 
Pravda, Apr 20 
*Statement "Stop the Outrages 
Persecution of Democrats in 
Chile" Pravda, Apr 20 
report Pravda, Nov 22 
*Report Pravda, Jan 9 
*Report Pravda, Feb 1 
report ~Pravda, Mar 22 
*Document "For peace, security, 
co-operation, and rapprochement 
between the people of Europe" 
Pravda, May 17 
report Pravda, May 22 
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communal organisations 
*Report Pravda, Jun 7 
MC, military 
leaders 
CDM 
Foreign Ministers 
MC 
PCC 
CDM 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
MC 
CHi 
Parliamentarians 
MC, military reps 
CDM 
report 
tReport 
*Communique 
Pravda, 
Pravda, 
Pravda, 
Oct 31 
Nov 20 
Dec 17 
report Pravda, May 28 
*Communique Pravda, Nov 27 
*Declaration "For fresh advances 
in international relaxation, the 
strengthening of security, and 
the development of co-operation" 
Pravda, Nov 27 
*Proposal [to CSCE states, on 
nuclear no-first-useJ 
*Draft Treaty 
no-first-useJ 
*Report 
Pravda, Nov 28 
[on nuclear 
Pravda, Nov 28 
Pravda, Dec 12 
report Kr.Zv., Feb 24-
report Pravda, May 21 
*Communique Pravda, May 27 
*Appeal [to CSCE Parliaments 
and Parliamentarians 
Pravda., Jul 7 
report Pra.';lda, Oct 21 
*Report Prar.-Tda, Dec 3 
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1978 
Apr 25 
J1ay 19 
Oct 19 
NoV' 23 
Dec 7 
1979 
Apr 26 
May 15 
Oct 17 
Oct 31 
Dec 6 
Dec 6 
1980 
May 15 
},iay 23 
Jun 18 
Jun 722 
Jul 9 
Oct 17 
Oct 20 
Dec 3 
Dec 5 
1981 
Jan 20 
Apr 23 
Oct. 30 
Dec 2 
Dec 4 
1982 
Apr 29 
Oct 22 
Oct 22 
1983 
Jan 5 
Jan 13 
CFM 
MC 
TIC 
PCC 
cm!\: 
MC 
CFM 
Parliamentarians 
MC 
CDJ!l 
CFM 
PCC 
ViC 
Parliamentarians 
MFA worlters 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
MC 
CFM 
CDM 
Party and State 
leaders 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
MC 
If.( 
CFM 
CDM 
MC 
MC 
CFM 
PCC 
CDM 
*Communique Pravda, Apr 27 
report Pravda, Hay ~O 
report Praj-Tda, Oct 20 
*Communique Pravda, Nov 24 
*Declaration Pravda, Nov 24 
0Statement on the Middle East 
situation [excl. Romania] 
Pravda, Nov 25 
*Report Pravda, Dec 8 
report Pravda, Apr 27 
*Communique Pravda, May 16 
."Appeal of the representatives 
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of the parliaments of the states-
participants of the Warsaw Treaty 
to the parliaments of the country-
participants of the North 
Atlantic Alliance" 
report 
*Report 
*Communique 
IZ\-Testiya, Oct 18 
Pravda, lfov 1 
~ Pravda, Dec 7 
Pravda, Dec 6 
tCommunique Pravda, May 16 
*Declaration Pravda, May 16 
*Statement [calling for a vmrld 
summi t] Pravda, May 16 
report Pravda, May 24 
*Communique Pravda, Jun 17 
*Appeal to the parliaments and 
parliamentarians of the states 
of Europe and the world 
report 
report 
report 
*Communique 
*Report 
*Report 
report 
report 
report 
*Communique 
-:fReport 
report 
report 
*Communique 
*Commun.ique 
*Political 
Declaration. 
*Report 
Pravda, Jun 19 
Kr. Zv., Jun 25 
Pravda, Jul 10 
Pravda, Oct 18 
Pravda, Oct 21 
Pravda, Dec 4 
Pravda, Dec 6 
Pravda, Jan 21 
Pravda, Apr 24 
Pravda, Oct 31 
Pravda, Dec 3 
Pravda, Dec 5 
Pravda, Apr 30 
Pravda, Oct 23 
Pravda, Oct 23 
Pravda, Jan 6 
Pravda, Jan 7 
Pravda, Jan 14 
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Jan 28 
Apr 7 
Apr 28 
Jun 28 
Oct 14 
Oct 20 
Oct 29 
Nov 10 
Dec 7 
Dec 21 
1984 
Jan 11'1 
Feb 14 
¥U3.r 5 
Apr 20 
Apr 26 
May 4 
:May 7 
Oct 19 
Dec 4 
Dec 5 
1985 
:Mar 1 
Jltar 13 
Apr 26 
:May 14 
11:ay 14 
deputy f"oreign 
ministers 
CFM: 
lK 
Party and State 
leaders 
CFM 
extraordinary CDM 
KC 
Parliamentarians 
CDl1\: 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
Party and State 
leaders 
CFK 
MC 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
MC 
CFM 
CDM 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
Party and State 
leaders 
Party and State 
leaders 
Parl ialnentarians 
report Pravda, Jan 29 
fReport Pravda, Apr 8 
report Pravda, Apr 29 
*Aeport Pravda, Jun 29 
t-Communique Pravda, Oct 15 
t-COTIh'1lunique Pravda, Oct 22 
report Pravda, Oct 30 
Pravda, Nov 13 *,Communique 
*Appeal to the Parliaments of 
states-participants of the 
Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe 
Pravda, Nov 13 
t-Report Pravda, Dec 8 
report Pravda, Dec 22 
*"On the question of the 
liberation of Europe from 
chemical weapons" 
Pravda, Jan 11 
report Pravda, Feb 15 
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t-"Proposal of the states-
participants of the Warsaw Treaty 
to the states-members of 1LHO 
regarding talks on the question 
of the non-increase and 
reduciton of military spending 
Pravda, Nar 6 
l-Communique Pravda, Apr 21 
report Pravda, Apr 27 
Pravda, May 5 report 
t-"Appeal on the mutual non-use 
of military force and the 
maintenance of relations of 
peace betvmen the states-
participants of the Warsavl 
Treaty and the states-members 
of NATO Pravda, May 8 
report Pravda, Oct 20 
,*Communique Izvestiya, Dec 6 
tReport Pravda, Dec 6 
0Report Pravda, Mar 2 
report Izvestiya, Mar 15 
*Communique Pravda, Apr 27 
*Protocol Pravda, Apr 27 
speech by K. V. Rusakov [on the 
30 th Anniversary] 
Iz ... ,restiya, lft.ay 15 
*Communique Izvestiy.:l, May 15 
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Hay 23 
Oct 23 
Nov 14 
Nov 21 
Dec 5 
1986 
Mar 8 
Mar 20 
Apr 8 
Apr 716 
Apr 25 
Jun 11 
Jun 27 
Sep 2 
Oct 15 
Nov 14 
Dec 3 
Endnote 
MC 
PCC 
MC 
"* 
"highest leaders" 
CDM 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
CFM 
MC 
PCC 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
deputy foreign 
ministers 
CFK 
MC 
CDN 
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"* 
*" 
, report Kr. Zv., May ?5 
*Communique Pravda, Oct 24 
*Statement "For the elimination 
of the nuclear threat and a turn 
for the better in European and 
world affairs" Pravda, Oct 24 
report Pravda, Nov 15 
*Report Pravda, Nov 22 
report Izvestiya, Dec 6 
Pravda, Mar 9 
Pravda, Nar 21 
report 
*Communique 
Address [on European nuclear 
Pravda, Apr 9 free zones] 
Statement [on 
of Libya] 
report 
Communique 
the US bombing 
Pravda, Apr 17 
Izvestiya, Apr 26 
Pravda, Jun 12 
Address of the states-
participants of the Warsavl 
Treaty to the country-
participants of NATO, and to 
all European countries, with a 
progra~~e of reducing armed 
forces and conventional arms 
in Europe Pravda, Jun 12 
report Nepsza badsag, Jun 28 
report Pravda, Sep 3 
COT"ulllunique Pravda, Oct 17 
report Pravda, Nov 15 
Communique Pravda, Dec 4 
1) This was not dated in Pravda, was dated January 10 in 
Hal'tsev (1986), but dated January 11 (the date of publication in 
Pravda), in the Hungarian edition of 1985 
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These two tables, compiled by me from the relevant documents 
the basic information contained in those 
primarily referred to in Chapter 4. 
(see Appendix 3) shO\'I 
documents. The Figures are 
The abbreviations are explained on p.xii. 
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B I SSUES MID PROPOSALS 
contained'in selectpd documents 
collecti'Je security 
E.eneral arDG reduction 
mutual dissolution 
banlrenounce/destro3_ nuclear weapons 
ban cbemcal/mss-destruction weapons 
arm:;/forces 11m! ts/reduction in Europe 
nuclear-free Gertt..'lny 
non-agression treaty 
"tbe Polish Government' 6 proposalS 
nuclear test ban 
nuclear-free Central Europe 
-
reduce troops abroad/enc torelgn bases 
coni 1 de nce-bu 11 di ng measures 
end war propa~an a 
non-mill tarisatlon of space 
German peace treaty 
"the Savle pro osa Ii 
European nuclear tree zon~s/zone5 01 pel!.ce 
Vest Berlin treaty 
"standing proposals-
R"enera DUC earlreeze 
recognl tion of POSt-w3T lrontlers 
all-European conference 
recoRni tion of liDR/two l..JerI2.n es 
guarantees for Don-nuc ear stllotes 
end aTJIG: race 
non-first-use of nuclear w23p::::r.s 
lie.! t/re ... uce It l tary oUCEets 
strate ic arms mltat: on 
implement UN {jenera ASSCDDJ y proposiHS 
no nuclear deployment on non-nUClear sates 
strengthen non-prolll era 1.: on 
limit/reduce force. 1n ,nollin uce"n 
in international routes 
restrict conventional arm:; SaiE'S 
reduce/liquidate EuromissLles 
freeze 10rces 1 n CSCE area 
ratHy SALT 
destro" chetl.1cal-weapon stoct"p .. as 
end production of nu~lear weapons 
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freeze Euromissiles/lflrs ~ 
non-extension of act v es 01 nAJU ~ <JU 
ban neutron we:!pons 
extend CBl\s/Stockbolo talks 
nuclear free/zone 01 peace 1'ie01 terrane:!n 
extend Helslnk: process 
11m1 t nava act~lt: es 
European chemic:! -weapon-tree zone s}. 
GDR-Czech/Bulgarian-RoMnian proposals 
<chemic:!1 weapon-free zones) 
co-operation on terrorism 
no t: nary cnemic:! weapons 
disarmment and develop"",n l1n~s 
broaden UJi ro e on d: sarmamen 
Rocani:!n proposals to VII \on enSlon 
norMlise Internatlona econoIt ... c t.:es 
new 1ntern~tlona  econom1C o~er 
end chemical-weapon industri",l base 
no new conventional weapon teChnologies 
non-tra.nsfer of weapons o second states 
reduce military actlvites 
rela.x tension in the Mediterranean 
non-1 ncreaS9 of French/Bri tlsh nucle",r 3rms : 
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THE BILATERAL TREATIES 
Table 1 indicates the bilateral treaties of hfriendship, co-
operation, and mutual assistance" that have been signed between 
the member-states of the Warsaw 
'" 
Treaty. These treaties, 
originating in the post-war period before the signing of the 
'Jarsaw Treaty (see Chapter 1), are considered to be part of the 
"first stageh of military co-operation between the allies 
(Grechko, 1977, p.330j Alexandrov, p.17j Yakubovskii, 1976j 
Lototskii, p.347). The most fundamental difference between these 
and the Warsav; Treaty is that the latter makes a point of not 
referring to "s.ocialist internationalism" jn any shape or form 
(Tyranovlski, p.105j see also l1eissner, 1966, p. 249). In addition 
it is explained that 
All the treaties contain resolutions on the development of 
economic and cultural associations and relatlons' of 
friendship and co-operation between the people of the 
contracting countries, and the obligation to co-operate with 
all states in the cause of securing universal peace and 
E.ecuri ty in accordance with the Charter of the (United 
Nations) . 
<Bakhov, p.5) 
So they seem to go further in these fields, too, than does the 
Warsavl Treaty (cf AppendiX 1). 
Many of the arguments supporting the bilateral treaties are 
similar to those used to defend the Warsaw Treaty - for example 
that they were a response to 'imperialist aggression' (Grechko, 
1977, p.331; Kozlov, p. 211), and that they are defending the 
revolutionary gains of the signatories <Kozlov, p.211; 
Alexandrov, p.17). Once again, the military construction of the 
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Table 1: The Bilateral Treaties 
tJS~;R aD.E. Cz~R ' f1.R. s.RR ERa. ~ EM. 
USSR 12Dl\c43 21Apr48 4Feb48 18Mar48 18Feb48 9Ju146 
12JunS4 27NovS3 8AprS5 7Jul70 14t1ayS7 7Sep67 
70ct75 SMay70 
GDR 
12,lun64 
70ct75 
6,Jun50 
17Mar67 15Mar67 lDct70 7Sep67 18May67 
3Dct77 28May77 10.Jun77 14Sep77 2AMar77 
CzSR 12Dec43 
27NovS3 
10MarA7 21Ju148 23AprA8 16AprA9 
17Mar67 lMar67 16Aug70 26Apr68 14.Jun68 
SMay70 30c t77 
PPR 21Apr48 
8Apr65 
6JunSO 10MarA7 26,Jand9 29i1ayAS 18Jun48 
15MarS7 1MarS7 12Nov70 6Apr67 16May68 
28May77 
SRR 4Feb48 
nul70 
21Ju148 26,lan49 16Jan48 24.Jan48 
1 Dc t70 16Au97O 12Nov70 19Nov70 24Feb71 
10Jun77 
PRB 10M ... "AO 23Apr48 29May48 It.JanA8 16Ju148~ 16Dec47 IVlla! "'v 
14May67 7Sep67 2SApr67 E.Apr67 19Nov70 lOJulE.9 
14~.ep77 
HPR 18Feb48 lE.Apr49 18Jun48 20anA8 lS,Jul4S* 
7Sep67 18MayE.7 14Jun68 16May68 24Feb71 10Jul69 
24Mar77 
PRA 9Ju146 16Dec47 
* Keissner (1966, p.240) says it VlaS in June. This must be a 
typographical error, since he later (1967, p.581) says it was in 
July. 
sources: Keissner (1966); M:ackintosh (1969); Staar (1982) 
signatories is seen to be under the dominant support of the USSR 
and the Soviet army's experience (Yakubovskii, 1976). Alexandrov 
likewise places the bilateral treaties alongside 'corresponding 
firm ties' in the spheres of politics, economics, and culture, 
that are assisting in leading to "an aVlareness of the emergence 
of a new international community" (p. 17) . As wi th the Warsaw 
Treaty in its practice, the bilateral treaties are seen as having 
the fundamental pri nci pIes of Marxism-Leni nism, COI"Ill'1l0n pol i tical 
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~ims and t~sks, and "the principles of organising political 
education and training in the armed forces" (Grechko, 1977, 
p.330) . These vlider aims of integration are confimed by l1eissner 
(1966, p.248), who sees the development of the bilateral treaties 
from the general anti-German nature of the first generation 
(ibid, p.247) to a system of integration in the second generation 
and an effective bloc in the third generation (1979, p.283). 
Meissner's general theme is that the basis of the bilateral 
treaties is to effect Soviet hegemony, and in particular 
integration under Soviet domination (ibid, p.291), with the third 
generation of bilateral treaties being an application of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine (ibid, p.287)~ With this aim in mind, Meissner 
sees the bilateral treaties as being a far more effective 
mechanism than the Warsaw Treaty <1967, p. 589) . HOVlever, in 
contradistinction to :M:eissner, Reissmliller considers that even 
though the bilateral treaties do "offset many of the 
shortcomings" of the Warsaw Treaty, by having a wider casus 
foederis than Europe and with the exception of Romania commit~ing 
the signatories to foreign policy co-ordination, "they are 
susceptible to poli tical erosion and to the grovling 
dissatisfaction with Soviet hegemony." Reissmuller concludes 
that "In the final analysis the system of bilateral treaties is 
not worth much more than the pact." - though this leaves open to 
question just 'vlhat is holding the Soviet bloc together. 
The Soviet Union and the WTO regularly offer the dismantling 
of the WTO in return for the dismantling of NATO, usually 
suggesting that the military structures should go first as part 
of an interim deal. No"wi thstanding Reissmuller's conclusions, 
this would make little difference to the Soviet bloc, since the 
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basis of its military relations are not dependent on multilateral 
co-ordination under the Warsaw Treaty', v:hether under the 
bilateral treaties or just individual arrangements as the 
stationing of the Soviet forces and TNFs in Central Europe. It 
is arguable that even the bilateral treaties are not entirely 
necessary, since, even though an argument for the Warsaw Treaty 
vias to allow "more effective" co-operation than that afforded 
under the bilateral arrangements (see above), they are also 
inter-state agreements v[hich would be subject to party' guidance' 
in the same way that the WTO is controlled. Party gUidance of 
state affairs has never been on offer for dismantling. The one 
principle which has been rigorously defended above all else is 
the continuation of the leading role of the parties. 
Officially, however, the Warsaw Treaty was never intended to 
supersede the arr8IBcments of the bilateral treaties. In his 
opening Statement to the Warsaw Conference in 1955. Bulganin 
reminded the delegates that 
Nearly all our countries are bound with one another by 
bilateral treaties of friendship and mutual assistance, which 
have played and contj nue to play an important part in safe-
~uarding·European peace and security. 
,Pravda, 12 Nay 1955, p.3 - emphasis added) 
Virtually the same v,fording was used by }.lenzhinskii, when he 
argued that the events of the 1950s additionally required the 
Warsav[ Treaty: 
The bilateral treaties of the fraternal socialist countries 
played and continue to playa prominent role as an effective 
and efficient instrument in securing the mutual security 
against imperialist aggression, strengthening international 
peace, and developing between them comprehensive co-
operation. (p.28) , 
M:enzhinskii had, in fact, stated (p.27) that the importance of 
the bilateral treaties was supplemented by the Warsaw Treaty. 
The most forthright presentation of hov[ the bilateral 
treaties and the Warsaw Treaty must be seen as complementary 
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aspect:::. of the states' inter-relations was made by Savinov in 
1980. In an extended passage on the matter, he ~Tote that 
The agreed basis of the co-ordination of foreiF,n policy in 
the framework of the Warsavl Treaty strengthens i tse1.f by the 
presence of the enduring bilateral treaties of relations, 
vlhich cement all the state-members of the Warsaw Treaty. (p.20) 
The bilateral treaties between the states-participants of 
the [WTO] are strengthened in the bilateral oblIgations 
resulting from membership of the Organisation of the Warsaw 
Treaty, the strivings 01 the contractinF, countries actively 
to participate in the improvement of all. forms of co-oper-
ation in the fields of pol.itics, economics, and defence,-are 
borne out. These treaties incorporate a provision that the 
sides, taking part in the decision-making struGture, observe 
their obligations resulting from the Warsaw Treaty. (i bid) . 
The inseparable connexion and [complementary] relationship 
of the Warsa\'1 Treaty and the bilateral treaties.... \ll8re 
repeatedly noted by the leaderships of the fraternal parties 
of the socialist countries. (p.21) 
Even in relation to the 30 th Annh'ersary of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation it was asserted that 
Together with the fraternal socialist countries' [bilateral] 
treaties of friendship and mutual interest and their 
association vIi thin the framework of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance, the Warsaw Treaty was a powerful inter-
national legal factor, cementing all the fraternal ties among 
European socialist countries. (Nezhinsky, p.62) 
In other words, all these various ties, both bilateral and 
multilateral, are to be seen as complementary factors, not just 
to the defence of socialism or the co~~itment to joint political 
action, but to the paramount ideological interest of the overall 
memberShip of the European socialist community. Since, <>~ <.<0 
Chapter 7 concluded, the WTO was just one element in the context 
of international socialism, then it does not matter hml many 
other ties, either bilateral or multilateral, also exist - they 
all work together to the common aim. One more treaty merely 
reinforces the rest; one fewer, for example the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Treaty, again would not matter, since the overall 
context of mutual socialist activity is not diminished. 
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Endnote 
1) Arguably, though, the West vmuld be left vii th the. Western 
European Union, vihich the 'v1TO seems to have ignored since the 
Preamble to the Warsaw Treaty, since it has never mentioned it in 
relation to the dissolution of opposing blocs. 
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A NOTE ON ALBANIA 
In the early postwar years, Albania was not incorporated 
fully into the bilateral treaty system (see Appendix 5), thus its 
inclusion ill: the Warsaw Treaty vms its first formal participation 
in the collective defence community. According to Kobal, how-
ever, from 1955 to the 1960s, Albania vms obj ecting to being 
forced to maintain large military forces (p.242)'. 
The PCC met on 28-29 March 1961 (see Appendix 2), but 
Albania did not send party representatives, and its chief 
delegate ¥las only the "First Vice-Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers, Minister of Defence" rather than the First Secretary 
of the ruling party as with the other states (see footnote 9 of 
Chapter 3). On 3-5 August 1961, the First Secretaries of the 
Warsaw Treaty states met in Moscow and issued a Communique on· the 
German question, but on August 8 Albania issued its own proposals 
for a German settlement. On 12 December 1961 the Albanian 
Embassy in Moscow was closed, the Soviet staff was withdravm from 
Tirana, and the other non-Soviet Varsaw Treaty states reduced 
their diplomatic representation to the level of Charge d'Affairs. 
Finally, on 7 June 1962, a PCC session 'r[(}S held in MOSCOVI at 
which Albania was not represented (see footnote 9, Chapter 3). 
According to the remaining members, it was Albania's 
decision not to participate, though there is confusion over when 
this began. Menzhinskii states that Albania was not an active 
member from 1961 <footnote, p. 30), whi le Tyranowski v:ri tes that 
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"Beginning vdth 1962, Albania did not take any part in the 
conferences of the [PCC]." Cp. 106), though he only refers to 
Albania as non-participatory rather than actually 'viithdravm'2. 
Kozlov is more outspoken and says that Albania "by virtue of the 
posi tion taken by its leaders" hadn't been active II since 1963" 
Cp. 212) . :3 A Pol ish source even vlTi tes that Albania "functioned 
within its [WTO's] structure only until 1964." (Czyzewski, p.7) 
Though, as pointed out above, Albanian attendance at meetings 
ceased in 1962. 
Kobal's version of events is that Albania protested that it 
was being excluded from the 1962 PCC session Cp.197).4 Hovlever 
Starr claims that under Khrushchev's successors attempts Vl8re 
made in 1965 to bring Albania back as a participatory member of 
the bloc, including the WTO, but by this time Albania was much 
more isolationist and refused Cp. 273) . Technically it \'las not 
until 13 September 1968 that Albania fully distanced itself from 
the WTO, passing a lavl to that effect (Meissner, 1983, p. 360a), 
in response to the events in Czechoslovakia. 
Writing for the 10~h anniversarys WTO Chief of Staff Batov 
Cp.112) listed the states vlhich founded the Warsaw Treaty, but 
did not give any footnote or rider to the listing of Al bania, 
implying that the Soviet Union at that time did not consider 
Albanian non-participation as final. Hovlever, the 1966 PCC 
'Statement on US aggression in Vietr,am' (Pravda, 8 July 1966) 
spoke of the Statement expressing the policy of "the parties to 
the Warsaw Treaty", which could be interpreted to imply that at 
that time Al bania, not a participant to the Statement, 'vias not 
considered to be a 'party to the Warsaw Treaty'. 
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During the 30~h Anniversary, Gribkov, in a footnote (19B5~~, 
p.B3) shirked the question of the founding membership of the WTO, 
by vlriting of the Treaty's "participants at the present time", 
and so did not have to mention Albani1:l.. This was also the method 
used by Smorigo (p.27). 
AnyVlay, Albania did not participate in the first WTO 
multilateral exercises of October 1961 (Yakubovskii, 1975~) p.2B2) 
and so vias only fully a member of the VTO during the virtually-
mori bund stage of the Organisation. It "muld seem that the 
question of Albania's role and political-military policy need be 
of little concern to a study of the WTO. 
Endnotes 
1) Kobal also mentions Albanian obj ections to "a large Soviet 
presence", but does not explain what arrangement this was, and 
v,rhether it is advisers or troops~ 
2) Commenting on the mechanism for Vii thdrawal from the Treaty, 
Tyranowski is adamant that Article 11 of the Treaty must be 
adhered to verbatim (cf Appendix 1). But he adds that "in the 
absence of conditions justifying such notice, a party may 
vii thdravl from the 'V,larsavl Treaty only vii th the consent of the 
remaining parties." (p.104) 
Article 1 of the Protocol extending the Treaty applies ~he 
same conditions for vd thdra'..:al as Article 11 of the Treaty (see 
Appendix 1). 
3) Kobal Yfrites that "Radio Moscow anounced on August 30, 1963, 
that the Albanian Government 'broke the ties of Albania with the 
Warsaw Organisation'." (p.198) Kobal further adds that Albania 
had ceased to participate in the OmA at the end of 1961 by 
wi thdrawing its representatives from the CMEA Secretariat, and 
stopped payments of CMEA dues on 22 December 1962 (ibid). 
4) It must be remembered that Albania's attitude to the WTO, 
and the Soviet cause of or response to it, was merely a symptom 
of, and of little direct importance to, the wider question of the 
Sino-Soviet schism. The Albanians were for their own reasons 
supporting the People's Republic of China. 
5)· Voennyi vestnik descri bed the author as "General of the Army 
P. Batov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union", and did not refer to 
his WTO post. (Six months later Batov Vias replacE.. ~ by Kazakov -
see Appendix 7.) This concurs with the analysis of the post of 
C-in-C (in Chapter 3, under the section on the Joint Command) 
showing that position also not to appear to be full time. 
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B NOTE ON ROMANIA 
Since 1964, Romania has had an openly maverick and recusant 
role vii thin the WTO, distancing itself from military and party-
pol i tical acti vi ties, but participating in the WTO structure, 
including putting its signature to virtually every PCC document 
(see Chapter 4). Romania's claim is that the country is 
rigorously following the parts 6f the Treaty (and the later 
official interpretations), claiming that the WTO is founded on 
"the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty 
of sta.tes. and 0.150 with the principle. of non-interference in 
their internal affairs" (see Appendix 1). (cf Kobal, p.202.) 
This attitude came into the open in 1964, when, under the 
guise of its attempts at mediating in the Sino-SoV"iet dispute, 
the Rumanian Workers' Party' issued a 'Statement on the Stand of 
the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the Inter-
national Communist and Working Class Nove.ment' v,hich was" Adopted 
by the Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the R~T Held 
in April 1964"2 (April 15-22). Section 4 (of seven sections), on 
"The World Socialist System", includes the folloviing passages: 
By promoting in the international arena a qualitatively new 
system of relations, unprecedented in history, the Communist 
and vlOrkers' parties in the socialist countries have placed 
at the founaation of these relati~ns the principles of 
national independAnce e.nsi. sovereignty, e.illJ..Ql rights, mutual 
advantage. comradelv assistance. non-lnterrerence ill internal 
affairs, obserV"anceYof territorial integri ty. :tha principles QL socialist internationalism. 
As. . .. ~ confirmed ~ historical experience, these 
Drinciples form the iIllllluta Ie law and guarantee of the 
aevelopment of :tha entire world socialist system. They have 
imposea themsE;lves as an object.ive necessity tor the deyelop-
meht of relatlons of co-operatlon, for securlng the unlty of 
action and cohesion of a community of independent states, 
vii th equal rights. Any curtailment or violation of these 
principles can be only a source of misunderstanding and 
Ciiscora. 
appendix 6 286 
the socialist countries achieve their unity of action 
in all dOIT~ins, economic as well as political, by reciprocal 
consultations, the joint elaboration of certain common stands 
as resards the major problems of ~rinci~le, and_ not by 
estabhshing unique solutions by some super-state authority. 
This is the only correct and possible way of developing co-
o~eration among sovereign and equal states; it guarantees the 
auoption of realistic and efficient solutions and secures a 
lasving basis for the common efforts aiming at the im~lement­
ation of the decisions or general line hne that have been 
o.do~ted . 
.. . ~specific and individual interests cannot be presented as 
general interests, as objective requirements of "he develop-
ment of the socialist system. 
[The text then included a call for notice to be taken of 
national-historical conditions.] 
The strict observance uf the basic principles of the new-
~ relatior;s among the social ist countries 1.l2. the primary 
prerequisi te of the JJ..n..i:ty and cohesion uf these countnes ana 
of the vferld sociali::;t s\rstem performing its decisive role in 
the development of mankind. 
(Rumanian vlorkers' Party, original stress) 
In his discussion of the statement, Floyd mainly 
concentrates on the application of the references elsevlhere in 
the text to economic relations a.nd the CKEA, but his general 
conclusions c.re that the Statement clearly signalled F;omanian 
defiance of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev - "by 1965, Rumania 
was no less free of Russian control than '"as YugoslaVia.. " 
(footnote 39, p. xi i) . But, unl ike YugoslaVia, or Hungary's line 
in 1956, the Romanians have never completely cut their ties vii th 
the bloc; and in other ways, particularly over the leading role 
of the party, Romania has been decidedly hardline. Since 1964, 
Romania has walked a narrow line between national 10. ti tude and 
bloc unity or solidarity. In military terms, this ha::; been 
manifested in Romania refusing to take a full part in 
multilateral field exercises (but sends observers, and has taken 
part in staff exercises - see the chronology in Kulikov, 198()i,), 
on the grounds that military forces must not be placed on 
another's territory (arguing the 'national sovereignty' and 'non-
interference' principles). 
Romania has ' guest status' ':'11 the non-al igned movement, and 
according to Ceausescu, it is up to non-aligned countries to 
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unite in order to challenge super-power domination and so offer 
solutions to international problems <Tismaneanu). 
It ~.1~r YY"",,W no doubt Romania that was behind opposi Hon to 
Brezhnev's calls in 1965 for greater political control within the 
WTO (see Chapter 3), though whether this could have been achieved 
wi thout support from the other members, and "lhether it vmuld have 
made the Organisation more efficient (by v,rhatever criterion), or 
even more significant in the face of overall party influence, is 
open to debate. By 1976, at the time of the Bucharest Reforms to 
the political mechanisms, Romania vlaS apparently strongly in 
favour of strengthening the political aspects of the Treaty, and 
was calling for the introduction of "the principle of consensus 
in the adoption of all decisions in this military-political 
alliance" (Tanyug in English, November 26, discussing a book on 
the Warsavl Treaty published in ROI"uania, SVE EE/5376/C114, 29 
November 1976). The Romanians vlere pushing for greater priority 
to be given to the political aspects of the Treaty, and 
"improving the system of providing information on all. the 
problems vlhich relate to peace and security in Europe" (ibid). In 
view of the extent of the Bucharest political reforms, it is 
debatable just how much Romania actually agreed with the final 
reorganisation, or just vrhat more change Romania v,ras demanding 
and didn't get (despite hosting the PCC session), let alone hOVI 
it has acted within the WTO since 1976. Certainly as it stands, 
national viev,rs and the needs of the non-Soviet members are nnt 
yet perfectly catered for. 
In military terms, the question of Romania's role in the WTO 
is a moot point. Just nOVl distant is Romania from WTO practice, 
and does this matter in terms of bloc security? 
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1981) detailing Romania's 
'people's defence' policy, it must be remembered that this is 
bas8d largely outwi th the regular army. The 1972 La", on the 
'Organisation of the National Defence' created a policy of 
"Emphasising resistance via lightly armed units of 'Patriotic 
Guards' . . .. the Romanian law diluted t.he role of the professional 
army." (Nelson, 1986~, In fOrInal military terms, therefore, "the 
RPA itself still resembles its allies, l'ii th a fairly standard WTO 
organ.isation, la.rge number of officer schools and emphasis on 
close political control." (Rakowska-Harmstone, et 0.1, 1981, 
p.216) though it has been removed "structurally.... from WTO 
integration" (ibid, p. 221). 
While Romania has broken away from general reliance on bloc 
military equipment (ibid, p.218; Erickson, 1981, p.162) this has 
resul ted more recently in the real isation of the need for acceSE 
to (I"u.3.inly Soviet) more-modern ",reaponE (Nelson, 1986Q.). Overall, 
however, in bloc terms, this need not be seen as unusual, since 
bloc equipment is not standard (see Erickson, 1981, p. 163). 
But, even in military terms, is Roruania 1 s position 
significant? Geostrategically, Bulgaria (and even Hungary), are 
more important. In an alliance that claims to be purely 
defensive, Romania if attacked by, say, ~rATO, would presumably 
defend itself, ",hich would hold up an attack on the USSR from 
that direction. In the final analysis, even if Romanian doctrine 
differs, Romania has not apparently distanced itself completely 
from the WTO military structure. Several Central European 
sources''>! denied that the Romanian position caused problems; a 
familiar response was to point out that no alliance, not even 
NATO, had uniform participation. (Whi 113 this might be because, 
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even in otherwise off-the-record talks, admission of Romanian 
dissidence was sti 11 beyond ,the pale, it could also be ~uggeE.ted 
ti1at. unconcern O ~Tr-.­V O::;J. Romania vms further evidence of the lack of 
impact of the WTO on both military and political national 
policies. ) 
In political terms, too, the most recent events "muld 
confirm the limited nature of Romania's autonomy. In 1985, the 
US Ambassador to Romania resigned, claiming that Ceausescu "had 
, outfoxed' the US by exaggerating his independence from 
Roscow .... " <David Buchan in The Financial Times, 17 Ray 1985, 
p. 1). 
lfu Funderbuck also complained that Washington had ignored 
evidence, collected by his embassy, that Romanian 
independence of Roscow was a sham. He cited growing economic 
li nks bet\-,reen Bucharest and MOSCOYi, large numbers of Soviet 
civilians in the country, and the Romanian transfer of 'Vlest-
ern technology and exports of arms to the Soviet Union. 
(i bid) 
Various Central European specialistsN, when questioned about 
+"h',-\Jul.:;::>, confi rmed this assessment. One such expert went on to 
argue that Romania "couldn't afford" to leave the WTO, and wished 
to influence it from within. To influence the WTO internally, 
Romania would of course have to have a measure of active 
partid pation. As noted in Chapter 4, Romanian participation in 
the political processes of the WTO is virtually perfect. 
Romania's national foreign poli cy3, while perhaps expressing its 
goals more stridently, does not conflict with overall WTO joint 
foreign policy. 
A further example of Romanian conformity vias to be expressed 
by Ceausescu in a speech on 20 December 1985, where he v,ras 
"calling on the Soviet bloc to take Q, more offensive propaganda 
line against the West" and included "a pledge to co-operate more 
closely with the Warsaw Pact members in the future." (Robin Gedye 
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in The Daily Telegraph, 21 December 1985, p.5) Vlhile this could 
be just another example of a Romanian ability to keep in vfith all 
sides, it could also serve to confirm that Romanian 'independence 
from' all aspects of the WTO is perhaps generally over-rated. 
Endnotes 
1) Romania dropped the Slav spelling of its name in 1965, and 
in the same year also it changed the name of its ruling party. 
2) The text is in William E. Griffith 
Relations, . 1964-1965 (Cambridge, M/London: 
1967) pp.269-296. 
(ed) Sino-Soviet 
The M.I.T. Press, 
3) For a comprehensive summary of Romanian foreign policy, see 
Mututshika, 1986. 
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BIOGRAPHTES 
Introduction 
This appendix contains the biographies of the VlTO 
Com:manders-i~-Chief (C-in-C) and Chie.fs of staff (C-of-S), plus 
the biographies for the two knmlD General Secretaries, and also 
for Konstantin Viktorovich Rusakov, who delivered the keynote 
address to the main meeting to celebrate the 30
t
.t-. Anniversary of 
the VlTO. 
For a discussion of the positions of C-in-C, C-of-S, 
and General Secretary, see Chapter 3; for reference to Rusakov 
see Chapter 5. Both Yakubovskii (197~) and Kulikov (1980-b) have 
chronologies which include the dates of appointment of the C-in-C 
and C-of-S. 
Ihe Commanders-in-Chief 
name 
Konev 
Grechko 
Yakubovskii 
Kulikov 
The Chiefs of Staff 
name 
Antonov 
Batov 
Kazakov 
Shtemenko 
Gribkov 
date of appointment 
14 ltlay 1955 
25 July 1960 
8 July 1967 
5 January 1977 
date of ~~pointment 
14 May 1955 
30 October 1962 
24 November 1965 
5 August 1968 
12 October 1976 
In Yakubovskii, the date is given, then a description of the 
post _ eg "Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces" - and 
then the name of the new occupant. The description and name aL "" 
interspersed vli th the vlOrd naznachen: "[ he was] appointed. " 
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Kuliko'l repeats this format, until the appointments of Gri bko'l 
(Chief of Staff, 1976) and Kuliko'l (Cownander-in-Chief, 1977); in 
both these cases the format becomes the date follovled by "The 
Governments of the states-participants of the Warsavl Treaty 
appointed .... " and the name. 
ThL::; subtlety implies either that the earlier appointments 
'emerged', or that it VJaS only Vii th the later appointments that a 
consensus of the governments occurred, or that the authors vlished 
to ~ that there had been a consensus. With both formats, and 
all interpretations, it underl i nes that however the appointments 
vlere arrived at, they are illlt.. formulated Vii thin the formal 
structure of the WTO, and are not to be seen as appointments from 
the PCC, the WTO's top body. It has been suggested'" that in 1968 
Czechoslovakia and Romania called for the C-in-C not to be a 
Soviet, but that the USSR described such an idea as "the voice of 
the enemy". Whether by the appointment of Gri bImv and Kulikov 
such objections to the perpetual Soviet holding of the posts had 
been shelved is of course still unknovm. 
Both Kulikov and Yakubovskii footnote each appointment Vii th 
the rider that the dates given are for the date of publication of 
the appointment in the Soviet press, vd th the exception of Konev 
and Antonov: Kulikov (1980~) dates their appointment from Nay 14, 
in the context of describing the e~tablishment of the Joint 
Cownand as part of the proceedings of the Warsaw Meeting, Viith no 
footnote about the press. Yakubovskii (1975~) describes the 
decision to create the Joint Cownand, and the appointment of 
Konev and Antonov, as part of a separate entry from the signing 
of the Treaty, with a footnote that it Vias the date of 
publication in the Soviet press. Furthermore, the Bol'shaya 
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Sovetslraya Entsiklopediya entry for the Warsaw Treaty states that 
Grechko took over the the C-in-C post from Konev in June 1960, a 
month before the press anouncement, and that Grechko continued in 
this capacity until July 1967, three months after his appointment 
as Soviet Hinister of Defence. 
Abbreviations are listed on p.xii. 
The biographies are included in alphabetical order. 
ANTONOV, Al~ksei Innokent'evich 
1896 September 15 - 1962 June 18 
1916: graduate, Pavlov Military School 
[First World War] 
1919 April: Soviet Army [Civil War] 
1928: joined CPSU 
1931: graduate, Frunze Military Academy 
1933: graduate, Frunze Military Academy operations facility 
1937: graduate, Academy of the General Staff 
1938-40: teaching 
[Great Patriotic War: Chief of Staff of various fronts] 
1942 December: First Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
1943: Soviet General of the Army 
1945 February: Chief of the General Staff 
[participant in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences] 
1946 March - 1948: First Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
1948-54 First Deputy COI"u .. '1l3.nder, COIfu'1lander of troops, Trans-
caucasus Military District 
1954 April - : First Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
"and from May 1955 also Chief of Staff of the Joint Armed Forces" 
of the WTO. 
(sources: Eol ' shaya Sovetskaya En tsikl opediyaj Voenno-
Entsiklopedi deski i 51 ovar') 
Eut note: The Communique on the first day of the session of the 
first PCC (Pravda, 28 January 1956, p.l) specifically describes 
Antonov as being the "general secretary of the PCC" , even though 
there was no mention, in the founding documents, of such a post 
having been created. There is no explanation or justification 
for Antonov holding such a post concurrent "lith being Chief of 
Staff. 
BATOV, Pavel Ivanovich 
1897 May 20 (June 1) -
1915: in the army 
1918 August: joined the Red Army [Civil War] 
1927: graduate, Vystrel [the higher infantry school] 
1929 - : member, CPSU 
[Spanish Civil War, Soviet-Finnish War, Great Patriotic War] 
1945 - : Commander, GSFG 
1949 - :Comr~nder of a Group of Soviet Forces, K~liningrad Oblast 
1950 - : Command pOSitions in Soviet Army, member of staff of USSR 
Ministry of Defence 
1955-58: COIfu'1lander, Transcarpathian Military District 
1959-60: Commander, Baltic Military District 
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1961-62: Conul'.ander, Southern Group of Forces [Hungary] 
1962-65: Chief of Staff, WTO JAFs 
1965 - : Chief General Inspector, USSR Ministry of Defence 
1970-81: Chair of the Soviet Co~umittee of War Veterans· 
(sources: Bo1' shaya Sovetskaya Entsik10pediya and Lewytskyj) 
FIRYUBIN, Nikolai Pavlovich 
1908 April 4 - 1983 February 12 
1924-35: worked in the construction industry 
1925 - : member, CPSU 
1935: graduate, Ordzhonikidze Aviation Institute, Moscow 
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1935-40: YIOrked in an aircraft factory, becoming "Master of the 
section to the Party Organiser" 
1940-53: Party and soviet posts, including First Secretary of a 
ci ty committee (Moscow), Secretary of the Moscow Committee and 
Moscow City Committee of the All-Union COITU"'llunist Party 
(Bolsheviks), deputy chairman of the Executive COllliui ttee of the 
Moscow Soviet 
During the Great Patriotic War was a representative of the State 
Committee of Defence, in charge of military production 
1953 - : "fruitfully worked in the system of the USSR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs", including as ambassado( to Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia. 
1957 - : was a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. "In the course 
of many years carried out the duties of the general secretary of 
the Poll tical Consul tati ve Committee of the states-participants 
of the Warsaw Treaty." 
(::;ource: obituary in Pravda, 16 February 1983, p. 3. ) 
Crowley et 0.1 , published in 1968, begin hy stating that Firyubin 
was the Secretary-Genera 1 of the PCC. }Jote that, as noted in 
Chapter 3, despite reports of such a post held by Firyubin from 
1965, he was not listed as an attendee until the final Communique 
of the 1972 session of the PCC. The wording of the obituary is 
unclear, but it could imply that Firyubin y:as acting WTO 
Secretary General from 1957, and that this post merited. the 
status of Deputy Foreign Minister. Crowley et 0.1 also state that 
he attended the Warsaw Meeting of 1955 [even though he was not 
listed as an attendee - see footnote 9, Chapter 3], and that 
betvmen 1956 and 1967 was engaged in various top-level diplomatic 
assignments, mainly in Europe but also to the UN Economic 
COITU"'llission for Europe, and in Asia. Both the obituary in Pravda 
and Crov,rley et 0.1 specify that Firyubin achieved the rank of 
"Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary". 
GRECHKO, Andrei Antonovich 
1903 October 4 (17) - 1976 April 26 
1919: joined Soviet Army [Civil War] 
1926: graduate, Cavalry School 
1928 - : member, CPSU 
1936: graduate, Frunze Military Academy 
1941: graduate, lHlitary Academy of the General Staff 
[Great Patriotic War] 
1945-53: Commander of troops, Kiev Military District 
1952-61: candidate member, CPSU CC 
1953 - : C-in-C, GSFG 
1955: 11arshal of the Soviet Union 
1957 November - : C-in-C Soviet Ground Forces, First Deputy USSR 
Minister of Defence 
1960 April - : First Deputy USSR Minister of Defence 
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1960 July -
1967 July: C-in-C, WIO JAFs 
1961 - : member, CPSU CC ~ 
1967 April - : USSR Minister of Defence 
1973 April - : member, CPSU CC Political Bureau 
(sources: Bo1'shi:,ya 50vetskaya Entsik10pediyaj Voenno-
En tsild opedi cheski i 51 ovar' 
GRIBKOV, Anatolii Ivanovich 
1919 March 23 -
1938: entered Soviet Army 
1939: graduate, Kharkov Armoured School 
[Soviet-Finland War] 
1941- : member CPSU 
[Great Patriotic War] 
1942: graduate, Frunze M.ilitary Academy <accelerated course) 
1944 November-
1949 }Jovember: General Staff 
1951: graduate, Military Academy of the General Staff 
1952 - : command positions in HQs, various military districts and 
in the General Staff 
1968: graduate, Advanced Academic Course ~t the M.il i tary Academy 
of the General Staff 
1968 - : First Deputy Commander, Leningrad Military District 
1973 - : Commander, Leningrad Military District 
1975: Advanced Academic Course at the Military Academy of the 
General Staff 
1976: General of the Armv 
~, 
1976: candidate member, CPSU CC 
1976 October - : Chief of Staff, WIO JAFs 
1981 - : full member, CPSU CC 
(source: Bo1' shaya Sovetskaya Entsilf1 opediya) 
(note: Levlytskyj describes his position from 1976 as "First 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Soviet Army and Navy Fleet, 
Chief of the General Staff [of the WIO J AFs] " , Ihis is. the 
designation given by the BSE to Shtemenko.) 
K1~ZAKOV, Mikhail Il'ich 
1901 September 26 (October 9) - 1979 
1919 - : member, CPSU 
1920: joined Soviet Army [Civil War) 
1927: graduate, advanced Cavalry training school for commanders 
1931: graduate, Frunze Military Academy 
1937: graduate, l1ilitary Academy of the General Staff 
[various command and staff positions; Great Patriotic War; 
various postv:ar command and staff positions) 
1953-56: Commander of troops, Ural Military District 
1955: General of the Army 
1956: deputy C-in-C Ground Forces 
1956 - Commander, Southern Group Forces [Hungary] 
1960 - Commander of troops, Leningrad Military District 
1961 - candidate member, CPSU CC 
1965 - Chief of Staff, WIO JAFs 
1968-79 : military inspector-adviser, USSR Ministry of Defence 
(source: Bo1'shaya Sovetskaya nntsik1opediya) 
KONEV, Ivan Stepanovich 
1897 December 16 (28) - 1973 May 21 
1916: drafted into the Tsarist army 
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1918: joined Red Army [Civil War) 
1926: graduate, Military Academy, higher academic courses 
1930: commanded a regiment 
1931-34: member, All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
1932: commanded a division 
1934: graduate, Frunze Military·Academy 
[various military posts] 
1939-52 : candidate member, CPSU CC 
[Great Patriotic War] 
1945 - C-in-C, Central Group Forces, Supreme COl"umissar in 
Austria 
1946 -
1950 -
1951 -
1952 -
C-in-C, Land Forces; deputy Minister of the Armed Forces 
Chief Inspector, Soviet Army 
commander of forces, Subcarpathian Military District 
member, CPSU CC 
1955 - : Fitst Deputy Minister of Defence, C-in-C Land Forces 
1956-60: First Deputy Minister of Defence 
1955 Ma.y -
1960 June: "simultaneously" C-in-C, WTO JAFs 
1960 - : General Inspector of a group of general inspectors, USSR 
Ministry of Defence 
1961 - : C-in-C, GSFG 
1962 April - : General Inspector of a group of general 
inspectors, USSR Kinistry of Defence 
(source: Bol' sha:ra Sovetslraya Entsilr1 opediya) 
Note that the Bol' shaya Sovetslraya Entsil opediya vias able to 
state that tbe post of ,HO C-in-(. vms 'simultaneous' to tbat of 
being C-in-C of Soviet Land Forces; note also tbat Konev attended 
tbe WarsaYI Conference in 1955 as a member of the Soviet 
delegation, without baving any designation witbin that delegation 
(see footnote 9, Chapter 3), which implies that he was attending 
in the expectation tbat be would be appointed WTO C-in-C 
KULIKOV, Viktor Georgevich 
1921 July 5 -
1939: entered Soviet Army 
1941: graduate, military infantry school 
1942 - : member, CPSU 
[Great Patriotic War) 
1947: graduate, Higher Officers' Tank School 
1953: graduate, Frunze Military Academy 
1959: graduate, Military Academy of the General Staff 
1967 May - : Commander of troops, Kiev Military District 
1969 October - : Commander;n-Chief, GSFG 
, \ 
1970 - : General of the Army 
1971 - : member, CPSU CC 
1971 September - : Chief of the General Staff, USSR Armed Forces; 
First Deputy USSR MinistGr of Defence 
(source: Bol'shaya Sovetslraya Entsilr1opediya) 
"After the vmr, Chief of Staff and deputy commander of a 
regiment, Chief of Staff and commander of a division. From 1959, 
deputy, First Deputy, Commander, and in 1964-67 Commander of the 
Army. . .. From 1977 First Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR, 
and Commander in Chief" of tbe J AFs of the vlTO. Voenno-
Entsilrlopedicheslrii Slovar' Lmqtzkyj adds that in 1977 he also 
became a Marsbal of the Soviet Union. 
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RUSAKOV, Konstantin Viktorovich 
1909 -
1939-57: involved in the fish~ industry as a civil servant 
1960 - : on the CPSU staff / 
297 
1965 - : First Deputy Head of the Department of Relations with 
Communist and Workers' :t)arties' of Socialist Countries, of the 
CPSU CC 
1968-73: Head of that Department 
1973-77: Aide to the Secretary-General of the CPSU CC 
1977 - : Head of the Department of Relations .... j Secretary of 
the CPSU CC 
(source: Le'n'Ytzkyjj Rusakov is not given an entry in the 
Bol'slJaya Sovetslraya Entsiklopediya) 
From his appointment in 1965, Rusalmv has attended virtually 
every summit-level meeting wi thin the WTO as a member of the 
Soviet delegations - see footnote 9, Chapter 3. 
SllTEMENKO, Sergei Matveevich 
1907 February 7 (20) - 1976 April 23 
1926: joined the Red Army 
1930 - : member, CPSU 
1930: graduate, Sevastopol school of anti-atrcraft artillery 
1937: graduate, Military Academy of mechanised and motorised 
[ forces] 
1940: graduate, Military Academy of the General Staff 
[peacetime posts; then posts, inlcuding in the General Staff, 
during the Great Patriotic War] 
1945 - : Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
1948 November - : Chief of the General Staffj Deputy Minister of 
the Armed Forces 
1952 June - : "responsible posts in the forces" 
1952-56: candidate member, CPSU CC 
1962 July - Chief of Staff, First Deputy C-in-C, Land Forces 
1964 April - : Deputy Chief of the General Staff, USSR Armed 
Forces 
1968 - : General of the Army 
1968 August - : Chief of Staff WTO J AFsj First Deputy Chief of 
the General Staff 
(source: Bol (shaya Sov-etskaya Entsiklopediya) 
YAKUBOVSKII, Ivan Ignat'evich 
1911 December 25 <1912 January 7) - 1976 November 31 
1932: joined Soviet Army 
1934: graduate, Joint Belorussian Military School 
1935: graduate, Leningrad Advanced Courses for Command Personnel 
of the Armoured Troops 
1937 - : member, CPSU 
[Great Patriotic War] 
1948: graduate, Military Academy of the General Staff 
1957 July -
1960 April: First Deputy C-in-C, GSFG 
1960 April -
1961 August: C-in-C, GSFG 
1961 - : member, CPSU CC 
1961 August -
1962 April: First Deputy C-in-C, GSFG 
1962 April -
1965 January: C-in-C, GSFG 
1965 January - : COIT~ndert Kiev Military District 
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1967 - : Marshal of the Soviet Union 
1967 April - : named First Deputy USSR lHnister of Defence 
1967 July: "he also assumed the positicn" of C-in-C WID JAFs 
(source: Bol' shaya Sovetslraya/ Entsikl opediya) 
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